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INTRODUCTION 
Courts and scholars seeking the original understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment have confronted two fundamental questions: what practices was the 
amendment designed to regulate; and how should a constitution regulate such 
practices? To inform the answers to those questions, this Article offers a new 
perspective of, and information on, the historical record regarding the framing of 
the amendment. It also presents for the first time a detailed examination of John 
Adams’s fundamental influence on the language and structure of the amendment 
and his knowledge of, and views on, how to regulate searches and seizures. 
Most of the language and structure of the Fourth Amendment was primarily the 
work of one man, John Adams. Adams was an important person for many other 
reasons, including as the second President of the United States. His life is the 
subject of many biographies; his letters, works, and extensive writings are a rich 
source of material. Less studied and understood, however, are his knowledge of, 
and views on, search and seizure and his role in formulating the principles to 
regulate those governmental actions. Upon examination, Adams stands out in that 
era as having profound opportunities to examine search and seizure practices and as 
having the most important role in formulating the language and structure of the 
Fourth Amendment. If the intent of the framers is a fundamental consideration in 
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construing the Constitution, as the Court has repeatedly told us it is, then John 
Adams’s knowledge and views should be considered an important source for 
understanding the Fourth Amendment. 
More fundamentally, Adams’s appreciation of search and seizure principles 
reflects a broader mosaic that demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment was the 
product of a rich jurisprudence on search and seizure. That jurisprudence offered a 
structured series of principles to regulate the search and seizure activities of that era 
and the amendment was not merely a reaction to general warrants. Further, 
although the framing-era sources did not always agree on the details of the criteria 
for regulating searches and seizures, they were united in seeking objective criteria 
to measure the propriety of governmental actions. That quest was firmly embedded 
into the language and structure of the Fourth Amendment. 
Rather than the broad currents of history, the events in England and in the 
American colonies during the period immediately preceding the American 
Revolution are viewed as the catalysts for the amendment’s adoption.1 It is the 
portion of the historical record that is most often recalled in Supreme Court 
opinions2 and by leading commentators.3 This is rightly so, given that the period of 
1761 to 1791 was characterized by aggressive British search and seizure practices 
and was the era when the principles that found their way into the Fourth 
Amendment crystallized. 
In 1761, James Otis first challenged British search and seizure practices and 
offered an alternative vision of proper search and seizure principles in the Writs of 
Assistance Case.4 Shortly thereafter, a series of English cases condemned general 
warrants.5 After declaring independence in 1776, numerous states drafted search 
and seizure protections in their own state constitutions.6 Notably, in 1779, John 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. E.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment was 
most immediately the product of contemporary revulsion against a regime of writs of 
assistance . . . .”); Jacob W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study 
in Constitutional Interpretation, in 84 THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 1, 19 (1966) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment 
was “the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events 
which immediately preceded the revolutionary struggle with England”). 
 2. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176−82 (1984); Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 760−61 (1969); Stanford, 379 U.S. at 481−85; Marcus v. Search 
Warrant of Prop., 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100−01 
(1959); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157−62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 466−67 (1932); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 149–50 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 389−91 (1914); Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 623−30 (1886); see also Richard M. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment 
and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 393, 396 (1963) 
(“[Judicial] opinions are replete with reliance upon history.”). 
 3. E.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23−50 
(1969); Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, in 55 THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 211, 223−88 (1937). 
 4. See infra notes 81−121 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 152−91 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 322−30 and accompanying text. 
2011] THE FRAMERS’ INTENT 981 
 
Adams drafted Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.7 In 1787, our 
present Constitution, without a Bill of Rights, was drafted. The absence of a Bill of 
Rights became a significant source of concern during the ratification process.8 
Several states requested that the new Constitution be amended to provide protection 
against unjustified searches and seizures.9 In response, the first Congress sent to the 
states for ratification what is now the Fourth Amendment,10 which became part of 
the Constitution in 1791. 
These are the broad outlines of a complex story, set out in the Parts that follow. 
Part I summarizes the two predominant interpretative theories that stem from an 
examination of the era that are in fashion today. As will become obvious later in 
this Article, neither of those theories are well supported by the historical record. 
Part II details the many sources that influenced John Adams’s understanding of 
search and seizure principles. Certainly, some of those influences are well 
documented and understood—indeed, some are almost mythical. The Writs of 
Assistance Case in 1761 is familiar history to any student of the Fourth 
Amendment: Adams, as a young lawyer, sat in the courtroom as James Otis argued 
against arbitrary search and seizure practices and proposed an alternative model to 
measure the propriety of such intrusions. Adams took notes of the arguments and, a 
short time later, wrote an extended “abstract” of the case. Inspired by Otis, Adams 
throughout his life repeatedly referenced the importance of Otis’s arguments. 
Almost twenty years after the Writs case, Adams drafted Article 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which embodied many of Otis’s arguments, 
but also contained several of Adams’s own innovations. If we look at Adams’s 
summaries of—and comments on—Otis’s argument in the Writs case as evidence 
of Adams’s knowledge and intent, the primary concern is not whether the 
summaries are historically accurate. Rather, an examination of Article 14 
demonstrates that Adams embraced the arguments he attributed to Otis. Hence, 
Otis’s argument sheds light on Adams’s beliefs as to core search and seizure 
questions. 
There were other significant influences on Adams, including a number of court 
cases that Adams was involved in—either as an attorney or as an observer—that 
implicated search and seizure principles. Further, Adams set out to, and amassed, 
one of colonial America’s best libraries. It contained the major treatises of the era 
and they set forth detailed views on how to regulate the searches and seizures of 
that era. He was also intimately involved in the broader political and social 
conflicts of the era and wrote extensively about governmental structures. As a 
litigator, observer, correspondent, and politician, Adams noted that others argued 
for, and he personally argued for, specific standards to measure the propriety of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. In Adams’s draft, the search and seizure provision was numbered Article 15 but 
became Article 14 when adopted. See 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 226 (Charles Francis 
Adams ed., 1851). For convenience, it is referred to throughout this Article as Article 14. 
 8. See infra notes 338−93 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 352−93 and accompanying text. 
 10. The Fourth Amendment was originally numbered the sixth amendment when sent to 
the states for ratification. Two of the proposed amendments were not ratified, resulting in it 
being renumbered the fourth. For convenience, it is referred to throughout this Article as the 
Fourth Amendment, even in the drafting and pre-ratification stages. 
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searches and seizures. Adams lived in Massachusetts, which was the center stage 
for much of the controversial British search and seizure practices. From that broad 
range of experiences, Adams had a depth of knowledge and experience concerning 
search and seizure principles unmatched by his contemporaries. 
Part III outlines the evolution of American search and seizure provisions. 
Throughout the period of 1761 to 1791, there were sporadic discussions of the need 
for protections against unjustified searches and seizures. Few persons focused on 
the details; typically, the discussion was on the abstract level of a need to regulate 
searches and seizures or, even more narrowly, on a need to ban general warrants. 
During the period of 1776 to 1780, two models of search and seizure regulation 
emerged: the predominant model that banned only general warrants and the 
distinctive model developed by Adams in Article 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, which offered a broader protection against all unreasonable 
searches and seizures, including general warrants. The new federal Constitution 
was drafted in 1787 without a Bill of Rights, prompting another period of 
discussion on search and seizure principles, ending with the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment in 1791. 
During the crucial period of 1787 to 1789, those two models remained the 
options to choose from in drafting a search and seizure provision. The states that 
urged adoption of a search and seizure amendment all advocated the Adams model 
and Congress ultimately utilized that model. Hence, his draftsmanship of Article 14 
made Adams an important figure in search and seizure jurisprudence. What is 
remarkable, however, is how little others contributed substantively to the final 
product. An obvious contributor was James Madison, who created the initial draft 
of the Fourth Amendment. But much of that draft can be traced to Article 14 and, 
in Congress, Madison’s draft was modified to even more closely resemble Article 
14. A few other men influenced the wording of the amendment but they appeared 
to be following Adams’s model. The choice of the Adams model appears to have 
been a conscious one, which is a significant point in light of claims that the 
amendment was merely designed to prohibit general warrants. Consequently, it is 
fair to say that the single most important person responsible for the language of the 
amendment is Adams. His views and understanding of the complexity of search 
and seizure principles are therefore important. Although the depth of Adams’s 
learning was unmatched, he provides a window to the wider intellectual 
developments of the era regarding search and seizure principles. That observation 
demonstrates that there was a shared goal of judges, commentators, treatise writers, 
and others to identify what objects were worthy of protection and to articulate the 
objective criteria that would justify a governmental intrusion. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT  
AND ITS DISPUTED HISTORICAL MEANING 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
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violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.11 
The amendment contains two grammatically independent clauses joined by the 
conjunction “and.” The first clause is called the Reasonableness Clause and merely 
specifies, without elaboration, that all searches and seizures must be reasonable. 
The second clause, commonly called the Warrant Clause, requires that warrants be 
under oath or affirmation, that the places to be searched and the persons and things 
to be seized must be particularly described, and that the intrusion be supported by 
probable cause. 
Historical analysis remains a fundamentally important tool to interpret the words 
of the Fourth Amendment.12 Despite its crucial role, there is no consensus 
regarding the details or meaning of the historical record. Broadly speaking, there 
are two fundamentally opposed views about the history and original purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment and the meaning of the reasonableness command. The first is 
the conventional view, whose main proponents include Lasson,13 Landynski,14 and 
Cuddihy;15 they have examined the broad sweeps of history and have found much 
that is complicated and contradictory. Nonetheless, they believe that some overall 
conclusions can be ascertained. Hence, as Landynski stated: 
The first clause—“[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”—recognized 
as already existing a right to freedom from arbitrary governmental 
invasion of privacy and did not seek to create or confer such a right. It 
was evidently meant to re-emphasize (and, in some undefined way, 
strengthen) the requirements for a valid warrant set forth in the second 
clause. The second clause, in turn, defines and interprets the first, 
telling us the kind of search that is not “unreasonable,” and therefore 
not forbidden, namely, the one carried out under the safeguards there 
specified.16 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 12. E.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346 n.14 (2001) (asserting that if 
a practice was established when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, a person challenging 
that practice as now constitutionally impermissible would bear a “‘heavy burden’ of 
justifying a departure from the historical understanding” (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1, 26 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting))). 
 13. Lasson, supra note 3. 
 14. Landynski, supra note 1.  
 15. WILLIAM JOHN CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL 
MEANING (2009). 
 16. Landynski, supra note 1, at 43 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original); see 
also CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 739−82 (drawing multiple conclusions about the scope and 
meaning of the amendment from a comprehensive treatment of history and disparaging the 
Amar and Davies paradigms); Lasson, supra note 3, at 103 (the phrase “unreasonable 
searches” and seizures was “intended . . . to cover something other than the form of the 
warrant”). 
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Following this view, the Court sometimes asserts that the analysis of 
reasonableness “begins . . . with the basic rule that ‘searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.’”17 
A second, opposing, view’s intellectual source is Telford Taylor’s 1969 book, 
Two Studies of Constitutional Interpretation.18 Taylor maintained that the 
amendment was designed primarily as a limitation on the issuance of warrants and 
that the framers took for granted the existence of warrantless searches because 
experience had given them no cause to be concerned about them. Taylor 
maintained that the drafting process of the Fourth Amendment “reinforces the 
conclusion that it was the warrant which was the initial and primary object of the 
amendment.”19 He opined that neither the legislative history of the amendment nor 
any other history “sheds much light on the purpose of the first clause. Quite 
possibly it was to cover shortcomings in warrants other than those specified in the 
second clause; quite possibly it was to cover other unforeseeable contingencies.”20 
Taylor concluded that the amendment was designed to authorize warrants and was 
not a safeguard against oppressive searches. Therefore, in Taylor’s view, the 
amendment was not designed to make most searches regulated by warrants.21 
Akhil Amar and Thomas Davies each produced influential articles in the 1990s 
on the role and meaning of history in interpreting the amendment. Each, however, 
are mutations of Taylor’s views. Amar adopts Taylor’s conclusion that 
reasonableness has no fixed meaning but rejects Taylor’s premise that the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to regulate general warrants. Davies accepts Taylor’s 
premise that the warrant requirement was designed solely to regulate general 
warrants but rejects Taylor’s conclusion that the modern concept of reasonableness 
is an undefined reasonableness analysis. 
Amar’s principal article was published in the Harvard Law Review in 1994.22 It 
has been cited by the Supreme Court on a few occasions23 and by scholars and 
lower courts. Numerous scholars have felt it necessary to reply to him.24 Amar 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
 18. TAYLOR, supra note 3. Taylor’s book has been repeatedly cited by the Supreme 
Court. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169 (2008); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 
532 U.S. 318, 336 (2001); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). A 
standardless reasonableness test predates Taylor’s book. E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U.S. 56, 61–63 (1950). But Taylor’s work gave that test a plausible historical basis. 
 19. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 43. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 46−47. 
 22. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 
(1994) [hereinafter Amar, First Principles]. 
 23. E.g., Moore, 553 U.S. at 170; Atwater, 532 U.S. at 332 n.6. 
 24. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. 
L. REV. 547 (1999) [hereinafter Davies, Original Fourth Amendment]; Tracey Maclin, When 
the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); 
Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). 
The historical summary contained in my treatise and my other writings is consistent with the 
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dedicated the article to Telford Taylor.25 Yet, Amar differs from Taylor in that 
Amar did not draw the conclusion that the central purpose of the amendment was to 
ban general warrants; instead, Amar asserted that all warrants “were friends of the 
searcher, not the searched.”26 Amar sees history simply and clearly and believes 
that general “reasonableness” is the proper measure of a search or seizure, not any 
warrant requirement.27 He maintains: “We need to read the Amendment’s words 
and take them seriously: they do not require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion 
of evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.”28 For 
Amar, Fourth Amendment reasonableness has no fixed meaning.29 
Thomas Davies’s principal article on the subject was published in the Michigan 
Law Review in 1999.30 Consistent with Taylor, Professor Davies views the original 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment quite narrowly as solely a rejection of general 
warrants.31 His views have been cited by numerous scholars and his work has even 
been described as the “leading originalist account.”32 
Davies is in broad agreement with Taylor’s conclusion that the purpose of the 
amendment was solely to prohibit general warrants. Davies, however, refuses to 
take the next step that Taylor took. Instead, he maintains that his goal in the 
Michigan article is merely to show that the “original meaning” of the Fourth 
Amendment “does not fully endorse either the warrant-preference or generalized-
reasonableness construction; in fact, it shows that neither is really equivalent to the 
framers’ understanding.”33 Davies leaves the reader in a void: he does not purport 
to know the original meaning of reasonableness beyond negativing the warrant 
                                                                                                                 
conventional account but my conclusions do not fit within either of the two opposing camps. 
See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, at 
ch. 2 (2008). Neither do the views of some other contemporary scholars. E.g., George C. 
Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and 
Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1478 (2005) (asserting that 
four principles emerge from the historical record: 1) the framers feared that governmental 
actors would abuse their offices; 2) “the Framers believed that searches (other than routine 
customs inspections) required individualized cause or suspicion”; 3) searches of structures 
required a warrant; and 4) the framers embraced some common law principles to regulate 
searches and seizures). 
 25. Amar, First Principles, supra note 22, at 757 n.*.  
 26. Id. at 774. 
 27. Id. at 758−59. 
 28. Id. at 759. 
 29. See id. at 804−11. 
 30. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24; see also Thomas Y. Davies, 
Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest 
Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1 (2007). 
 31. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 551 (“[T]he evidence 
indicates that the Framers understood ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ simply as a 
pejorative label for the inherent illegality of any searches and seizures that might be made 
under general warrants. In other words, the Framers did not address warrantless intrusions at 
all in the Fourth Amendment.”). But see id. at 570 n.43 (asserting that the framers believed 
that individualized suspicion was an inherent aspect of reasonableness). 
 32. Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law 
History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 J. CONST. L. 1, 4 (2007). 
 33. Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 736. 
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preference view and the competing view of Taylor. Taylor’s view, in contrast, has 
more dramatic implications regarding the regulation of governmental intrusions. 
According to Taylor, the two clauses are distinct. The first clause substantively 
requires only that searches and seizures be “reasonable.” The second clause 
addresses only those searches and seizures conducted under warrants, saying 
nothing about when a warrant is necessary or about what factors are to be examined 
to determine reasonableness. 
The Supreme Court’s collective opinion has for decades vacillated between the 
two competing views of the relationship of the clauses. The Court’s initial cases 
were notable for their premise that a warrant complying with the specifications of 
the Warrant Clause was required for all searches.34 The Court’s only acknowledged 
exception in those early cases was for searches incident to arrest, which had a 
strong historical pedigree.35 To this day, the Court sometimes states that all 
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, subject to enumerated exceptions, in 
the absence of a warrant.36 At other times, the Court has rejected a “categorical 
warrant requirement” and has looked to the totality of the circumstances to measure 
the validity of the government’s activities.37 
In more recent times, the competition between those two views has continued 
but has become more complex. The Court has developed numerous models and 
frameworks for measuring reasonableness, beyond the warrant preference and 
general reasonableness models, all of which uneasily coexist in current Supreme 
Court case law.38 Some cases engage in a contemporary balancing of individual and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 34. See In re Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (asserting that a warrant based on 
probable cause was necessary to search a letter in the mail); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (“The United States Marshal could only have invaded the house of the 
accused when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution.”); Amos v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315–17 (1921) (cannot search a house without a warrant); 
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (“While the question has never been 
directly decided by this court, it has always been assumed that one’s house cannot lawfully 
be searched without a search warrant . . . .”); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) 
(finding that failure to obtain a warrant before searching a garage, when there was “abundant 
opportunity” to do so, necessitated suppression of evidence). 
 35. See CLANCY, supra note 24, § 8.1.1. 
 36. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009); California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565, 580–81 (1991); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 37. E.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 42 (2003) (rejecting lower court’s 
categorical approach in favor of a “‘totality of circumstances’ principle” to measure 
reasonableness); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (“general” approach to 
measuring reasonableness examines totality of circumstances); Robbins v. California, 453 
U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting “judicially created” preference for 
warrants and advocating Taylor’s view); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65−66 
(1950) (“The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but 
whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts and 
circumstances—the total atmosphere of the case.”). 
 38. See generally CLANCY, supra note 24, at ch. 11 (discussing the various models the 
Court uses to measure reasonableness); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s 
Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977 (same). 
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governmental interests,39 adopt the common law as of 1791 as dispositive,40 or 
mandate some level of individualized suspicion.41 Thus, as I have said elsewhere: 
There are at least five principal models that the Court currently chooses 
from to measure reasonableness: the warrant preference model; the 
individualized suspicion model; the totality of the circumstances test; 
the balancing test; and a hybrid model giving dispositive weight to the 
common law. Because the Court has done little to establish a 
meaningful hierarchy among the models, the Court in any situation may 
choose whichever model it sees fit to apply. Thus, cases decided within 
weeks of each other have had fundamentally different—and 
irreconcilable—approaches to measuring the permissibility of an 
intrusion.42 
Looking specifically at the role of history in Supreme Court opinions over the 
course of time, it takes no great insight to say that its treatment has varied. 
Occasionally, historical analysis has been outright rejected as a basis to interpret 
the amendment.43 The Court has sometimes asserted that law enforcement practices 
are not “frozen” by those in place at the time the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.44 Hence, the Court has occasionally asserted that interpretation of the 
amendment evolves to permit modern developments45 and that the amendment 
must be interpreted in light of contemporary norms and conditions.46 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. E.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 40. E.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
 41. E.g., Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 42. CLANCY, supra note 24, § 11.1, at 468. 
 43. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12−15 (1985) (changing the common law 
rule permitting police to shoot at fleeing suspects in part because modern felonies differ 
significantly from common law felonies and because of technological changes in weaponry). 
 44. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980). 
 45. Cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). In applying the amendment to 
searches of school children by school authorities, the Court recognized that the government’s 
interest included contemporary needs: “Maintaining order in the classroom has never been 
easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use 
and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.” Id.  
 46. E.g., Steagald, 451 U.S. at 217 n.10 (“Crime has changed, as have the means of law 
enforcement, and it would therefore be naive to assume that those actions a constable could 
take in an English or American village three centuries ago should necessarily govern what 
we, as a society, now regard as proper.”); Payton, 445 U.S. at 600 (stating that “custom and 
contemporary norms necessarily play” a “large role” in assessing reasonableness); cf. 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299−300 (1999) (utilizing contemporary 
considerations in the balancing test to measure the reasonableness of a search or seizure as 
an alternative if historical analysis does not produce a dispositive answer). But cf. Richards 
v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 n.4 (1997) (cautioning that “[i]t is always somewhat 
dangerous to ground exceptions to constitutional protections in the social norms of a given 
historical moment,” given the Fourth Amendment’s purpose of preserving that degree of 
privacy that was afforded at the time it was adopted). 
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Warren Court era was known for a nonhistorical treatment of Fourth Amendment 
issues.47 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has often relied on the common law at the 
time of the framing in 1791 as an important guide. Exactly how that tool has been 
used, as with other interpretative techniques, varies with who wrote the opinion.48 
Using the common law as the measure of what the Fourth Amendment requires is 
distinct from using the common law as the measure of the framers’ intent. As to the 
former, the common law rule as of 1791 defines Fourth Amendment terms, such as 
reasonableness, search, or seizure. As to the latter, the common law is consulted to 
ascertain the framers’ intent, which is in turn used to justify reliance on some 
conception of what the amendment requires. Hence, sometimes there is a broader 
recognition that the amendment was designed by the framers to protect individuals 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.49 Such a view maintains that the 
framers intended not only to prohibit the specific evils of which they were aware 
but also, based on the general terms they used, to give the Constitution enduring 
value beyond their own lifetimes.50 In other words, according to that view, the chief 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 48. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183−84 (1984) (finding that 
although “[t]he common law may guide consideration of what areas are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment,” common law rights are not coincident with the Fourth Amendment); 
Payton, 445 U.S. at 591 (common law view utilized to shed light on framers’ intent); 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1974) (common law acts as a guide to interpret the 
Fourth Amendment). See generally David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and 
Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2000) (tracing Supreme Court treatment of the 
common law as an interpretative tool). 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (“What we do know is 
that the Framers were men who focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended the 
Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would far outlast the specific 
abuses which gave it birth.”); United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 
(1972) (“Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech from 
unreasonable surveillance.”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (“If 
times have changed, reducing everyman’s scope to do as he pleases in an urban and 
industrial world, the changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more, 
not less, important.”); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (rejecting literal 
construction of words in favor of amendment’s purpose); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353 (1974) (“The Bill of 
Rights in general and the fourth amendment in particular are profoundly anti-government 
documents.”); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, 
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 626−27 (1996) 
(arguing that the values underlying the amendment, to protect individual rights, must be 
reflected in its application to modern conditions, where scientific invention has made it 
possible for government agents to violate privacy rights without employing physical power). 
 50. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 1−2 (1980) (“[T]he Constitution proceeds by briefly indicating certain fundamental 
principles whose specific implications for each age must be determined in contemporary 
context . . . . That the complete inference will not be found there—because the situation is 
not likely to have been foreseen—is generally common ground.”); Joseph D. Grano, 
Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603, 620 
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interpretative tool is to be consistent with the framers’ values but not mired in the 
details of the search and seizure practices of 1791. 
II. JOHN ADAMS AND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: 1761 TO 1780 
A. Historical Context 
This Part examines the historical events between 1761 and 1780 and John 
Adams’s role during that period. The year 1761 marked the beginning of the 
challenges to British search and seizure practices and 1780 is the year that 
Massachusetts ratified its constitution, written by John Adams. That twenty-year 
span is remarkable for the broad examination of and challenges to then-existing 
practices, the articulation of alternative principles, and the adoption of state 
constitutional protections against unjustified intrusions. It is also the period of 
history most relied on by the Supreme Court when construing the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The longer historical record is complex, involving hundreds of years of evolution in 
the regulation of searches and seizures, with many contradictory developments.51 
Nonetheless, during the 1761 to 1780 time frame, life was fairly simple, as were most 
search and seizure principles. There were no organized police forces,52 forms of criminal 
activity were straightforward, and investigations rudimentary at best. Only one type of 
warrantless seizure may have been common, that is, the arrest of a suspected felon.53 
Such seizures were rarely made except in hot pursuit of the felon.54 “Those were simple 
times, and felons were ordinarily those who had done violence or stolen property.”55 Due 
to the lack of warrantless searches and seizures and the fact that the only persons 
searched or seized without a warrant usually were suspected felons, those actions were 
                                                                                                                 
(1982) (“The underlying grievances are certainly relevant to the interpretative task, but 
constitutional provisions cannot be properly viewed simply as shorthand statements for the 
specific grievances that gave rise to them.”); James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: 
The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1137 (1992) 
(“Constitutional analysts generally agree that the document was meant to be more than a 
mere catalogue of forbidden actions.” The framers intended that the “underlying values” be 
honored. (emphasis in original)). 
 51. See generally CUDDIHY, supra note 15 (providing a comprehensive treatment of the 
complex history of search and seizure in England and its American colonies to adoption of 
the Fourth Amendment). Thus, for example, as Professor Sklansky has demonstrated, the 
common law—which was one important source of search and seizure rules—was not a 
“unified, systematic body of rules, constant across space and time.” Sklansky, supra note 48, 
at 1795. Search and seizure rules “varied from colony to colony and from decade to decade.” 
Id. Sklansky also observed that “in both England and America, theory and practice often 
diverged.” Id. at 1795−96. That latter observation remains true to this day. 
 52. Although there was a loose system of justice, involving part-time constables and peace 
officers, “the mobilization of criminal justice depended almost entirely on private initiation of 
criminal prosecutions.” Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 620−22. 
 53. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 27−28. See generally 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF 
THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 85−103 (1736). 
 54. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 28 (citing 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 582−83 (2d ed. 1959)). 
 55. Id. 
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not the cause of public outcry.56 This is not to say that there were no rules governing 
searches and seizures in that era. On the contrary, there was a vibrant common law 
tradition, and there were influential treatise writers who were articulating rules to address 
the needs of the times.57 
The law relating to warrants was more complex. As Telford Taylor observed, 
scholars seeking the origin of search and seizure warrants have traveled into a 
“foggy land.”58 One form of practice included the common law search warrant, 
which “crept into the law by imperceptible practice,”59 and was a “hybrid criminal-
civil process.”60 Such warrants were well established by the middle of the sixteenth 
century.61 Warrants to recover stolen goods were originally issued as general 
warrants but that practice was giving way to requiring special warrants by the 
middle of the eighteenth century.62 As will be discussed, a central claim of James 
Otis in the Writs case in 1761 was that such warrants were “special,”63 which came 
to mean in that era that the victim of a theft had to state under oath before a justice 
of the peace the basis for his belief that his goods would be found in a specified 
place; if probable cause was established, “the justice would issue a warrant 
authorizing the victim to go with a constable to the specified place and, if the goods 
were found, to return [with] the goods and the suspected felon before the justice, 
for . . . disposition of the matter.”64 The validity of Otis’s claim as a matter of 
established English common law at that time is debatable65 but appears closer to the 
truth as to the then-existing Massachusetts practice.66 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. E.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977); TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 39; 
Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 578; Tomkovicz, supra note 50, at 
1133. 
 57. See infra notes 196−231 and accompanying text. 
 58. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 24. 
 59. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029 (K.B.) 1067. 
 60. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 24. 
 61. Lasson, supra note 3, at 17. 
 62. See M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 336−39 (1978); see also Grumon 
v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 43−46 (1814) (recognizing that a search warrant for stolen goods 
must limit the search to particular places where it is reasonable to suspect goods are and to 
such persons reasonably suspected); Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213, 215 (Conn. 1787) 
(same). 
 63. See Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Aug. 11, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS 
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 345.  
 64. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 25. See generally Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116 n.17 
(1975). 
 65. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 392. Compare 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 150 (asserting 
that a “general warrant to search in all suspected places [for stolen goods] is not good, but 
only to search in such particular places, where the party assigns before the justice his 
suspicion and the probable cause thereof” and maintaining that general warrants were 
“dormant”), with MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 418 (1746) (giving an example 
of a general warrant for stolen goods that permitted “diligent Search in all and every such 
suspected Houses . . . as you and this Complainant shall think convenient” (emphasis in 
original)); id. at 419, 423−24 (setting out other general warrant forms to search after a 
robbery and for “rogues”). 
 66. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 311−12, 340−41, 371−75, 386 n.54, 389 n.68 
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There also existed a common law arrest warrant for felons.67 An arrest warrant 
was a command to the sheriff of the county or the marshal of the court to 
apprehend a felon and bring the felon to court.68 This warrant was issued upon a 
showing similar to that necessary for a search warrant.69 Another form of practice 
evolved from the crown’s issuance of warrants and writs of assistance. The 
authority to do so was found neither in the common law nor in any statute; instead, 
it was a manifestation of “residual police power untrammeled by doctrine or 
methodology and exercised at the royal discretion in the interest of good public 
order.”70 That form of practice was condemned in the 1760s in the English general 
warrant cases, which were influential with the leaders of the founding era and in 
subsequent Supreme Court case law.71 
English practice also provided for statutory authorization for searches and 
seizures, which has been traced to the fourteenth century. Through the seventeenth 
century, the legislation was “uniformly characterized by the granting of general and 
unrestricted powers.”72 Legislation enabling customs searches and seizures was 
adopted in 1662, authorizing searches without suspicion anywhere the searcher 
desired to look.73 Pursuant to the statute, writs of assistance were issued. Writs 
were not issued as a result of any information that contraband was stored at a 
specified place; instead, the customs officials could search wherever they chose. 
“The discretion delegated to the official was therefore practically absolute and 
unlimited.”74 A writ was a simple directive in the form of a document in the name 
of the king that “ordered a wide variety of persons to help the customs man make 
his search.”75 The writs were akin to “permanent search warrants placed in the 
hands of custom officials: they might be used with unlimited discretion and were 
valid for the duration of the life of the sovereign.”76 The man who did the seizing, 
                                                                                                                 
(discussing evolution of the history of stolen goods warrants from general to specific and 
concluding that they were probably specific in Massachusetts by 1761). 
 67. 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 105–09. 
 68. Id. at 105. 
 69. Id. at 111. 
 70. SMITH, supra note 62, at 21. See generally Lasson, supra note 3, at 18–22 (tracing 
early history of search and seizure in England). 
 71. See infra Part II.C.  
 72. Lasson, supra note 3, at 23. 
 73. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 26. 
 74. Lasson, supra note 3, at 54. 
 75. SMITH, supra note 62, at 29. 
 76. Landynski, supra note 1, at 31; see also Lasson, supra note 3, at 53–54. The writs 
expired six months after the death of the sovereign. Id. at 57. There is some dispute about 
whether the writs served to authorize the search or whether that power inhered in the officers 
by virtue of their commission, with the writs being merely “judicial orders which 
empowered the customs officials to summon the sheriff or constable . . . to keep the peace 
while the search was in progress.” Landynski, supra note 1, at 32 n.53. Regardless of their 
formal characterization, the writs were regarded “as synonymous with the power to search 
itself.” Id.; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) (equating customs writs of 
assistance to general warrants). But cf. SMITH, supra note 62, at 37–39, 461, 520–21 (citing 
cases and 1768 opinion of the English Attorney General and recognizing that a writ of 
assistance was not a search warrant but the vehicle by which statutory power to search was 
exercised). 
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known as the informer, would initiate the proceedings to condemn the goods.77 The 
successful informer would receive a portion of the goods condemned, making the 
informer the “beneficiary of a mode of law enforcement that was commonly 
resorted to” at a time when no regular police organizations existed.78 It was that 
form of practice that Otis opposed in the Writs case. 
B. John Adams and the Writs of Assistance Case79 
Perhaps the single most significant influence on Adams’s views occurred when 
Adams was a young man, just beginning his legal career in Boston in 1761. 
Smuggling was a widespread practice in the American colonies, and writs of 
assistance were a principal means of combating the practice, at least in 
Massachusetts.80 In 1760, new writs of assistance were requested following the 
expiration of the previously issued writs due to the death of the king.81 A group of 
Boston merchants opposed the proposed writs, retaining James Otis to represent 
their cause.82 The key issue at the first hearing on the proposed writs, and the 
question upon which the case ultimately turned, was whether the Superior Court 
should continue to grant the writs in general and open-ended form or whether it 
should limit the writs to a single occasion based on particularized information 
given under oath.83 Otis’s argument has often been cited by the Supreme Court and 
many others as reflecting the framers’ intent and as an exposition of proper search 
and seizure practices.84 Indeed, no authority preceding Otis had articulated so 
completely the framework for proper search and seizure practices that was 
ultimately embodied in the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.85 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. SMITH, supra note 62, at 13. If the case were defended and went against the 
informer, he would be liable for damages at common law. Id. at 13, 310 (citing Leglise v. 
Champante, (1728) 93 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B.)). The common law position was modified in 
England by statute in 1746; the statute provided that, if the court certified that probable cause 
for the seizure existed, the action for damages in effect would be barred. A similar limitation 
was introduced into the American colonies in 1764. Id. at 13 n.9. 
 78. SMITH, supra note 62, at 13. 
 79. This litigation has many names but no formal designation. Another common 
reference is Paxton’s Case; Charles Paxton was the customs official who sought the new 
writs.  
 80. Landynski, supra note 1, at 30. See generally Lasson, supra note 3, at 51–78. 
Authorities in Massachusetts were more successful in obtaining writs of assistance than in 
other colonies. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 62, at 96, 106–07, 115. 
 81. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 36. 
 82. Id. 
 83. JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, 
at 531–32 (1865). 
 84. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364 (1959); Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 625 (1886). 
 85. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 382 (“[Otis’s] proclamation that only specific writs 
were legal was the first recorded declaration of the central idea to the specific warrant 
clause.”); SMITH, supra note 62, at 7 (“[In that argument,] the American tradition of 
constitutional hostility to general powers of search first found articulate expression.”). 
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Three men have given accounts of what occurred in that courtroom: Thomas 
Hutchinson (the chief justice of the court that heard the arguments), Otis, and 
Adams.86 Adams, in fact, gave several summaries at different times. The first was 
his contemporaneous notes, the second was an “abstract” written a short time after 
the argument, and the third significant summary was in a series of letters to 
William Tudor more than fifty years after the event. Except for Adams’s 
recollections in the Tudor letters, all of the accounts are broadly consistent with 
each other. In contrast, Adams’s account in the Tudor letters is generally 
discounted as an inaccurate recall of the details of the arguments.87 
Hutchinson’s summary of the Writs of Assistance Case was succinct: 
It was objected to the writs, that they were of the nature of general 
warrants; that, although formerly*[88] it was the practice to issue 
general warrants to search for stolen goods, yet, for many years, this 
practice had been altered, and special warrants only were issued by 
justices of the peace, to search in places set forth in the warrants; that it 
was equally reasonable to alter these writs, to which there would be no 
objection, if the place where the search was to be made should be 
specifically mentioned, and information given upon oath. The form of a 
writ of assistance was, it is true, to be found in some registers, which 
was general, but it was affirmed, without proof*[89], that the late 
practice in England was otherwise, and that such writs issued upon 
special information only.90 
Hutchinson recalled that he, as chief justice, sought information about the proper 
practice and that judgment was suspended pending receipt of that information. 
Upon learning that general writs were used in England, it “was judged sufficient to 
warrant the like practice in the province.”91 
Otis’s own account came in an article published on January 4, 1762, in the 
Boston Gazette.92 Otis did not sign the article but it has been attributed to him.93 In 
that article, Otis alluded to legalistic arguments, such as the lack of statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. The Writs case was argued in February 1761 and re-argued in November 1761. 
Petition of Lechmere, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 106, 114–15 (L. 
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). Adams was present for only the first argument. 
Id. The Boston Gazette ran a few short accounts of the controversy but those accounts 
covered only the second argument in November 1761 and the subsequent issuance of the 
writs. See QUINCY, supra note 83, at 486–88. 
 87. See, e.g., QUINCY, supra note 83, at 469 n.1. 
 88. THOMAS HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 
FROM 1749 TO 1774, at 93–94 (1828). The star footnote in the original cites Dalton’s The 
Country Justice. DALTON, supra note 65. Adams had a copy of this treatise in his library. See 
infra note 200. Dalton was “widely used in America.” SMITH, supra note 62, at 336. 
 89. HUTCHINSON, supra note 88, at 93–94. The star footnote in the original states, “The 
authority was a London magazine.” See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 277, 387, 414 
(discussing the magazine article); SMITH, supra note 62, at 537–39 (reproducing the article). 
 90. HUTCHINSON, supra note 88, at 93–94. 
 91. Id. at 94.  
 92. QUINCY, supra note 83, at 488. 
 93. See id. 
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authority for issuing the writs, but his main focus was on the dangers to the security 
of each individual posed by the uncontrolled authority to search that customs 
officials had as a result of the writs. He wrote: 
[E]very hous[e]holder in this province, will necessarily become less 
secure than he was before this writ had any existence among us; for by 
it, a custom house officer or ANY OTHER PERSON has a power given him, 
with the assistance of a peace officer, TO ENTER FORCEABLY into a 
DWELLING HOUSE, and rifle every part of it where he shall PLEASE to 
suspect uncustomed goods are lodg[e]d!—Will any man put so great a 
value on his freehold, after such a power commences as he did 
before?—every man in this province, will be liable to be insulted, by a 
petty officer, and threat[e]ned to have his house ransack’d, unless he 
will comply with his unreasonable and imprudent demands: Will any 
one then under such circumstance, ever again boast of british honor or 
british privilege?94 
Otis also cited Walley v. Ware, a case where a magistrate had questioned Ware 
about the charge of breach of the Sabbath day acts or for profane swearing.95 In 
response, Ware, who was a customs official, demanded to search the magistrate’s 
home for uncustomed goods.96 Otis observed that Ware did not pretend to have any 
“suspicion of contraband goods as a reason for his conduct.”97 
The article acknowledged that a person’s security in his home is sometimes 
“forfeited” but those instances were “in cases of the most urgent necessity and 
importance; and this necessity and importance always is, and always ought to be 
determin’d by adequate and proper judges.”98 The writs procedure, Otis 
maintained, stood in sharp contrast, with each person subject to “petty tyrants.”99 
After arguing that there was no necessity for the writs, Otis concluded by 
emphasizing the uncontrolled discretion of the customs officials: “[C]an a 
community be safe with an uncontroul’d power lodg’d in the hands of such 
officers, some of whom have given abundant proofs of the danger there is in 
trusting them with ANY?”100  
Adams’s accounts of the Writs case were more detailed. Highlighted here are 
pertinent portions of the arguments of Jeremiah Gridley and Oxenbridge Thatcher, 
followed by an extended examination of Otis’s argument.101 Gridley, the attorney 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original) (quoting Otis’s article in the Gazette). 
 95. Id. at 490; see id. at 476 n.29 (describing the facts of Walley v. Ware). 
 96. Id. at 476 n.29. 
 97. Id. at 490. 
 98. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 99. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 100. Id. at 494 (emphasis in original). 
 101. Gridley, Thatcher, and Otis became close friends of Adams, who later remarked that 
he remained friends with the three men “till their deaths.” 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
JOHN ADAMS 273 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961). Indeed, their names appear frequently in 
Adams’s extensive writings; in particular, Adams, Gridley, and Otis were often together in 
courtrooms, clubs, meetings, and other gatherings. Gridley, during an interview with Adams 
in 1758 concerning Adams’s qualifications to be sworn to practice in Boston as a lawyer, 
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general of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, defended the general writs of assistance, 
among other things,102 as necessary to enforce the customs laws.103 As reported in 
Adams’s abstract, Gridley argued that the writs were justified by 
the necessity of the Case and the benefit of the Revenue . . . . [T]he 
Revenue [was] the sole support of Fleets & Armies, abroad, & 
Ministers at home[,] without which the Nation could neither be 
preserved from the Invasions of her foes, nor the Tumults of her own 
Subjects. Is not this I say infinitely more important, than the 
imprisonment of Thieves, or even Murderers? yet in these Cases ‘tis 
agreed Houses may be broke open. . . . So it is established, and the 
necessity of having public taxes effectually and speedily collected is of 
infinitely greater moment to the whole, than the Liberty of any 
Individual.104  
Gridley conceded that the “common privileges of Englishmen” were taken away 
but asserted that those benefits were also taken away in criminal cases.105 
Gridley was opposed by two advocates: Thatcher and Otis. Thatcher’s argument 
made little impression on Adams and has not served to influence subsequent 
development of search and seizure principles.106 “The bulk of [Thatcher’s] 
                                                                                                                 
gave Adams some advice: “[P]ursue the Law itself, rather than gain of it. Attend enough to 
the profits, to keep yourself out of the Briars: but the Law itself should be your great 
Object.” Id. at 272. Adams held Otis in high esteem; he described Otis as “by far the most 
able, manly and commanding Character of his Age at the Bar.” Id. at 275. Adams also 
recounted in his diary the increasing mental problems of Otis in the years leading up to the 
Revolution. E.g., 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, at 270–71 (diary entry for 
December 23, 1765) (recounting Otis’s emotional instability and “inexplicable Passages in 
his conduct); 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, at 50 (diary entry for August 
22 and 23, 1771) (observing that “Otis’s Gestures and Motions are very whimsical, his 
Imagination is disturbed—his Passions all roiled”); id. at 64–65 (diary entry for October 27, 
1772) (describing Otis as “looking and acting as wildly as ever he did”). Otis was an 
important political figure for several years after the Writs case but ultimately was 
marginalized due to mental illness. See generally WILLIAM TUDOR, THE LIFE OF JAMES OTIS 
(1823). 
 102. He also discussed whether the court had jurisdiction to issue such writs. E.g., 
Petition of Lechmere, Adams’ “Abstract of the Argument,” in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 86, at 134, 136–38. 
 103. See generally QUINCY, supra note 83, at 476–82. This necessity argument has often 
been invoked in justifying searches. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell’s St. 
Tr. 1029 (K.B.) 1063–64 (discussing the argument by attorneys for Lord Halifax that the 
power of the executive to issue search warrants for papers in seditious libel cases was 
essential to the government). See generally CLANCY, supra note 24, § 11.3.4.4.2–.3 
(discussing the role of necessity in measuring reasonableness in Supreme Court opinions). 
 104. SMITH, supra note 62, at 281. 
 105. Id. 
 106. This is not to say that Adams discounted Thatcher as a person or as an advocate. 
Adams referred to Thatcher as “an eminent barrister at law, in as large [a] practice as any 
one in Boston. There was not a citizen of that town more universally beloved for his 
learning, ingenuity, every domestic and social virtue, and conscientious conduct in every 
relations of life.” Letter from John Adams to H. Niles (Feb. 13, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 285 (1856). Adams described himself as frequent visitor to 
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argument as recorded by Adams was addressed to the power of the Superior Court 
to act as the Court of Exchequer.”107 Nonetheless, Thatcher addressed some search 
and seizure standards, raising concerns about the scope of the writs:  
[A]ny other private Person may, as well as a Custom-House Officer, 
take an officer, a sheriff or Constable, &c. and go into any shop, store, 
&c. and seize; any Person authorized by such a Writ, under the seal of 
the Court of Exchequer, may, not custom-house officers only. 
Strange.108  
He also noted the permanent nature of the writs and the fact that they were “not 
returnable.”109 He added: “If such seisure were brot before your Honours youd 
often find a wanton Exercise of their Power. At home, the officers seize at their 
Peril, even with Probable Cause.”110 
1. Adams’s Contemporaneous Notes of Otis’s Argument 
Adams took notes of Otis’s argument as he sat in the courtroom on February 24, 
1761.111 In relevant part, Adams recorded that Otis asserted: 
This Writ is against the fundamental Principles of Law.—The 
Priviledge of House. A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as 
a Prince in his Castle—notwithstanding all his Debts, & civil processes 
of any Kind.—But 
 For flagrant Crimes, and in Cases of great public Necessity, the 
Priviledge may be incrohd [encroached] on.—For Felonies an officer 
may break, upon Prossess, and oath.—i. e. by a Special Warrant to 
                                                                                                                 
Thatcher’s home, until Thatcher’s death in 1765, where they discussed many intellectual 
subjects. Id. at 285–86; see also Letter from John Adams to Edmund Jenings (July 14, 1780), 
in 9 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 588, 589 (Gregg L. Lint ed., 1996) (referring to Otis and 
Thatcher and remarking that he did not “know where to find greater or better Men”). For a 
brief summary of Thatcher’s life, see CLIFFORD K. SHIPTON, NEW ENGLAND LIFE IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: REPRESENTATIVE BIOGRAPHIES FROM SIBLEY’S HARVARD GRADUATES 
443–49 (1995). 
 107. Petition of Lechmere, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra 
note 86, at 106, 114. 
 108. Petition of Lechmere, Adams’ Minutes of the Argument, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 123, 124. 
 109. Id. at 125. 
 110. Id.; see also Petition of Lechmere, Adams’ “Abstract of the Argument,” in 2 LEGAL 
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 134, 138–39. In 1765, Thatcher wrote The 
Sentiments of a British American, in which he observed that, if an admiralty court certified 
that there was “probable cause of seizure,” an action against a customs official would not lie. 
Oxenbridge Thacher, The Sentiments of a British American, in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 483, 495 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965); see also Stephen Hopkins, The 
Rights of the Colonies Examined, in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra, at 
516 (observing that probable cause certification by a judge prevented recovery for improper 
customs search). 
 111. Petition of Lechmere, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra 
note 86, at 106, 114. 
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search such an House, . . . sworn to be suspected, and good Grounds of 
suspicion appearing. 
 Make oath cor[am]. Ld. Trea[surer], or Exchequer, in Eng. or a 
Magistrate here, and get a Special Warrant, for [the] public good, to 
infringe the Priviledge of House. 
 Gen. Warrant to search for Felonies. Hawk. Pleas Crown.—every 
petty officer from the highest to [the] lowest, and if some of ‘em are . . . 
comm[issioned] others are uncomm[issioned]. Gouv Justices used to 
issue such perpetual Edicts. . . .  
 . . . . 
 If an officer will justify under a Writ he must return it. 12th Mod. 
396.— perpetual Writ.  
 Stat. C.2. We have all as good R[igh]t to inform as Custom House 
officers—& every Man may have a general, irreturnable . . . 
Commission to break Houses.— 
 By 12. of C. on oath before Ld Treasurer, Barons of Exchequer, or 
Chief Magistrate to break with an officer.—14th C. to issue a Warrant 
requiring sheriffs &c to assist the officers to search for Goods not entrd, 
or prohibitd; 7 & 8th. W. & M. gives Officers in Plantations same 
Powers with officers in England.— 
 Continuance of Writts and Proscesses, proves no more nor so much 
as I grant a special Writ of aff. on special oath, for specl Purpose.112 
2. The Abstract of Otis’s Argument 
Within a few weeks of the hearing, Adams created an “abstract” of the 
arguments,113 which has been reproduced numerous times.114 Others have 
questioned whether Adams “exercised artistic license” and mixed his own views 
with those of Otis, perhaps to create “a minor work of political propaganda.”115 If 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. John Adams’s Report of the First Argument in February 1761, in QUINCY, supra 
note 83, at 469, 471–75. The material quoted here omits the footnotes inserted by Quincy 
and substitutes the modern spelling of such words as “Houfe.” The notes are also reproduced 
in a variety of other works. E.g., Petition of Lechmere, Adams’ Minutes of the Argument, in 
2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 123, 123–32 (modernizing spelling and 
punctuation, extending abbreviations, and adding explanatory footnotes). For discussion of 
the sources cited by Otis, see CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 389–91; QUINCY, supra note 83, at 
471–76, 483. 
 113. Adams noted in his diary some time shortly after April 3, 1761, that he had shown 
the abstract to “J.Q.,” who was apparently Joshua Quincy, and that Quincy remarked that 
Gridley “did not use that Language. He never was Master of such a style.” Petition of 
Lechmere, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 106, 122 
(1850). 
 114. See Petition of Lechmere, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra 
note 86, at 106, 121–23; Petition of Lechmere, Adams’ Abstract of the Argument, in 2 
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 134, 134–35 n.103 (noting multiple 
sources of the abstract and reproducing it with notes on its variations). Numerous sources 
quote the abstract. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608–09 (1980) (White, J., 
dissenting); SMITH, supra note 62, at 331–79 (extensive analysis of Otis’s argument); 
TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 36–37. 
 115. Petition of Lechmere, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra 
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one views the abstract as a reflection of Adams’s views on search and seizure—or 
at least his knowledge of search and seizure practices and preferred options as to 
principles—rather than for its historical accuracy, such arguments lose much of 
their force. Yet, as to historical accuracy, regarding the core concerns as to the 
standards by which the government should be able to exercise authority to search 
and seize, the notes, the abstract, the article attributed to Otis, and Hutchinson’s 
account are very similar.116 
According to the abstract, Otis made a variety of arguments as to the invalidity 
of the writs, including the ability of courts to question acts of Parliament.117 Putting 
                                                                                                                 
note 86, at 106, 123. 
 116. In his Autobiography, Adams discounted the accuracy of his contemporaneous 
notes: 
I took a few minutes, in a very careless manner, which by some means fell into 
the hands of Mr. Minot, who has inserted them in his history. I was much more 
attentive to the Information and the Eloquence of the Speakers, than to my 
minutes, and too much allarmed at the prospect that was opened before me, to 
care much about writing a report of the Controversy. 
3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 276. Despite this disclaimer 
made late in life, the notes are remarkably consistent with the abstract, made shortly after the 
arguments. Adams’s comments are also somewhat confusing. Minot reproduced Adams’s 
abstract of the argument—not his notes. Minot dedicated the book to Adams and gave 
Adams a copy. See THE JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
www.johnadamslibrary.org/book/?book=2347625Adams%20252.10%20v.2.  
  Adams underlined and made a few comments in the margin of his copy of the book, 
labeling as “interpretation” the following parts of Otis’s argument, as recounted by Minot:  
Until the trump of the acrh-angel shall excite different emotions of his foul. 
* * *  
What is this but to have the curese of Cannan with a witness on us; to be the 
servant of servants, the most despicable of God’s creation. 
See GEORGE RICHARDS MINOT, CONTINUATION OF THE HISTORY OF THE PROVINCE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY: FROM THE YEAR 1748 [TO 1765], at 95–96 (1798) (copy in Boston 
Public Library). Adams’s copy, which is dated 1803, has two other minor comments: he 
crossed out the word “charge” and inserted “chance” in the margin, id. at 90, and struck out 
the word “decerned” and wrote that “the conclusions better descen’d,” id. at 92. Given the 
lack of comments regarding the rest of Minot’s version, it is a fair conclusion that Adams 
viewed the summary as accurate. See also Letter from John Adams to John Tudor (Mar. 29, 
1817), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 246 (1856) (noting that Minot’s 
account contained “some interpolations”). 
 117. E.g., Petition of Lechmere, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 86, at 106, 117–21 (analyzing Otis’s arguments on the limits of judicial and 
legislative authority). This is an important point: Otis not only offered an alternative vision 
of the proper criteria for warrants to issue, he also argued that courts had the power to find 
illegal those warrants that did not meet that criteria. Advocates of the undefined 
reasonableness standard apparently miss that distinction. Hence, Davies argues that there 
was no meaning to the concept of reasonableness in part based on Otis’s argument that the 
Writs were void as “against reason.” Davies asserts:  
Coke’s “against reason” dictum was the fulcrum for James Otis’s 1761 
argument during the Writs of Assistance Case. Of course, Otis denounced the 
general writ of assistance as a violation of American liberties. But the crucial 
point is that he leveled a constitutional attack against the legislation authorizing 
the writ.  
2011] THE FRAMERS’ INTENT 999 
 
those arguments aside and focusing on the pertinent question regarding the proper 
criteria to regulate searches and seizures, Otis maintained: 
I will admit that writs of one kind may be legal; that is, special writs, 
directed to special officers, and to search certain houses, &c. specially 
set forth in the writ, may be granted by the Court of Exchequer at 
home, upon oath made before the Lord Treasurer by the person who 
asks it, that he suspects such goods to be concealed in those very places 
he desires to search. . . . And in this light the writ appears like a warrant 
from a Justice of the Peace to search for stolen goods. Your Honors will 
find in the old books concerning the office of a Justice of the Peace, 
precedents of general warrants to search suspected houses. But in more 
modern books you will find only special warrants to search such and 
such houses specially named, in which the complainant has before 
sworn that he suspects his goods are concealed; and you will find it 
adjudged that special warrants only are legal. In the same manner I rely 
on it, that the writ prayed for in this petition, being general, is illegal. It 
                                                                                                                 
 Otis opened by developing and emphasizing the high level of protection the 
common law afforded the house under the “castle” doctrine. He then 
established that the common-law authorities had already condemned general 
warrants as illegal. From those premises, he concluded that any statute that 
authorized use of a general writ would be so contrary to the principles of 
common law as to be “void.” 
Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 689–90 (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted). He later continues: 
Thus, John Adams likely had a ready-made qualifier for “searches and 
seizures” when he wrote the Massachusetts provision. Because “unreasonable” 
was a pejorative synonym for gross illegality or unconstitutionality, 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” simply meant searches and seizures that 
were inherently illegal at common law. As a result, the Framers would have 
understood “unreasonable searches and seizures” as the pejorative label for 
searches or arrests made under that most illegal pretense of authority—general 
warrants. 
Id. at 693. 
  Davies misses the larger point. Otis was working within a legal regime where the 
notion that a court could void a statute as “against reason” was at best novel and had little 
support beyond what Coke had asserted in Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P.), 
8 Co. Rep. 113b. That question today would be framed to ask whether the statute was 
constitutional. Otis, in that part of the argument that Davies relies on, was addressing 
whether the court had the power to strike down a defective writ. The Fourth Amendment and 
the concept of judicial review now gives courts such authority. The separate question 
concerns what criteria should be employed to assess the reasonableness of the search or 
seizure. Davies conflates the two questions to support his view that the framers had no 
criteria in mind when they inserted the word “unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment. 
Ignored or at least dismissed by Davies is the part of Otis’s argument where he offered 
explicit criteria to measure the legality (now “reasonableness”) of a search. In that portion of 
his argument, Otis was not arguing for some undefined concept of “reasonableness” but, 
instead, articulated specific criteria to measure the propriety of the writs, that is, the 
requirements that regulated the issuance of a common law search warrant for stolen goods. 
That second question, the criteria that should be utilized to determine if an intrusion is 
justified, is the important one today. 
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is a power, that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every 
petty officer. I say I admit that special writs of assistance, to search 
special places, may be granted to certain persons on oath; but I deny 
that the writ now prayed for can be granted, for I beg leave to make 
some observations on the writ itself . . . . In the first place, the writ is 
universal, being directed ‘to all and singular Justices, Sheriffs, 
Constables, and all other officers and subjects;’ so, that, in short, it is 
directed to every subject in the King’s dominions. Every one with this 
writ may be a tyrant; if this commission be legal, a tyrant in a legal 
manner also may control, imprison, or murder any one within the 
realm. In the next place, it is perpetual; there is no return. A man is 
accountable to no person for his doings. Every man may reign secure in 
his petty tyranny, and spread terror and desolation around him. In the 
third place, a person with this writ, in the daytime, may enter all 
houses, shops, &c. at will, and command all to assist him. Fourthly, by 
this writ not only deputies, &c., but even their menial servants, are 
allowed to lord it over us. Now one of the most essential branches of 
English liberty is the freedom of one’s house. A man’s house is his 
castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his 
castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate 
this privilege. Custom-house officers may enter our houses, when they 
please; we are commanded to permit their entry. Their menial servants 
may enter, may break locks, bars, and every thing in their way; and 
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court, can 
inquire. Bare suspicion without oath is sufficient. This wanton exercise 
of this power is not a chimerical suggestion of a heated brain. I will 
mention some facts. Mr. Pew had one of these writs, and when Mr. 
Ware succeeded him, he endorsed this writ over to Mr. Ware; so that 
these writs are negotiable from one officer to another; and so your 
Honors have no opportunity of judging the persons to whom this vast 
power is delegated. Another instance is this: Mr. Justice Walley had 
called this same Mr. Ware before him, by a constable, to answer for a 
breach of Sabbath-day acts, or that of profane swearing. As soon as he 
had finished, Mr. Ware asked him if he had done. He replied, Yes. Well 
then, said Mr. Ware, I will show you a little of my power. I command 
you to permit me to search your house for uncustomed goods. And 
went on to search his house from the garret to the cellar; and then 
served the constable in the same manner. But to show another absurdity 
in this writ; if it should be established, I insist upon it, every person by 
the 14 Charles II. has this power as well as custom-house officers. The 
words are, ‘It shall be lawful for any person or persons authorized,’ &c. 
What a scene does this open! Every man, prompted by revenge, ill 
humor, or wantonness, to inspect the inside of his neighbor’s house, 
may get a writ of assistance. Others will ask it from self-defence; one 
arbitrary exertion will provoke another, until society be involved in 
tumult and in blood. 
 Again, these writs are not returned. Writs in their nature are 
temporary things. When the purposes for which they are issued are 
answered, they exist no more; but these live forever; no one can be 
called to account. Thus reason and the constitution are both against this 
writ. . . . [Otis thereafter examined the legal authority for the writs, 
arguing that there was none.] But these prove no more than what I 
before observed, that special writs may be granted on oath and 
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probable suspicion. The act of 7 & 8 William III. that the officers of the 
plantations shall have the same powers, &c. is confined to this sense; 
that an officer should show probable ground; should take his oath of it; 
should do this before a magistrate; and that such magistrate, if he think 
proper, should issue a special warrant to a constable to search the 
places.118 
3. The William Tudor Letters 
Toward the end of his life and more than fifty years after the Writs case, Adams 
wrote a series of lengthy letters to William Tudor, purporting to describe the scene 
and the arguments.119 The letters are claimed recountings of the details of the 
argument, intermingled with Adams’s comments on a variety of matters.120 Much 
of the length of the letters are reproductions of various English statutes and Otis’s 
comments on them. Adams wrote those detailed accounts despite his repeated 
claims, in the letters and elsewhere during that same time period, that he could not 
accurately recollect Otis’s arguments.121 Numerous authorities have examined the 
“inaccuracies and exaggerations of these letters.”122 The Tudor letters are 
remarkable for what they omit: there is no recounting of Otis’s arguments 
regarding proper search and seizure procedures. Instead, as others have observed, 
Adams “put into Otis’ mouth the entire body of arguments against the power of 
Parliament developed” in the decade following the Writs case.123 
Nonetheless, approaching the letters as evidence of Adams’s knowledge and 
views about search and seizure practices, there are a few comments that shed light. 
First, Adams uses the word “security” repeatedly to describe the quality of the right 
protected as to each person’s life, liberty, and property.124 Thus, for example, 
Adams said that Otis examined the acts of trade and demonstrated that, if they were 
considered revenue laws, “they destroyed all our security of property, liberty, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, app. A, at 524–25 (1850) (emphasis in 
original). 
 119. See 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 289–92, 314–62 (1856) 
(collecting letters from Adams to Tudor from the summer and fall of 1818). 
 120. In one aside, Adams observed that molasses was one of the principal commodities 
imported, the main use of which was to make rum. Adams noted that “[w]its may laugh at 
our fondness for molasses” but, for his part, Adams maintained: “I know not why we should 
blush to confess that molasses was an essential ingredient in American independence.” 
Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Aug. 11, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 7, at 345. 
 121. E.g., Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (June 1, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS 
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 314; Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (June 17, 
1818) in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 321; Letter from John Adams to 
William Tudor (Sept. 13, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 355. 
 122. Petition of Lechmere, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra 
note 86, at 106, 107 (collecting authorities). 
 123. Id.  
 124. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (June 1, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 315–16 (1856). 
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life.”125 That same concept—security—was utilized by Adams in Article 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and is replicated in the Fourth Amendment. In 
addition, Adams had Otis noting the scope of the searches: “Houses were to be 
broken open, and if a piece of Dutch linen could be found, from cellar to the cock-
loft, it was to be seized and become the prey of governors, informers, and 
majesty.”126 Otis, according to one Tudor letter, insisted that the writs were 
“inconsistent with the fundamental law, the natural and constitutional rights of the 
subjects.”127 He later observed that they were “the most tyrannical instruments that 
ever were invented.”128 
4. The Aftermath of the Writs Case 
Hutchinson wrote that Otis’s efforts encouraged those in opposition to the 
government and “taught” the people that the practices were “incompatible with 
English liberties.”129 Indeed, the use of the writs of assistance for customs searches 
and seizures “caused profound resentment” in the colonies130 and their use is 
considered to be “the first in the chain of events which led directly and irresistibly 
to revolution and independence.”131 After the Superior Court ruled in favor of the 
proponents of the writs, a series of steps were taken by opponents. The 
Massachusetts Assembly passed a bill requiring that writs of assistance be issued 
only when the customs officer possessed credible information, from a specified 
informant, that one of the acts of trade had been violated by a specified person at a 
specific place.132 The bill was vetoed by the governor, despite his recognition that 
the bill was very popular and that the veto would cause a clamor.133 Public reaction 
in Massachusetts and in other colonies against the writs was widespread and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 125. Id. at 316.  
 126. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (June 9, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 319. 
 127. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (June 24, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 323. 
 128. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Aug. 16, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 347. 
 129. HUTCHINSON, supra note 88, at 94–95. The people perceived Otis’s actions as 
springing from a “sincere concern for the liberties of the people” and elected him as their 
representative in the next election to the general assembly. Id. at 95. 
 130. Landynski, supra note 1, at 31. 
 131. Lasson, supra note 3, at 51; see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967) 
(claiming that the use of general warrants was a motivating factor behind the Declaration of 
Independence); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the revulsion was so “deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of 
the potent causes of the Revolution”); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the abuses surrounding searches and seizures “more 
than any one single factor gave rise to American independence”); Leagre, supra note 2, at 
397 (claiming that, based on the history of abuses, the “chief concern in the colonists’ minds 
was probably with the issuance of general warrants”). 
 132. See SMITH, supra note 62, at 567–68; see also QUINCY, supra note 83, at 495–96 
(providing text of the bill). 
 133. SMITH, supra note 62, at 425–28. 
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included rescuing seized ships,134 issuing town meeting promulgations,135 
pamphleteering, publishing accounts of Otis’s arguments in the Writs of Assistance 
Case,136 and creating other writings and propaganda decrying the oppressive nature 
of the writs.137 
In 1767, Parliament passed the Townshend Act to clarify existing statutory 
authority to issue the writs in the colonies.138 That Act, which authorized general 
writs of assistance, was ineffective, with most courts in the American colonies 
continuing to refuse to issue the writs.139 Some colonial courts instead issued 
special writs.140 That interpretation of the Act was in direct conflict with its purpose 
and two different attorneys general of England issued opinions reminding the 
American courts that the writs authorized by the legislation were to be general.141 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. See, e.g., QUINCY, supra note 83, at 436–38, 445–46, 463; Sewall v. Hancock, 
Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 179–80. 
 135. For example, at a meeting of the inhabitants of Boston on November 2, 1772, a 
committee was appointed “‘to state the Rights of the Colonists.’” The committee report, 
published by order of the town, attacked the writs of assistance as giving “‘absolute and 
arbitrary’” power to customs officials to search anywhere they pleased. The report 
concluded: 
Thus our Houses, and even our Bed-Chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, 
our Boxes, Trunks and Chests broke open, ravaged and plundered, by 
Wretches, whom no prudent Man would venture to employ even as Menial 
Servants; whenever they are pleased to say they suspect there are in the House, 
Wares, [etc.] for which the Duties have not been paid. Flagrant instances of the 
wanton exercise of this Power, have frequently happened in this and other 
seaport Towns. . . . These Officers may under the color of Law and the cloak of 
a general warrant, break through the sacred Rights of the Domicil, ransack 
Mens Houses, destroy their Securities, carry off their Property, and with little 
Danger to themselves commit the most horrid Murders. 
QUINCY, supra note 83, at 467 (emphasis in original) (quoting the Report of the Committee 
at 15–17); see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 315 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 136. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 396, 544–45. 
 137. See generally SMITH, supra note 62, at 466–501, 562–66; QUINCY, supra note 83, at 
436–38, 444–49, 458–59, 463, 488–94. As an example of the contemporary reaction, Chief 
Justice Thomas Hutchinson’s home was burned by arsonists during the Stamp Act riots of 
1765. The then-governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony attributed the attack to Hutchinson’s 
role in granting writs of assistance to customs officials. QUINCY, supra note 83, at 416 n.2, 
434 n.20; TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 38; Lasson, supra note 3, at 68. 
 138. SMITH, supra note 62, at 438–60 (discussing how the Townshend Act was motivated 
by the recognition that there was no legal basis to issue writs of assistance in the colonies). 
The Acts of Trade created a new American Board of Customs to enforce the acts and 
authorized the highest court in each colony to issue writs of assistance. QUINCY, supra note 
83, at 449–50.  
 139. See generally QUINCY, supra note 83, at 500–11; O.M. Dickerson, Writs of 
Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 49–75 
(Richard B. Morris ed., 1939) (summarizing colonial courts’ reaction to petitions for writs of 
assistance between 1761 and 1776). 
 140. QUINCY, supra note 83, at 510–11, 534–35; SMITH, supra note 62, at 2, 460, 469–70. 
 141. SMITH, supra note 62, at 2–3, 461–62, 520–23. Only South Carolina gave in. Id. at 
3–4. 
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Notably, Massachusetts continued to issue general writs of assistance,142 which 
played a large role in John Adams’s cases. This is to say that Massachusetts 
remained the main battleground in the colonies regarding British search and seizure 
practices,143 although the Townshend Act kept the issue alive in other colonies for 
most of the period leading up to the Revolution. 
5. Importance of the Writs of Assistance Case to Adams 
Adams left a long record regarding the importance of the Writs of Assistance 
Case to him. In his Autobiography, Adams wrote:  
A Contest appeared to me to be opened, to which I could foresee no 
End, and which would render my Life a Burden and Property, Industry 
and every Thing insecure. There was no Alternative left, but to take the 
Side, which appeared to be just, to march intrepidly forward in the right 
path, to trust in providence for the Protection of Truth and right, and to 
die with a good Conscience and a decent grace, if that Tryal should 
become indispensible.144 
Without doubt, however, the most telling of his comments occurred on July 3, 
1776, the very day that the Declaration of Independence was agreed to by Adams 
and the other delegates at the convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In a letter 
to his wife reflecting on the moment, Adams wrote: 
Yesterday the greatest question was decided, which ever was debated in 
America, and a greater, perhaps, never was nor will be decided among 
men. A resolution was passed without one dissenting colony, “that 
these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and 
independent States, and as such they have, and of right ought to have, 
full power to make war, conclude peace, establish commerce, and to do 
all the other acts and things which other States may rightfully do.” You 
will see in a few days a Declaration setting forth the causes which have 
impelled us to this mighty revolution, and the reasons which will justify 
it in the sight of God and man. A plan of confederation will be taken up 
in a few days. 
 When I look back to the year 1761, and recollect the argument 
concerning writs of assistance in the superior court, which I have 
hitherto considered as the commencement of this controversy between 
Great Britain and America, and run through the whole period, from that 
time to this, and recollect the series of political events, the chain of 
causes and effects, I am surprised at the suddenness as well as greatness 
of this revolution.145 
                                                                                                                 
 
 142. See generally QUINCY, supra note 83, at 401–35. 
 143. Cf. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 327 (“Colonial Massachusetts, not Great Britain, 
formulated most of the ideas that formed the specific warrant clause of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 144. 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 276. 
 145. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (July 3, 1776), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
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Can there be any clearer statement of the importance of the Writs case to 
Adams? Yet we have much more; throughout his life, Adams repeatedly made 
similar statements. For example, in 1780, Adams marked 1760 as the beginning of 
the dispute with Great Britain, when  
orders were sent from the board of trade in England to the custom-
house officers in America, to apply to the supreme courts of justice for 
writs of assistance to enable them to carry into a more rigorous 
execution certain acts of parliament called the acts of trade . . . by 
breaking open houses, ships, or cellars, chests, stores, and magazines, 
to search for uncustomed goods. In most of the Colonies these writs 
were refused. In the Massachusetts Bay the question, whether such 
writs were legal and constitutional, was solemnly and repeatedly argued 
before the supreme court by the most learned counsel in the 
Province . . . . [T]he arguments advanced upon that occasion by the bar 
and the bench, opened to the people such a view of the designs of the 
British government against their liberties and of the danger they were 
in, as made a deep impression upon the public, which never wore 
out.146 
Similarly, in a famous letter to William Tudor, in 1817, Adams wrote about the 
impact of Otis’s argument:  
Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, 
ready to take arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the 
first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great 
Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.147  
If we take Adams at his word, throughout his long life Adams held the belief that 
the Writs case was so important that it marked the beginning of the American 
Revolution. Notably, Adams distinguished between the war and the Revolution.148 
He saw the “the real American Revolution” as a “radical change in the principles, 
opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people” and “in the minds and hearts of 
the people.”149 
                                                                                                                 
ADAMS, supra note 7, at 418 (1854). 
 146. Letter from John Adams to Mr. Calkoen (Oct. 4, 1780), in 7 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 7, at 267 (1852). 
 147. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 247–48 (1856); see Lasson, supra note 3, at 58–59 (quoting 
10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 247–48 (1856)); see also United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 286 n.8 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Adams’s 
assessment of Otis’s argument); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980) (same).  
 148. Letter from John Adams to H. Niles (Feb. 13, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 7, at 282 (1856). 
 149. Id. at 282–83 (emphasis omitted); see also Letter from John Adams to Thomas 
Jefferson (Aug. 24, 1815), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 172 (1856) 
(“The revolution was in the minds of the people, and this was effected from 1760 to 1775 . . . 
before a drop of blood was shed at Lexington.”); Letter from John Adams to Dr. Morse 
(Nov. 29, 1815), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 183–84 (1856) (stating 
that the “revolution in the principles, views, opinions, and feelings of the American people” 
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Several themes that found later resonance in John Adams’s views and in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence can be seen in Thatcher’s arguments, including the 
acknowledgement of probable cause as a standard to measure the propriety of an 
intrusion, a concern with standardless discretion, and the temporary nature of 
warrants. Still, it was Otis who inspired Adams, and many of the principles that 
Otis advocated found a place in Adams’s writings and subsequent search and 
seizure constitutional provisions. Specifically, significant aspects of Otis’s 
arguments became elements of Article 14 and Fourth Amendment structure and 
jurisprudence. They include the following: identifying the right to be “secure” as 
the interest implicated by a search or seizure; listing the home as a protected place; 
utilizing the common law search warrant as a model for when warrants can issue; 
defining unjustified intrusions as “unreasonable”; and indicating that probable 
cause based searches and seizures are proper. More broadly, Otis’s concerns about 
the need for certain procedures, the scope of intrusions, and the arbitrary use of 
authority, have had continued importance in search and seizure jurisprudence to 
this day. Underlying all of those arguments and principles was a quest for objective 
criteria to measure the legitimacy of a search or seizure. 
C. The English General Warrant Cases 
Shortly after the Writs of Assistance Case, a series of general warrant cases were 
litigated in England. The principal case, Wilkes v. Wood,150 has been considered by 
the Supreme Court as a fundamental driving force behind the adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment.151 The case arose as a result of the publication of a series of 
pamphlets, called the North Briton, which were published anonymously.152 The 
author, John Wilkes, used the pamphlets to deride government ministers and 
criticize governmental policies.153 After an especially bitter attack in the North 
Briton, No. 45, the government decided to apprehend and prosecute the responsible 
party for seditious libel. A warrant was issued by Lord Halifax, the secretary of 
state, to four messengers, ordering them “to make strict and diligent search for the 
authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, entitled, The 
North Briton, No. 45, . . . and them, or any of them, having found, to apprehend 
                                                                                                                 
began with Otis’s argument); Letter from John Adams to H. Niles (Jan. 14, 1818), in 10 THE 
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 276 (1856) (stating that Otis’s argument “breathed 
into this nation the breath of life”). 
 150. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.). 
 151. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965) (describing the Wilkes 
opinion as “a wellspring of the rights now protected by the Fourth Amendment”); Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626–27 (1886) (maintaining that it can be “confidently 
asserted” that the Wilkes case and its results “were in the minds of those who framed the 
Fourth Amendment”). See generally Marcus v. Search Warrant of Prop., 367 U.S. 717, 724–
29 (1961) (outlining the history of the relationship between the struggle for freedom of the 
press and the scope of the search and seizure power in England). Cf. 1 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE MASON 290 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970) (Edmond Randolph viewed the Virginia 
provision prohibiting general warrants as inspired by the seizure of Wilkes’s papers in 
England under a general warrant). 
 152. Lasson, supra note 3, at 43–44. 
 153. Id. 
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and seize, together with their papers.”154 This warrant was general as to the persons 
to be arrested, the places to be searched, and the papers to be seized. It resulted in 
the arrest of forty-nine persons in three days.155 Eventually, the messengers located 
the printers and learned Wilkes’s identity. Wilkes and all of his private papers were 
then seized.156 
The printers and Wilkes brought separate suits against the messengers for false 
imprisonment.157 In Wilkes, Chief Justice Pratt (soon to be elevated and called Lord 
Camden) criticized the warrants for failing to specify the offenders’ names in the 
warrant and for giving the messengers the discretionary power to search wherever 
their suspicions chanced to fall.158 Pratt maintained that if the power to issue such 
warrants existed, “it certainly [might] affect the person and property of every man 
in this kingdom, and [was] totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”159 
Adams purchased the 1771 edition of James Burrow’s Reports of Cases 
Adjudged in the Court of King’s Bench,160 which contains the report of Money v. 
Leach,161 including background information about the origins of the litigation 
involving the use of general warrants to locate the persons involved in publishing 
the North Briton, No. 45. Burrow’s report begins by summarizing the background 
facts. Money and two other King’s messengers entered Leach’s house to look for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. Id. at 43 (quoting the warrant). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 43–44. 
 157. See Money v. Leach, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.); Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 
Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.); Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.). 
 158. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498. 
 159. Id. 
 160. 3 JAMES BURROW, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE COURT OF KING’S BENCH 
SINCE THE TIME OF LORD MANSFIELD’S COMING TO PRESIDE IN IT (1771), available at 
www.archive.org/details/reportsofcasesad03burr (scan of Adams’s copy). One cannot know 
for sure when Adams acquired the Burrow volume containing the Wilkesite litigation, but it 
is the original edition, published in 1771. Moreover, on April 20, 1771, Adams wrote about 
reading Burrow in his diary: 
This mettlesome barrister gives us the best account of the unanimity of the 
King’s Bench, that I have ever heard or read. According to him, it is not 
uncommon abilities, integrity and temper, as Mr. Burrow would persuade us, 
but sheer fear of Lord Mansfield, the Scottish chief, which produces this 
miracle in the moral and intellectual world; that is, of four judges agreeing 
perfectly in every rule, order, and judgment for fourteen years together. Four 
men never agreed so perfectly in sentiment for so long a time before. Four 
clocks never struck together a thousandth part of the time; four minds never 
thought, reasoned, and judged alike before for a ten thousandth part. 
2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 257 (1850). For Adams’s purchase, see THE 
JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, www.johnadamslibrary.org/book/?book= 
2215967Adams%2082.1%20v.3%20Folio. Adams also makes reference to a case from 
Volume 2 of Burrow’s Reports, which was another opinion by Lord Mansfield, in a paper 
written by him in 1774. See 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 165 (1851). 
 161. (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 3 Burr. 1742. In this Part, all quotations to Money are 
from the 1771 edition of Burrow’s Reports, rather than the English Reports, because this is 
the version that Adams used. I have preserved the original capitalization, spelling, and 
typeface.  
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the printer or publisher of the North Briton, No. 45, based on the general warrant 
issued by Halifax.162 Although the information had not been used to support the 
issuance of the warrant, the authorities became aware of information that the North 
Briton had been written by Wilkes and that he had been seen frequenting Leach’s 
home.163 The messengers alleged as justification for their actions that Leach had 
printed the twenty-sixth edition and that, before executing the warrant, they 
received information that Leach was the printer of No. 45.164 According to the 
messengers, when they entered Leach’s home, which is where he conducted his 
printing business, they observed a newly printed copy of the North Briton and an 
unfinished part of a new edition that Leach was then reprinting.165 Leach was 
seized and kept in custody for four days until Halifax could interrogate him. At the 
conclusion of that time period, it was concluded that Leach was not the printer of 
No. 45 and he was released.166  
The case, tried before Judge Pratt, resulted in a jury verdict awarding Leach 
substantial monetary compensation.167 The messengers appealed.168 On appeal 
before Chief Justice Mansfield and a panel of other judges, counsel for the 
messengers argued, inter alia, that the warrant complied with “long Practice and 
Usage.”169 Responding to the assertion that it was a general warrant, counsel 
asserted that “it is legal to issue and execute a Warrant against a Person unknown, 
but only described.”170 Reciting the facts known to the messengers before executing 
the warrant, counsel also argued that the messengers had “probable Cause” to seize 
Leach.171 He emphasized: “This Warrant was executed honestly, and upon a 
probable Cause.”172  
In response, Leach’s counsel addressed the claim that there was probable cause 
to seize Leach: 
Here is no probable Cause, nor any Reason for justifying the Officer 
under a probable Cause. . . . Here is only Information from One of 
their own Body, “That the Author of the Paper had been seen going into 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. The warrant directed the messengers and their assistants  
to make strict and diligent search for the said Authors Printers and Publishers 
of the aforesaid seditious Libel intitled “The North Briton No. 45. April the 
23rd. 1763:” And them or any of them having found, to apprehend and seize, 
together with their Papers, and to bring in safe Custody before said Earl, to be 
examined concerning the Premisses, and to be further dealt with according to 
Law . . . . 
(1765) 3 Burr. 1742 (K.B.) 1743. 
 163. Id. at 1748. 
 164. Id. at 1743. 
 165. Id. at 1743–44. 
 166. Id. at 1744, 1749. 
 167. Id. at 1745. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1755. 
 170. Id. at 1756. 
 171. Id. at 1757. 
 172. Id. at 1757. 
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Leach’s House; and that Leach was the Printer of the Composition in 
general;” not of this particular Paper. 
 But though neither this Hearsay-Information was itself true; nor 
would the Consequence follow, if it had been true; yet they thereupon 
arrest and imprison an innocent Man.173  
Counsel for Leach also attacked the legality of the warrant: 
 But THE WARRANT itself is illegal. ’Tis against the Author, Printer 
and Publisher of the Paper, generally, without naming or describing 
them; and not founded on any Charge upon Oath: It is also, “to seize 
his Papers”; that is, All his papers.  
 . . . . 
 IF “Author, Printer, and Publisher,” without naming any particular 
Person, be sufficient in such a Warrant as this is; it would be equally so, 
to issue a warrant generally, “to take up the Robber or murderer of such 
a One.” This is no Description of the Person; but only of the Offence: It 
is making the Officer to be Judge of the Matter, in the Place of the 
Person who issues the Warrant. Such a Power would be extremely 
mischievous, and might be productive of great Oppression.174 
Leach’s counsel added points about the warrant’s lack of an oath and about its 
broad scope, that is, its authorizing the seizure of all papers.175 He cited in support 
Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown and Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown.176 
In rebuttal, counsel for the messengers again asserted that they had probable 
cause to detain Leach: “They were reasonably satisfied, ‘that Leach was the 
Printer.’ And on Search, this probable Cause was encreased to a higher Degree: 
For, they found another fresh Sheet of the same Work, just printed off, and wet.”177 
Frankly, the arguments of the lawyers in Money v. Leach are quite familiar to us 
today—and that is my essential point. Adams was exposed to litigation that raised 
core themes debating the proper criteria to search and seize: the legality of general 
warrants; whether the person to be arrested must be identified in the warrant; 
whether the place to be searched must be specified; whether a warrant must be 
supported by an oath; what information sufficed to support the issuance of a 
warrant; and whether probable cause was required to search or seize. The concern 
with a “general warrant” was just a part of the broader mosaic. Of particular note 
are the competing claims about probable cause as a measure of justification and 
about certain that information did or did not meet that standard. Except for the 
peculiarities of punctuation and speech, the arguments on both sides of the Leach 
case could be easily made in twenty-first century America but are now grounded on 
Fourth Amendment principles. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 173. Id. at 1761.  
 174. Id. at 1762. 
 175. Id. at 1762–63. 
 176. Id. at 1763. He also noted that Chief Justice Scruggs had been impeached for issuing 
warrants similar to the one in Leach. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1764. 
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The ruling in Leach also has a contemporary ring. The Chief Justice, Lord 
Mansfield, first determined that the question “[w]hether there was a probable Cause or 
Ground of Suspicion” was a jury question and not properly before the court.178 
Mansfield also stated that the warrant’s authorization that all papers could be seized 
had not been executed and was, therefore, not before the court.179 As to the warrant 
being general because it failed to name or describe anyone, Mansfield opined: 
 It is not fit, that receiving or judging of Information should be left to 
the Discretion of the officer. The Magistrate ought to judge; and should 
give certain Directions to the Officer. This is so, upon Reason and 
Convenience. 
 Then as to Authorities—Hale and All Others hold such an uncertain 
Warrant void: And there is no Case or Book to the contrary.180 
The three other judges also viewed the warrant as illegal and void.181 
The Wilkesite cases are traditionally viewed as having had a significant 
influence on American thought about search and seizure practices in the era leading 
up to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.182 Amar, for example, views those 
                                                                                                                 
 
 178. Id. at 1765. 
 179. Id. at 1766. 
 180. Id. at 1766–67. 
 181. Id. at 1767. The case was set for reargument, and, after hearing reargument, 
Mansfield stated that his opinion had not changed. Id. The other judges were said to be 
“assenting” in affirming the judgment. Id. at 1767–68. See supra note 160 for Adams’s 
comments on Burrow’s characterization regarding the unanimity of opinions of judges 
sitting with Lord Mansfield. 
 182. See supra note 151. Another contemporary English case, Entick v. Carrington, 
(1765) 19 Howell’s St. Tr. 1029 (K.B.), also has been repeatedly cited by the United States 
Supreme Court as a “‘monument of English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every 
American statesman’ at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be ‘the true 
and ultimate expression of constitutional law.’” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
596 (1989) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886)). Accord Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967). Notwithstanding this confidence by the Supreme Court, I 
have found no reference to Entick at all by Adams or by anyone involved in the discussions 
between 1787 and 1791 regarding the need for a bill of rights, despite the voluminous 
commentary of the era regarding the adoption of the Constitution and proposed amendments. 
However, Entick was the subject of numerous London publications at the time of the 
decision, and the case found its way into numerous reports of cases. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, 
at 459, 481. Nonetheless, there were various versions of the case report, and the one most 
often cited, with the “more elaborate versions of Camden’s statements . . . was not published 
until 1781.” Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 566 n.25. 
  The Entick case stemmed from a warrant issued by the secretary of state to arrest 
Entick and to seize his books and papers, based on the charge that he was “the author, or one 
concerned in the writing of several weekly very seditious papers.” 19 Howell’s St. Tr. at 
1031. Entick was arrested, and all of his papers were seized from his home. After his release, 
he sued the messengers in trespass. The jury returned a verdict for Entick, and the case was 
heard by Judge Pratt, who by then was called Lord Camden. Id. at 1044. Camden 
condemned the scope of the warrant, which had authorized seizure of all of Entick’s papers, 
comparing it unfavorably to the criteria for warrants for stolen goods. Id. at 1063. He also 
discussed the fundamental role that property rights played in society and outlined a hierarchy 
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cases as primarily responsible for most of the list of objects explicitly protected by 
the amendment.183 William Cuddihy has documented that the cases were 
extensively reported in the popular press in the colonies, including in Boston, and 
that they were exploited to increase bad feelings against British rule and molded 
colonial sentiment to view general warrants as oppressive.184 
Yet, remarkably absent from Adams’s writing is any extended discussion of 
these English developments. He was clearly aware of them. Wilkes, after being 
charged with seditious libel in 1763 for his part in publishing the North Briton, No. 
45, fled to the continent; he returned in the spring of 1768 and was elected to 
Parliament.185 On June 6, 1768, as a member of the “Committee of the Boston Sons 
of Liberty,” Adams sent a letter to Wilkes. It opened with this greeting: “The 
friends of Liberty, Wilkes, Peace and good order to the number of Forty five, 
assembled at the Whig Tavern Boston New England, take this first opportunity to 
congratulate your Country, the British Colonies and yourself, on your happy return 
to the land alone worthy of such an Inhabitant . . . .”186 The Sons of Liberty in 
                                                                                                                 
of property rights. Camden said that there was no right to seize or inspect papers, which were 
considered the owner’s “dearest property.” Id. at 1066. He distinguished the right to search 
for and seize stolen goods based on the property rights involved: in the case of stolen goods, 
the owner is permitted to recapture his own goods; the seizure of private papers, however, 
involved taking the owner’s property by the government. Id. at 1066–68. Camden also 
rejected the government’s right to search papers as a means of discovering evidence in either 
criminal or civil cases. Id. at 1073. Camden’s hierarchy had a strong influence on early 
decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See 
also Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or 
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 310–26 (1998) (discussing Entick’s influence on 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 183. In a lecture at Suffolk University Law School, Professor Amar asked: 
[W]hy did both Massachusetts’ Article XIV and the federal Fourth bother to 
specify “persons,” “houses,” and “papers”? Precisely to remind us, I suggest, of 
the heightened sensitivity government should show towards searches and 
seizures of these three specially-named items. Houses are often more private 
than other buildings; diaries and other private papers are often our dearest 
possessions (and raise large issues of free expression, as do all political papers); 
and searches and seizures of our bodies––our persons––obviously call for 
special sensitivity. Note how, in Wilkes and Entick, intrusions occurred against 
persons, houses, and papers––with bodily arrests and the ransacking of secret 
cabinets in homes in search of personal and political papers––and so here, too, 
we see the obvious prominence of these paradigm cases in both the 
Massachusetts and the federal Constitutions. (Personal and political papers 
were not really at issue in the Boston writs-of-assistance case; and the main 
focus of concern seems to have been searches of buildings rather than persons.) 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 53, 69 (1996) (emphasis in original). 
 184. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 538–40, 847–50. As Cuddihy stated: “Massive 
coverage of the Wilkes affair by the colonial press sensitized readers not only to but against 
general warrants.” Id. at 538; see also Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 
562–65 (summarizing newspaper accounts and other sources of information about the 
general warrant cases). 
 185. 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 106, at 215–16 n.1 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977). 
 186. Id. at 214. For subsequent correspondence between Wilkes and the Sons of Liberty, 
see id. at 216, 220–23, 232–34; R.W. POSTGATE, THAT DEVIL WILKES 173–78 (1929); PETER 
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Boston viewed Wilkes as a hero and “Wilkes and Liberty” and “45” were popular 
symbols.187 More generally,188 Wilkes was perceived throughout the American 
colonies as a champion of liberty.189 
D. John Adams’s Library 
“I have spent an Estate on Books.”190 
“[B]y degrees, I procured the best library of law in the State.”191 
Adams was not merely boasting; he read widely and acquired an extensive 
collection of books.192 The importance of his library to him and to our 
                                                                                                                 
D.G. THOMAS, JOHN WILKES: A FRIEND TO LIBERTY 161–62 (1996).  
 187. See, e.g., ESTHER FORBES, PAUL REVERE AND THE WORLD HE LIVED IN 120, 128 
(1942). In one famous example, Paul Revere in 1768 was commissioned by fifteen Sons of 
Liberty to create a silver punch bowl in honor of the members of the Massachusetts 
legislature who refused to give in to the King’s request to rescind a letter that had been sent 
to other colonies, which had sought to generate opposition to the Townshend Acts. 
Engraving on the bowl included “No. 45,” “Wilkes and Liberty,” and a “torn document for 
general warrants.” Id. at 128–29. The bowl is now in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts and 
has been described as ranking with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as 
the nation’s “three most cherished historic treasures.” Sons of Liberty Bowl, MUSEUM OF 
FINE ARTS, BOSTON, http://www.mfa.org/collections/object/39072. 
  In his diary on August 14, 1769, Adams recounted dining with 350 Sons of Liberty 
under the Sign of Liberty Tree, followed by a variety of toasts. He noted that Otis and 
Samuel Adams promoted such occasions because they “impregnate [the people] with the 
sentiments of Liberty.” 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 341. 
Although Adams did “not see one Person intoxicated,” id., the editor of his diary viewed that 
observation as “remarkable, considering that fourteen toasts were drunk at the Liberty Tree 
in Boston, followed by forty-five (in honor of John Wilkes’s North Briton, No. 45) at the 
dinner.” Id. at 342 n.2.  
 188. Adams was a member of the Bill of Rights Society. 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
106, at xiv. That Society, begun in England in 1769, was largely designed to promote Wilkes’s 
views and pay his debts. THOMAS, supra note 186, at 111–15. Adams’s correspondence 
occasionally referenced Wilkes. In one letter, Adams observed that, during the period leading up to 
the Revolutionary War, “parties in England were as angry as in America. Wilkes and Junius 
agitated king, ministry, parliament, and nation.” 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 
202 (1856). In a letter to John Taylor in 1814, Adams mentioned Wilkes’s being interrupted when 
writing an edition of the North Briton and attributed to Wilkes this comment: “I have been studying 
these four hours to see how near I could come to treason without committing it.” 6 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 490 (1851). 
 189. Wilkes was viewed by Americans as a friend of liberty and his name was known. 
Indeed, numerous towns and places were named after him (and Lord Camden). See, e.g., 
Amar, First Principles, supra note 22, at 65–66 (recounting locations).  
 190. Letter to Abigail Adams, June 6, 1774, in FAMILIAR LETTERS OF JOHN ADAMS AND 
HIS WIFE ABIGAIL ADAMS DURING THE REVOLUTION 4 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1876). 
 191. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 50 n.* (1850). 
 192. For an overview of his early readings and influences, see 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 86, at liv–lvi, lxxiv–lxxvii. He was an avid reader and commented often 
about the course of his legal and other studies. For example, as a young lawyer, Adams 
borrowed Hale’s treatise from Otis and reported that he had read it three times. 1 DIARY AND 
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understanding of his knowledge and views cannot be overstated.193 Adams began 
collecting books on law, history, and political systems by the early 1760s and 
amassed one of the largest libraries in New England, which is now housed at the 
Boston Public Library.194 Adams was first and last a lawyer, with a deep love for 
learning and understanding the law.195 He had access to a broad set of materials on 
search and seizure, including during the period of 1761 to 1779, which were the 
years that influenced Adams’s views on search and seizure, culminating in his 
drafting of Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  
Treatises. The Adams collection included the major treatises of the day that had 
detailed explanations of search and seizure principles.196 His collection included: 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England,197 Richard Burn’s 
The Justice of the Peace,198 Edward Coke’s Institute on the Laws of England,199 
                                                                                                                 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 169, 173. He wrote that he had “read a 
Multitude of Law Books,” including Coke, Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown, and others. Id. at 
173.  
 193. E.g., 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 220 (diary entry 
for August 1, 1761) (maintaining that the “English Constitution is founded, tis bottomed And 
grounded on the Knowledge and good sense of the people” and that the “very Ground of our 
Liberties, is freedom of Elections,” but to decide who to elect, a person’s mind has to be 
“opened and enlarged by Reading”); id. at 337 (diary entry for January 30, 1768) (observing 
that he had spent a great deal of money collecting a library but observing that “it is only a 
means, an Instrument” and pondering how he would use it). 
 194. The Boston Public Library has digitized many of his books and catalogues all of 
them at THE JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
http://www.johnadamslibrary.org. 
 195. His deep knowledge of the law and utilization of extensive citations to authority to 
support his views are illustrated in papers he wrote in 1773 on the independence of judges 
and on the rights of the province of Massachusetts. See 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra 
note 106, at 252–345 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977). As a young attorney at their first meeting, 
Gridley grilled Adams on what law books Adams had read. See 1 DIARY AND 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 54–55. Later, Adams joined a club that 
Gridley formed to read and discuss books on law and other subjects. Id. at 251–55. 
 196. For an examination of colonial knowledge of treatises discussing search and seizure 
principles, see generally CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 188–90, 552–54. For a summary of the 
treatment of the general warrant in the major treatises of the era, see id. at 268–73, 28–83. 
 197. Adams had all four volumes of Blackstone’s Commentaries. He had the third edition 
of volume 1, published in 1767. See THE JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
http://www.johnadamslibrary.com/search/books/?author=blackstone. There is little doubt 
when Adams obtained his copy of volume 4 of Blackstone, given that Adams is listed as one 
of the subscribers to the American printing, dated 1771–72. Id. That volume is particularly 
notable for citing Money v. Leach as support for Blackstone’s assertion that general warrants 
were illegal. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288 n.i. In his diary on June 7, 1771, 
Adams recounts a conversation where he suggested to a person that he purchase a copy of 
Blackstone to further his legal knowledge. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 
271 (1850). 
 198. Adams owned the three-volume seventh edition, published in 1762, and volume 4 of 
the tenth edition, published in 1766. See THE JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC 
LIBRARY, www.johnadamslibrary.org/search/books/?author=burn. Adams, for example, cited 
Burns in 1773. See 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 106, at 295, 303 n.2 (Robert J. 
Taylor ed., 1977). 
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Michael Dalton’s The Country Justice,200 Matthew Hale’s Pleas of the Crown,201 
and William Hawkins’s A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown.202 
Those treatises were the major sources of understanding search and seizure 
principles; other parts of this Article demonstrate that Adams and his 
contemporaries routinely cited the treaties as authority for positions they advocated. 
This is not to say that search and seizure principles were either fully formed or that 
there was a consensus as to proper practices. If there had been consensus, modern 
analysis would have a firmer grounding and clearer basis. Nonetheless, claims that 
the concept of reasonableness had no meaning or that no objective criteria existed 
to guide the framers is belied by the treatment of search and seizure principles in 
the treatises of the era. 
To illustrate the depth and scope of the era’s treatment of search and seizure 
principles, and referencing only the books in Adams’s library, the following 
highlights are offered. Blackstone discussed four ways in which an arrest could 
legally occur, including the need for probable cause and a particularized warrant.203 
                                                                                                                 
 199. See THE JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
www.johnadamslibrary.org/search/books/?author=Coke. Adams repeatedly referenced 
reading Coke. E.g., 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 133, 158, 
174, 253, 273; 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 103 (1850) (diary entry for 
November 26, 1760); 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 142–46, 160–65 
(1851) (papers written in 1774); 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 106, at 258, 262 
(Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977) (on the independence of judges, written in 1773). In a letter to 
Jonathan Mason, Jr., on August 21, 1776, he requested Mason to “pursue my Lord Coke” 
and urged Mason, who had already read volume 1, to “study the second, third, and fourth 
Institutes with equal diligence. My lord Coke is justly styled the oracle of the law, and 
whoever is master of his writings, is master of the laws of England.” 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 7, at 432–33 (1854). 
  Adams had the 1644 edition of volume 4 of Coke’s Institutes. In that volume, Coke 
discussed a variety of search and seizure topics, including warrants for stolen goods, the law 
of arrest, and under what circumstances the authorities could enter a person’s home. 4 
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTE ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176–78 (1644). 
 200. See THE JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
www.johnadamslibrary.org/book/?book=2206347Adams%2042.1%20Folio. Adams, for 
example, cited Dalton in 1773. See 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 106, at 295, 303 
n.2 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977). 
 201. Adams had the two-volume set of Hale published in 1736 with the Latin title: 
Historia Placitorum Coronae. Adams’s signature appears on the first volume as follows: 
“John Adams 1760.” See THE JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
www.johnadamslibrary.org/book/?book=2216444Adams%2092.10%20v.2%20Folio. 
 202. Adams had the fourth edition, dated 1762, and he signed his name inside the book. 
See THE JOHN ADAMS LIBRARY, BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
www.johnadamslibrary.org/book/?book=2223764Adams%20111.5%20Folio. In his diary, 
however, Adams referred to reading Hawkins in 1760. See 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 7, at 103 (1850) (diary entry for November 26, 1760). Adams, for example, cited 
Hawkins in 1773. See 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 106, at 297, 303 n.3 (Robert J. 
Taylor ed., 1977). 
 203. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 197, at *287–91. Blackstone’s four methods were: 
  1. With a warrant. Blackstone cited Coke for the proposition that a justice of the 
peace could not issue one to “apprehend a felon upon bare suspicion” and Hale for the need 
to offer the justice of the peace “probability offered to him of such suspicion.” Id. at 287. He 
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He also detailed the rights of Englishmen.204 Burn provided a list of “causes of 
suspicion” to justify an arrest.205 He detailed when an arrest could be made with or 
without a warrant,206 discussed the manner of arrest, such as nighttime arrests,207 
circumstances that justified breaking doors,208 and the power to search pursuant to 
writs of assistance in excise and customs situations and, in the case of resistance, 
the permissibility of breaking open “doors, chests, and other package.”209 
                                                                                                                 
added:  
it is fitting to examine upon oath the party requiring a warrant, as well to 
ascertain that there is a felony or other crime actually committed, without 
which no warrant should be granted; as also to prove the cause and probability 
of suspecting the party, against whom the warrant is prayed.  
Id. (emphasis in original). Blackstone rejected general warrants: “A general warrant to 
apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or particularly describing any person in 
special, is illegal and void for it’s [sic] uncertainty; for it is the duty of the magistrate, and 
ought not to be left to the officer, to judge the ground of suspicion.” Id. at 288 (emphasis in 
original). 
  2. Arrests by officers without warrant. The standards for such arrests included that a 
constable could arrest, in the case of a felony actually committed, if the constable had 
“probable suspicion” as to that person. Id. at 289. 
  3. Arrests by private persons, Blackstone stated, could be made, inter alia, upon 
“probable suspicion” of the person, but the private person could not break open doors to do 
so. Id. at 290. 
  4. Upon hue and cry. The requirements included: 
The party raising it must acquaint the constable of the vill with all the 
circumstances which he knows of the felony, and the person of the felon; and 
thereupon the constable is to search his own town, and raise all the 
neighbouring vills, and make pursuit with horse and foot: and in the 
prosecution of such hue and cry, the constable and his attendants have the same 
powers, protection, and indemnification, as if acting under the warrant of a 
justice of the peace. But if a man wantonly or maliciously raises a hue and cry, 
without cause, he shall be severely punished as a disturber of the public peace. 
Id. at 291. 
 204. See infra note 459.  
 205. 1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 85 (7th ed. 
1762). Burn’s list included:  
  1. “The common fame of the country; but it seems, that it ought to appear upon 
evidence, in an action brought for such arrest, that such fame had some probable ground.” Id. 
  2. When the person is found in circumstances that “induce a strong presumption of 
guilt; as coming out of a house wherein murder hath been committed, with a bloody knife in 
one’s hand; or being found in possession of any part of goods stolen, without being able to 
give a probable account of coming honestly by them.” Id. 
  3. Flight or actions indicating a “consciousness of guilt.” Id. 
  4. Accompanying a known offender at the time of the offense. Id. 
  5. “The living an idle, vagrant, and disorderly life, without having any visible means 
to support it.” Id. 
 206. Id. at 86. 
 207. Id. at 87. 
 208. Id. at 88. He also noted the differences of opinion between Hale and Coke. Id. at 88–
89. 
 209. Id. at 446. 
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Dalton addressed, among other principles, when an arrest is valid for affrays and 
breaches of peace210 and when officials could break and enter a house.211 He 
observed that a man’s home is his castle except against the King,212 that warrants 
for customs searches permitted entry into any house during the daytime “where the 
Goods are suspected to be concealed,”213 and that differences exist between day and 
nighttime excise searches.214 Dalton set forth standards for hue and cry215 and 
detailed causes of suspicion that a person is a felon.216 He addressed standards for 
warrants to issue,217 including that it was “not safe” for a justice of the peace to 
issue a blank warrant,218 and that one could not be issued “upon a bare Surmise to 
break any Man’s House to search for a Felon.”219 He asserted that the liberty of a 
man “is a Thing specially favoured by the Common Law.”220 To arrest, Dalton 
stated, there “must be some just Cause, or some lawful and just Suspicion at the 
least.”221 He discussed causes of suspicion to arrest for felonies,222 including 
permitting an arrest if in the “Company of the Offenders,” if living “idly and 
vagrant,”223 or if in possession of the stolen goods.224  
Hale wrote about a broad variety of search and seizure topics, often citing 
Dalton and Coke to support his statements. He discussed the circumstances when 
an arrest warrant could be issued by the court: the requesting party usually should 
be examined under oath, that examination must be reduced to a writing concerning 
whether a felony had been committed and the party’s grounds for suspicion,225 and 
the person suspected of the crime had to be named.226 A general warrant was 
condemned by Hale as “not a sufficient justification in false imprisonment.”227 He 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. DALTON, supra note 65, at 3–4. 
 211. Id. at 29, 299–300, 404. 
 212. Id. at 300. 
 213. Id. at 69. 
 214. Id. at 79. 
 215. Id. at 128–29. 
 216. Id. at 381–82. 
 217. Id. at 401–05.  
 218. Id. at 402. 
 219. Id. at 403 (emphasis in original). 
 220. Id. at 406. 
 221. Id. at 407. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 408. 
 225. 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 91–92, 111. 
 226. Id. at 112, 114. 
 227. Id. at 112; see also 1 HALE, supra note 53, at 580, 584. Hale stated that the general 
warrant to apprehend all persons suspected of committing a crime was void and was no 
defense to a suit for false imprisonment. Id. at 580; 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 112. Lasson 
has summarized Hale’s views: 
The party asking for the warrant should be examined under oath touching the 
whole matter, whether a crime had actually been committed and the reasons for 
his suspicion. The warrant should specify by name or description the particular 
person or persons to be arrested and must not be left in general terms or in 
blanks to be filled in afterwards. Upon the reasoning of the first rule, Hale held 
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discussed the circumstances when doors of a house could be broken to search or 
arrest.228 A notable aspect of his writing was Hale’s repeated recognition of 
probable cause as the standard to arrest or search.229 Another theme was the 
difference between ex officio powers and those granted under a warrant.230 He also 
outlined what could be done by hue and cry231 and the standards for issuing and 
executing arrest and search warrants.232 
Reports of Cases. Adams had numerous reports of cases. As discussed earlier, of 
particular significance regarding Adams’s knowledge of search and seizure 
principles is his 1771 edition of James Burrow’s Reports of Cases Adjudged in the 
Court of King’s Bench, which included the case report of Money v. Leach.233 
History Books. For the purpose of the present inquiry, the most important 
history book that Adams had was George Richard Minot’s Continuation of the 
History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay.234 Minot had obtained a copy of 
Adams’s abstract of the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case, where James Otis famously 
offered a detailed alternative view to the abusive search and seizure practices 
engaged in by British colonial authorities. As noted previously, Adams inserted 
notes in the margins of the book, commenting on the accuracy of Minot’s account.  
Theories of Government. Of less direct relevance to search and seizure 
provisions, but undoubtedly a strong influence on Adams’s views about the 
relationship of individuals to government, was Adams’s extensive collection of 
books on the history and structure of government.235 The collection was utilized by 
Adams in writing his own thoughts on the structure of government, including his 
lengthy A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of 
                                                                                                                 
that warrants to search any suspected place for stolen goods were invalid 
(although he admitted that there were precedents of such general warrants) and 
should be restricted to search in a particular place suspected, after a showing, 
upon oath, of the suspicion and the “probable cause” thereof, to the satisfaction 
of the magistrate. 
Lasson, supra note 3, at 35–36 (citations omitted). 
 228. See 1 HALE, supra note 53, at 582; 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 82, 92, 102–03, 116–
17. 
 229. 1 HALE, supra note 53, at 579–80; 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 81–82, 85, 91–92, 103, 
105, 110, 150, 152. Hale recognized that the grounds to establish probable cause were “very 
many” and listed “common fame,” hue and cry, possession of stolen goods, and association 
with the known robber. Id. at 81. 
 230. E.g., 2 HALE, supra note 53, at 85, 90. 
 231. Id. at 98–104. 
 232. Id. at 105–20, 149–52. 
 233. See supra notes 160–81 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra note 116. 
 235. The learning that Adams received from his collection is reflected throughout his 
writings. For example, in 1774 and 1775, he wrote a series of papers signed Novanglus in the 
Boston Gazette, which are referred to collectively as A History of the Dispute with America, 
from its Origin, in 1754, to the Present Time. See 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
7, at 3–177 (1851). The papers are laced with copious references to historical and legal 
authorities. 
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America,236 published shortly before the convening of the federal Constitutional 
Convention in 1787.237 
E. Adams as Litigator and Observer 
1. Customs Searches and Seizures 
Adams litigated numerous cases in the Court of Vice Admiralty, most of which 
involved breaches of British Acts of Trade.238 The Acts “regulated the flow of 
colonial trade, laid duties on some aspects of it, and established a system of 
enforcement.”239 It was within that web of acts and enforcement that the Writs case 
arose in 1761. A few years later, Adams litigated two significant Admiralty cases. 
The cases illustrate Adams’s awareness of the British search and seizure practices, 
demonstrate his opposition to them,240 and illuminate some of his views on proper 
search and seizure criteria. 
The first, Folger v. Sloop Cornelia, is an interesting footnote to the Writs 
litigation. Adams was co-counsel with James Otis and they represented Timothy 
Folger, who was a “Searcher and Preventive Officer at Nantucket.”241 Folger was 
sympathetic to the merchant interests; opposing him were the customs officials of 
the port of Boston.242 Folger was, at best, lax in his enforcement of the acts and had 
been actively engaged in importation. He also had a store in which imported goods 
were sold and had extensive dealings with merchants, including John Hancock.243 
Folger’s presence in Nantucket thus created “a sizable loophole for evaders of the 
Acts of Trade” and “represented a threat to the security of the revenue.”244 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 236. Reproduced in 4–6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7 (1851). 
 237. Adams’s Defence drew both praise and criticism during the time that the new 
Constitution was being debated. See, e.g., 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 473, 474–75 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (quoting Compo: To the Head of the Wrongheads of New Haven 
County, CONNECTICUT COURANT, Nov. 26, 1787). Jefferson, for example, praised it, see 4 
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 579 n.1 (1851), but Madison saw little value in 
it, see 2 WILLIAM C. RIVES, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 503–04 
(1870). 
 238. Admiralty—Revenue Jurisdiction, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 86, at 98; see also id. at 102–05.  
 239. Id. at 98. 
 240. Despite his opposition to the Acts of Trade, Adams also represented Crown officers 
in two cases in 1769. Adams later related that he had been asked to take the position of 
advocate general of the Admiralty but he declined “since he wished to be under no 
obligation to those whose political principles he opposed.” Id. at 102–03. 
 241. Folger v. Sloop Cornelia, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra 
note 86, at 147; cf. QUINCY, supra note 83, at 450–51 (stating that Folger was removed from 
office in 1768 because he had voted in the Massachusetts House of Representatives for 
resolves favoring American manufacturers). 
 242. See Folger v. Sloop Cornelia, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 86, at 147.  
 243. Id. at 149.  
 244. Id. at 148–50.  
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actual litigation, however, had little to do with the background. In January 1768, 
Folger seized the sloop Cornelia.245 Thereafter, customs officials in Boston advised 
Folger that his commission was invalid and litigation ensued over who could 
validly seize the ship and receive the proceeds from the seizure.246 The formal 
outcome of the case had nothing to do with the peculiarities of British search and 
seizure practices, although Folger’s relationship with the antigovernment faction 
colored Folger’s subsequent efforts to affirm the validity of his commission.247 
The second, more significant, case resulted from the seizure of John Hancock’s 
sloop Liberty in June 1768. John Hancock was an outspoken critic of British rule 
and a wealthy, influential merchant, who later became a signer of the Declaration 
of Independence and governor of Massachusetts. “The uproar over the Liberty led 
the Crown to send troops to Boston.”248 This in turn led to the Boston Massacre in 
March 1770,249 with Adams representing British soldiers involved in that shooting. 
Adams represented Hancock in the Liberty litigation and, as “draftsman of political 
manifestos for the Town of Boston,” commented on the event.250 That case, Sewall 
v. Hancock, described as Adams’s most politically significant case until the Boston 
Massacre trials, “played a leading part in the development of colonial opposition to 
the British customs system and Vice Admiralty courts.”251 
The Liberty was searched and seized “for violation of the statutory prohibition 
against unloading [goods] before entry.”252 The events that followed were as much 
political as judicial. The sloop was ultimately put up for sale and purchased by 
customs authorities, who fitted her out as a revenue cutter.253 She was later seized 
by a mob in Rhode Island and burned.254 
Adams, representing Hancock in the trial concerning his involvement in the 
unloading, drafted an “unusual”255 argument in Hancock’s defense; he challenged 
the statute as invalid because neither Hancock nor his representative had ever 
consented to it, in violation of his fundamental rights under Magna Carta, and that 
it also denied Hancock his right to a jury trial.256 The popular aspect of the seizure 
is more telling. After the ship was seized, a series of town meetings were held in 
Boston.257 Representatives of the town were appointed and Adams was charged 
                                                                                                                 
 
 245. Id. at 151. 
 246. Id. at 152. 
 247. Id. at 156.  
 248. Admiralty—Revenue Jurisdiction, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 86, at 98, 103. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 102; see also Sewell v. Hancock, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 86, at 184–92. 
 251. Sewell v. Hancock, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
86, at 173. 
 252. Id. at 175. 
 253. Id. at 179. 
 254. Id. at 179–80. 
 255. Id. at 190. 
 256. Id.; Sewall v. Hancock, Adams’ Copy of the Information and Draft of His 
Argument, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 194, 198–207; see also 
QUINCY, supra note 83, at 457–63 (reproducing Adams’s notes). 
 257. Sewall v. Hancock, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
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with drafting instructions for those representatives.258 In his draft, which was 
approved by the town meeting, Adams asserted that the seizure of the Liberty had 
been unjustified because it was “without any probable cause of seizure that we 
know of, or indeed any cause that has yet been made known.”259 “The statements 
on probable cause . . . by the Boston town meeting on the Liberty[] saturated 
newspapers from Rhode Island to South Carolina.”260 The Liberty incident thus 
represented another significant reference to probable cause as the proper measure 
of a search or seizure; both Thatcher and Otis had referenced that standard in the 
Writs case. With the Liberty, Adams became an advocate for that standard. 
2. Familiarity with Search Warrants for Stolen Goods 
In addition to Otis’s argument in the Writs case and the various treatises in his 
library, there is other evidence of Adams’s knowledge of search and seizure 
practices related to the recovery of stolen goods. Otis, it should be recalled, argued 
that warrants for stolen goods were “special,” that is, a magistrate issued them 
based on an oath, a showing of “good Grounds of suspicion,”261 “probable 
suspicion,” or “probable ground,” and required a particular description of the place 
to be searched.262 Contemporaneous with the Writs case, Adams served as an 
attorney in the case of Hunt v. White, which involved a “very slanderous, and 
malicious Lye, made and published to [Hunt’s] Damage.”263 Although all the 
details are unclear, Adams prepared for his argument by writing in his diary: 
Mr. Hunt, it seems sometime after last Thanksgiving Day, made his 
application to Mr. Justice Dyer, for a Warrant to search for stolen 
goods. The Justice administered an oath to him and he swore that on the 
Night after last Thanksgiving Day, his House was broken and 17£ of 
Money stolen from his Chest. A Warrant of search was granted and 
dilligent search was made, but the Money not found.264 
According to Adams’s notes, White thereafter told a variety of false stories related 
to those events265 and the litigation did not turn on the form the warrant took. 
Nonetheless, the warrant that Hunt obtained had many of the features of a “special” 
warrant and was based on criteria later embedded in Article 14 and the Fourth 
                                                                                                                 
86, at 176.  
 258. Instructions of the Town of Boston to Their Representatives, 17 June, 1768, 
reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 501. 
 259. Id. at 503. 
 260. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 590. Cuddihy cites additional authority of the period 
using the lack of probable cause to explain why certain notorious maritime seizures between 
1761 and 1776 were unreasonable. Id. at 586–91. He observes that probable cause did not 
have an exact definitional content, but the controversies “had inserted ‘probable cause’ of 
seizure into the American legal vocabulary as a nebulous understanding that property could 
not be seized without substantial reason.” Id. at 591. 
 261. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, app. A, at 522 (1850). 
 262. Id. at 525; see also supra text accompanying note 118. 
 263. 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 179. 
 264. Id. at 180. 
 265. See id.  
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Amendment: issuance by a magistrate; an oath; and a statement of facts to justify 
the issuance.266 
3. The Home as a Castle 
Otis’s argument in the Writs case in 1761, as reported by Adams, emphasized 
that a man’s home is his castle. Otis was, of course, not the first to make such 
observations, and the principle seems to have been generally accepted in the 
colonies.267 In addition to the treatises he read, there is ample evidence indicating 
Adams’s familiarity with this principle. 
The years between the Writs case and the onset of the Revolutionary War were 
tumultuous ones in Boston. One notorious event occurred on February 22, 1770, 
when Ebenezer Richardson shot and killed an eleven-year-old boy.268 Richardson 
had been widely rumored to be a member of the customs establishment and, hence, 
was the target of much criticism.269 On that date, a Boston mob targeted the shop of 
Theophilus Lillie, who had refused to honor an agreement not to import British 
goods.270 “[T]he technique used against men like Lillie had been the ‘exhibition,’ a 
sign or placard planted before the offending shop, carrying language whose general 
import was ‘Don’t Buy from the Traitor.’”271 A gang of boys paraded in front of 
Lillie’s shop and placed a sign in front of his door.272 Richardson, observing the 
boys and the sign, at first attempted to persuade other bystanders to run their 
wagons over the sign; failing that, he took a cart and a horse and attempted to do so 
himself.273 This led to a general tumult, with the crowd hurling missiles at 
Richardson, who retreated to his home, accompanied by a man named George 
Wilmot.274 Witnesses at trial testified that stones shattered the windows of the 
house and, eventually, the crowd began to push at the doors.275 As the “pelting 
continued . . . Richardson thrust a gun through the window, ‘snapping’ it at the 
mob. Finally, he fired a charge of bird shot,” resulting in the boy’s death.276 
The crowd seized Richardson and Wilmot, much abused them, and dragged 
them through the town.277 At Faneuil Hall, in the presence of a thousand people, 
justices of the peace examined Richardson and Wilmot and committed them to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 266. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. I previously quoted that material and 
now highlight important aspects. 
 267. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 185–88 (recounting numerous iterations of that 
principle); Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 601–03 (same). 
 268. Rex v. Richardson, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
86, at 396. 
 269. Id. at 396–97.  
 270. Id. at 397. 
 271. Id. at 397–98. 
 272. Id. at 398. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 398–99. 
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. at 399. 
 277. Id.  
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jail.278 The Sons of Liberty exploited the incident to their “utmost advantage” by 
publishing inflammatory newspaper reports and using the boy’s funeral to advance 
their cause.279 Two thousand people reportedly attended the funeral.280 The Boston 
Massacre occurred two weeks later. In this atmosphere, as the editors of Adams’s 
Legal Papers have observed, the chance of Richardson receiving “a fair trial [was] 
minimal and of acquittal zero.”281 
The significance of the case, Rex v. Richardson, for present purposes, is not 
rooted in what happened to Richardson and Wilmot;282 instead, it stands out due to 
the arguments of counsel for Richardson. Josiah Quincy eventually became 
Richardson’s attorney.283 His principal defense was that Richardson could use all 
possible means to defend himself because his life was threatened while he was in 
his own home.284 Adams’s papers contain notes from defense counsel, probably 
written by Quincy.285 Those notes summarize the right of self-defense, including 
the following references to the importance of the home: “A Man’s house is his 
Castle and he may defend it by himself alone or with such as he calls to assist him. 
1 H.H.P.C. 445. 487. 5 Coke Repts. 91b. Semane’s Case. 11 Coke Repts. 82b. 
Lewis Bowles Case.”286 
Quincy’s references have been interpreted by Wroth and Zobel, the editors of 
Adams’s Legal Papers. The first reference, “1 H.H.P.C. 445. 487,” refers to the first 
volume of Hale’s Pleas of the Crown: 
 445: But if A. come to enter with force, and in order thereunto shoots 
at his house, and B. the possessor, having other company in his house, 
shoots and kills A. this is manslaughter in B.” I id. at 487: “[H]is house 
is his castle of defense, and therefore he may justify assembling of 
persons for the safeguard of his house.287 
                                                                                                                 
 
 278. Id.  
 279. Id. at 399–400. 
 280. Id. at 400. Adams, in his diary, recounted that he attended the funeral. He remarked: 
“My Eyes never beheld such a funeral. The Procession extended further than can be well 
imagined. This [shows] there are many more Lives to spend if wanted in the Service of their 
Country.” 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 101, at 349–50 (diary 
entry for Feb. 26, 1770, or “thereabouts”). 
 281. Rex v. Richardson, Editorial Note, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
86, at 400–01. 
 282. Wilmot was found not guilty and Richardson was ultimately pardoned. Id. at 405–
11. 
 283. Id. at 402. 
 284. Id. at 404. 
 285. Rex v. Richardson, Defense Counsel’s Notes, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 86, at 411 & n.87.  
 286. Id. at 412. The prosecutor’s notes of the arguments are similar. See Rex v. 
Richardson, Paine’s Minutes of the Trial, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, 
at 422–23. 
 287. Rex v. Richardson, Defense Counsel’s Notes, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 86, at 412 n.91. 
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The second refers to “5 Coke Repts. 91b. Semane’s Case,” which is Semayne v. 
Gresham,288 more often called Semayne’s Case.289 That case has endured through 
time regarding the construction of search and seizure principles. It has been cited 
and debated in numerous Supreme Court opinions, with much of the discussion 
examining the circumstances in which the government may enter a person’s 
home.290 The most famous aspect of the case, however, is Lord Coke’s assertion 
that “the house of every one is to him as his . . . castle.”291 Relevant to the 
Richardson litigation was Semayne’s observations on the right of a person to use 
self-defense in one’s home: 
“[T]he house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress, as 
well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose; and 
although the life of man is a thing precious and favoured in law . . . if 
                                                                                                                 
 
 288. (1605) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.); 5 Co. Rep. 91a; see 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 86, at 412 n.92. 
 289. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 63. 
 290. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (referring to unannounced 
entries); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 123 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“At least 
since 1604 it has been settled that in the absence of exigent circumstances, a government 
agent has no right to enter a ‘house’ or ‘castle’ unless authorized to do so by a valid 
warrant.”); United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003) (referring to unannounced 
entries); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (“In 1604, an English court made the 
now-famous observation that ‘the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as 
well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose.’”); Minnesota v. Carter, 
525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“As far back as Semayne’s Case of 1604, the 
leading English case for that proposition . . . , the King’s Bench proclaimed that ‘the house 
of any one is not a castle or privilege but for himself, and shall not extend to protect any 
person who flies to his house.’”); id. at 95 n.2 (asserting that Semayne’s Case “makes clear” 
that “‘the Sheriff may break the house, imply that at the suit of the party, the house may not 
be broken: otherwise the addition (at the suit of the King) would be frivolous.’”); id. at 100 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Read narrowly, the protections recognized in Semayne’s Case 
might have been confined to the context of civil process, and so be of limited application to 
enforcement of the criminal law. Even if, at the time of Semayne’s Case, a man’s home was 
not his castle with respect to incursion by the King in a criminal matter, . . . [t]he axiom that 
a man’s home is his castle . . . has acquired over time a power and an independent 
significance justifying a more general assurance of personal security in one’s home, an 
assurance which has become part of our constitutional tradition.”); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 
U.S. 927, 931–32 (1995) (citing Semayne’s Case for the proposition that a man’s home is his 
castle and to support knock and announce rule); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 
469, 488 n.3 (1986) (the home is a castle); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217–20 
(1981) (discussing whether Semayne’s Case permitted forcible entry of third person’s home 
to arrest suspect but that the home remained a castle for residents); id. at 228–29 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (discussing Semayne’s Case and arguing that arrest warrant permitted entry 
into third person’s home to effectuate arrest); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) 
(extensive debate between the majority and dissent over whether Semayne’s Case permitted 
a warrantless arrest of a person in his or her own home); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47–
48 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (citing it for recognition of a requirement to knock 
and announce); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308–09 (1958) (same). 
 291. Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195. 
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thieves come to a man’s house . . . to rob him, or murder, and the owner 
of his servants kill any of the thieves in defence of himself and his 
house, it is not felony, and he shall lose nothing . . . . [E]very one may 
assemble his friends and neighbours . . . to defend his house against 
violence . . . .”292 
The third reference is to “11 Coke Repts. 82b. Lewis Bowles Case,”293 which 
stated: 
If a Man is in his House, and hears that others will come to his House 
to beat him, he may call together his Friends, &c. into his House to aid 
him in Safety of his Person; for as it has been said, A Man’s House is 
his Castle and his Defense, and where he properly ought to remain.294 
Taken together, the three authorities—Hale, Coke, and Semayne’s Case—are 
important sources for the substantive aspect of search and seizure law because they 
shed light on which objects are protected. Consistent with those important 
predecessors, Adams in Article 14 specifically listed the house as one of the four 
objects protected; so does the Fourth Amendment. More broadly, the Richardson 
litigation evidences recognition of—and use of—those authorities as sources of a 
complex search and seizure jurisprudence that extended well beyond narrow 
concerns with general warrants. 
In his own case preparation as a lawyer, Adams in 1774 addressed the 
protections afforded a person in his home. The case, King v. Stewart, was an 
instance of mob “violence which disturbed Adams deeply.”295 On March 19, 1766, 
a mob broke into the home and store of Richard King, terrorized the family, caused 
significant damage, and burned some of his papers.296 Protracted litigation followed 
and Adams became counsel for King in 1773.297 In Adams’s handwriting is “what 
appears to be a complete text of his address to the jury.”298 In the course of that 
argument, Adams described “that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that 
delightful Tranquillity which the Laws have thus secured to [an Englishman] in his 
own House.”299 He added: 
An Englishmans dwelling House is his Castle. The Law has erected a 
Fortification round it—and as every Man is Party to the Law, i.e. the 
Law is a Covenant of every Member of society with every other 
Member, therefore every Member of Society has entered into a solemn 
                                                                                                                 
 
 292. Id. 
 293. Bowles v. Bury, (1616) 77 Eng. Rep. 1252 (K.B.) 1258; 11 Co. Rep. 79, 82. 
 294. Rex v. Richardson, Defense Counsel’s Notes, in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 86, at 412 n.93 (quoting Bowles, 11 Co. Rep. at 82). 
 295. King v. Stewart, Editorial Note, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, 
at 106. 
 296. Id.  
 297. Id. at 106–07. 
 298. Id. at 107. 
 299. King v. Stewart, Adams’ Minutes of the Review, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, supra note 86, at 137. 
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Covenant with every other that he shall enjoy in his own dwelling 
House as compleat a security, safety and Peace and Tranquility as if it 
was surrounded with Walls of Brass, with Ramparts and Palisadoes and 
defended with a Garrison and Artillery. . . . 
 Every English[man] values himself exceedingly, he takes a Pride 
and he glories justly in that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that 
delightfull Tranquillity which the Laws have thus secured to him in his 
own House, especially in the Night. Now to deprive a Man of this 
Protection, this quiet and Security in the dead of Night, when himself 
and Family confiding in it are asleep, is treat[ing] him not like an 
Englishman not like a Freeman but like a Slave . . . .300 
4. Litigation on Arrest Warrants 
Beginning in 1761, a series of events resulted in “complex litigation,” described 
as a “landmark in the history of Martha’s Vineyard, [which] arose out of an 
unhappy family situation.”301 A series of warrants were issued to arrest various 
members of the Mayhew family, including Wadsworth Mayhew.302 When Deputy 
Sheriff Cornelius Bassett sought to execute a warrant for the arrest of Mayhew, he 
enlisted the aid of a number of men.303 Apparently, they set out at 9:30 p.m. for the 
house where Mayhew was supposed to be and surrounded it.304 Bassett went to the 
front door and demanded entrance.305 In response, he “received a charge of 
buckshot in the legs.”306 He and his men then broke down the door and, after a 
struggle, seized Wadsworth.307 
Numerous lawsuits resulted and Otis308 and later Adams represented Bassett and 
another man.309 Robert Treat Paine was the opposing attorney.310 Adams and Paine 
both took notes. Adams scribbled that the “Turning Point” of the case was the 
“legality of [the] Warrant.”311 He referred to the warrant as “General,” and added: 
“Void in itself. Broke open in the dead of Night.”312 He also cited several 
authorities on the law of arrests that stand for the propositions that one coming to 
another’s door to make an arrest must announce his purpose and give those inside 
                                                                                                                 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 87; see also CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 563–69 (providing additional details 
about the litigation and asserting that the litigation “defined Massachusetts as the first 
jurisdiction to complete the transition from general to specific warrants”). 
 302. Bassett v. Mayhew, Editorial Note, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
86, at 87–90. 
 303. Id. at 89.  
 304. Id. 
 305. Id.  
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 89–90. 
 308. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 565. 
 309. Id. at 567; Bassett v. Mayhew, Editorial Note, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 86, at 90.  
 310. Bassett v. Mayhew, Editorial Note, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
86, at 90. 
 311. Id. at 91. 
 312. Id.  
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the opportunity to admit the person before the breaking of the door was justified.313 
He thereafter wrote: “No Necessity. Late in the Night.”314 Paine’s minutes also 
referenced the law pertaining to arrests and warrants315 and listed the following 
“Objections to Warrant” at the end: 
To search all suspected houses. 
Not for sufficient Cause to break house. 
If Warrant good, officer could not break in the night.316 
Cuddihy notes the “foremost irony” of the litigation: “Adams and Otis, who had 
acquired reputations as opponents of general writs of assistance, had championed 
clients acting under close relatives of those writs.”317 Irony aside, the detailed 
criteria for the issuance and execution of warrants that Adams and Paine recognized 
as controlling demonstrate detailed knowledge of search and seizure principles, 
including a distinction between general and specific warrants, limitations on 
nighttime searches, knock and announce principles, and the law of arrests.318 
F. Adams as Delegate to the Continental Congress 
In 1774, the American colonies created the First Continental Congress. John 
Adams was a delegate from Massachusetts, serving from September 5 to October 
26.319 In an address to the American people on October 21, 1774, and again in an 
address to the King on October 26, 1774, Congress “protested the power of the 
Commissioners of Customs ‘to break open and enter houses without authority of 
any civil magistrate founded on legal information.’”320 Simultaneously, “Congress 
warned the inhabitants of Quebec that British legislation had exposed them to 
excises,” and that they should “expect entrance by ‘insolent’ excise-men into 
‘houses, the scenes of domestic peace and comfort and called the castles of English 
subjects in the books of their law.’”321 
                                                                                                                 
 
 313. Id. at 99 nn.59–63. 
 314. Id. at 99. 
 315. Bassett v. Mayhew, Paine’s Minutes of the Referees’ Hearing, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS 
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 101–05. 
 316. Id. at 105. 
 317. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 569. 
 318. See id. at 566–69.  
 319. Among Adams’s notes from that Congress is this reference to a speech by Lee: 
“Life, and liberty which is necessary for the security of life, cannot be given up when we 
enter into society.” Notes of John Adams, Sept. 8, 1774, in THE SPIRIT OF ’SEVENTY-SIX 51, 
52 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1958). 
 320. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 543–44 (citing sources). 
 321. Id. at 544 (citing sources); see also id. at 779–80 (arguing that Professor Davies’s 
characterization of these addresses as referring to writs of assistance is inaccurate and 
asserting that Congress was referring to actions that did not require writs); 2 DIARY AND 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 147 (Adams writing in his diary on October 
4, 1774, that Lee showed him the address to the People of Canada). 
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III. 1776 TO 1791: THE EVOLUTION OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISIONS 
A. Article 14 and Other Early Search and Seizure Provisions 
Many of the state governments at the time of the American Revolution adopted 
legal protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.322 Those protections, 
embodied in the constitutions of the various states after declaring their 
independence, typically addressed only abuses associated with general warrants.323 
The Massachusetts Constitution, drafted by John Adams in 1779 and adopted by 
the Commonwealth in 1780,324 offered a much different model. The constitution 
                                                                                                                 
 
 322. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 603–13. 
 323. The Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina constitutions only addressed and 
abolished general warrants. See VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights § 10, reprinted in 
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 311, 312 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1960); MD. 
CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights § 23, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, 
supra, at 346, 348; N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights § 11, reprinted in 
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra, at 355, 355; see also infra note 346 (reproducing the 
Virginia provision). Pennsylvania offered a somewhat broader provision. Its statement of 
rights, Section 10, provided: 
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and 
possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without oaths 
or affirmation first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and 
whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search in 
suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their property, not 
particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be granted. 
PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the Commonwealth, or 
State of Pennsylvania § 10, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra, at 328, 330. The 
first clause of this provision, although declaring the broader principle of freedom from 
searches and seizures, arguably served only as a premise for condemning general warrants, 
which were the only abuses prevented. Vermont adopted a constitution in 1777 with a search 
and seizure provision nearly identical to Pennsylvania’s but Vermont was not admitted into 
the Union until 1791. See VT. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, 
supra, at 358, 366. With the exceptions of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the 
remaining states did not address searches and seizures at all in constitutions they adopted. 
See, e.g., SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra, at 309–10. 
  Some other legal restraints were also adopted. For example, New Jersey passed a 
statute in 1782 to prevent illegal trade with the enemy. The act provided for the issuance of 
search and seizure warrants “as in the case of stolen Goods” by judges upon application 
made if “due and satisfactory Cause of Suspicion shewn,” and made upon written oath or 
affirmation, that goods are concealed in a house or other building. QUINCY, supra note 83, at 
508–09 n.11 (quoting Statute of June 24, 1782, c. 317). In 1787, Connecticut recognized that 
general search warrants were illegal at common law. See Frisbie v. Butler, 1 Kirby 213, 215 
(Conn. 1787). 
 324. See generally 3 ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 225–28 n.3 (L.H. Butterfield & 
Marc Friedlaender eds., 1963) (summarizing how Adams came to be the sole drafter). New 
Hampshire duplicated the Massachusetts provision in its bill of rights in 1784. N.H. CONST. 
of 1784, art. I, § 19, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 323, at 382, 384. 
For an excellent treatment of the evolution of the treatment of Article 14 by Massachusetts 
courts, see Joseph A. Grasso, Jr., “John Adams Made Me Do It”: Judicial Federalism, 
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Adams created was preceded by a “Declaration of Rights,” including a search and 
seizure provision325 that ultimately became Article 14, which provided: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches 
and seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his 
possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the 
cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or 
affirmation, and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make 
search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, 
or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special 
designation of the person or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no 
warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities 
prescribed by the laws.326 
Although Adams consulted other state constitutions,327 Article 14 had significant 
innovations: the words “secure” and “unreasonable” to define the quality and scope 
of the right protected were new to search and seizure provisions; and the first 
sentence declared a broad right against unreasonable searches and seizures, not just 
a prohibition against general warrants. Other aspects of Article 14 were similar to 
provisions in other states. The first sentence contains a list of four objects 
protected, similar to the list in Pennsylvania’s Constitution, which was adopted four 
years before the Massachusetts provision.328 The second sentence of Article 14 
abolished general warrants, as had several previous state constitutions. Adams, 
consistent with the Pennsylvania constitution, required the foundation of the 
warrant to be specified and under an oath or an affirmation. Adams added some 
innovative language: (1) the warrant had to be “accompanied with a special 
designation of the person or objects of search, arrest, or seizure;” and (2) issued 
“with the formalities prescribed by the laws.”329 
It is somewhat remarkable and certainly disappointing that Adams never seems 
to have commented on the Massachusetts search and seizure provision.330 Nor is 
there any discussion—other than an ambiguous comment by a congressman whose 
                                                                                                                 
Judicial Chauvinism, and Article 14 of the Massachusetts’ Declaration of Rights, 77 MISS. 
L.J. 315 (2007). 
 325. The sole change made to Adams’s draft was to substitute the word “subject” for 
“man.” 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 106, at 263 nn.23–24. 
 326. MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1780, art. XIV, reprinted in Lasson, supra note 
3, at 82 n.15. 
 327. E.g., 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 391 (Adams’s 
diary entry for June 23, 1779, which disparages the Pennsylvania Constitution and notes that 
the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights had been “taken almost verbatim” from Virginia’s); 
Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Sept. 10, 1779), in 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 106, at 140 (stating that he had “many fine Examples” of other constitutions to 
examine in preparing the Massachusetts draft). I have found no record of Adams explicitly 
discussing how other search and seizure provisions influenced his draft. Nonetheless, as 
discussed in text, there are obvious influences. 
 328. See MASS. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1780, supra note 326. 
 329. Id. 
 330. There appear to be only a few isolated comments by Adams about any aspect of the 
Massachusetts Constitution. See, e.g., 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 505–
09 (1854) (noting three letters written between 1779 and 1780). 
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identity is disputed—by any of the men who debated the structure of the Fourth 
Amendment as to why they were choosing Adams’s model as the better of the two 
models. Nonetheless, as discussed in the next subparts, Adams’s model became the 
preferred format during the crucial period that began with the drafting of the 
Constitution in 1787 and ended with the drafting of the Fourth Amendment in 
1789. 
B. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 
The United States Constitution resulted from a convention in Philadelphia in 
1787. Almost none of the debate at the convention involved discussion of a bill of 
rights, and there is no record of any discussion of a search and seizure provision. 
The framers were concerned with the larger issues of the structure and powers of 
the federal government and its relationship to the states. In the final days of the 
convention, George Mason, a delegate from Virginia, proposed including a bill of 
rights. He argued: “It would give great quiet to the people, and, with the aid of the 
state declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours.”331 Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts moved that a bill of rights be prepared, which was seconded by 
Mason. The very brief recorded debate that accompanied the motion only 
mentioned the necessity for juries and was not otherwise specific as to the elements 
of a bill of rights. The motion was defeated by an even vote among the states, with 
Massachusetts being absent.332 Both Mason and Gerry ultimately declined to sign 
the Constitution at the conclusion of the convention but their influence on the 
process continued, with each playing a role in the subsequent evolution of the 
language of the Fourth Amendment. 
Adams was in England at the time of the Constitutional Convention and the 
convention had adopted a code of silence.333 Upon reviewing a copy of the 
proposed Constitution shortly after it had been made public, Adams wrote a letter 
to Thomas Jefferson stating that he hoped it would be adopted “and Amendments 
be made at a more convenient opportunity.”334 He then posed these questions to 
Jefferson: “What think you of a Declaration of Rights? Should not such a Thing 
have preceded the Model?”335 As will be discussed, subsequent arguments, on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 331. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 538 
(Ayer Co., Publishers, Inc. reprint ed. 1987) (1845) (quoting George Mason).  
 332. See id.  
 333. See, e.g., DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787, at 51 (2007) (discussing the 
“strict” adherence to the code of silence by the delegates). 
 334. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 10, 1787), in 1 THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS 210 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). 
 335. Id. Although Jefferson did not reply directly on this point to Adams, he did write to 
Madison on December 20, 1787, that “no just government should refuse” a bill of rights. 
STEWART, supra note 333, at 227, 327 (quoting the letter); see also Letter from John Adams 
to Cotton Tufts (Jan. 23, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 778 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998) (affirming support for the Constitution but 
indicating a need for future amendments); Letter from John Adams to Cotton Tufts (Feb. 12, 
1788), in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 212 n.4 (“[A] Declaration of Rights I 
wish to see with all my Heart.”). 
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either side of the debate over the inclusion of a bill of rights in the Constitution, 
were often not much more detailed than the sentiments expressed in Adams’s letter. 
C. The Confederation Congress 
The proposed constitution was sent to the Confederation Congress. Cuddihy 
summarizes that body’s actions: 
 On receiving the Constitution, the Continental Congress resolved to 
send it to the state legislatures but only after rejecting efforts by both its 
enemies and its friends to predetermine the result. Supporters of the 
Constitution wished it transmitted with a recommendation favoring 
adoption. On the other hand, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia and 
Melancthon Smith of New York proposed that Congress first attach a 
bill of rights to the Constitution. One article of Lee’s bill of rights, 
which he excerpted from the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, 
would have insulated citizens against “unreasonable searches [and] 
seizures of their persons, houses, papers or property.” Congress rejected 
both proposals and forwarded the Constitution unanimously but without 
recommendation, either for or against acceptance.336 
Cuddihy’s point is an important one: Lee utilized the first sentence of Article 14 of 
the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights as the basis of his proposal. Moreover, Lee 
shared that model with many others, including George Mason, an important figure 
during the ratification debates in Virginia, and urged Mason to develop a plan for 
several states to ratify the Constitution with amendments.337 
                                                                                                                 
 
 336. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 671–72 (citations omitted). Lee’s proposal in full read: 
“That the Citizens shall not be exposed to unreasonable searches, seizure of their persons, 
houses, papers, or property.” 2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 442 n.1 (James Curtis 
Ballagh ed., 1914); see also 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 653 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998) (same with minor stylistic changes). 
 337. In a letter to Mason from Richard Henry Lee, dated October 1, 1787, Lee 
commented on the proceedings in the confederation Congress and how it had sent the 
proposed Constitution without change to the States despite his attempts to amend it. He sent 
Mason a copy of his proposed amendments. Lee suggested to Mason that Virginia and other 
states join in creating amendments and approving the Constitution with the amendments. 
Letter from Richard Henry Lee to George Mason (Oct. 1, 1787), in 2 THE LETTERS OF 
RICHARD HENRY LEE, supra note 336, at 438–40. A similar letter was sent to Samuel Adams, 
Elbridge Gerry, and numerous other influential men. See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to 
Samuel Adams (Oct. 5, 1787), in 2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE, supra note 336, at 
444–47. Lee’s proposal was widely disseminated and “responses to Lee’s letter and 
amendments were voluminous.” 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 463 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2003). 
  Lee’s proposed amendment is linguistically broader than the initial views of the 
writer of a pamphlet that gained widespread circulation, Letters of a Federal Farmer. In 
letter number 4, dated October 12, 1787, the writer complained that several essential rights 
were omitted, including “freedom from hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants not 
founded on oath, and not issued with due caution, for searching and seizing men’s papers, 
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D. The Ratification of the Constitution by the States 
After the Constitutional Convention, and during the period of time when the 
individual states were considering the proposed Constitution, thousands of 
letters, pamphlets, speeches, and other comments were generated, both for and 
against adoption.338 There were extensive communications among the various 
factions throughout the states.339 The omission of a bill of rights was a 
significant criticism of the proposed Constitution, but the surviving records 
                                                                                                                 
property and persons.” Letter from the Federal Farmer no. 4, in NEIL H. COGAN, CONTEXTS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 706, 710 (1999). However, in letter number 6, dated December 25, 
1787, the writer listed among the “unalienable or fundamental rights in the United States” 
that “he is subject to no unreasonable searches or seizures of his person, papers or effects.” 
Letter from the Federal Farmer no. 6, in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 274 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995). Giving more detail, in letter number 
16, dated January 20, 1788, the writer stated: 
[T]hat all persons shall have a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches 
and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, or possessions; and that all 
warrants shall be deemed contrary to this right, if the foundation of them be not 
previously supported by oath, and there be not in them a special designation of 
persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and that no person shall be 
exiled or molested in his person or effects, otherwise than by the judgment of 
his peers, or according to the law of the land. 
Letter from the Federal Farmer no. 16, in COGAN, supra, at 717, 722. Some have attributed 
the Letters to Lee but others have doubted that attribution. See, e.g., 14 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 237, at 15–16 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983). 
Lee was elected to the Senate after ratification of the Constitution and was a champion of 
amendments in the Senate. See 1 RICHARD H. LEE, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF RICHARD HENRY 
LEE 240–41 (1825). 
  Lee’s memoir and correspondence reflect some broader knowledge of search and 
seizure developments and related matters. In 1767, he received a letter from his brother, who 
made reference to the attempts to destroy Wilkes, to brand Wilkes with seditious libel, and 
of meeting Wilkes. Lee’s brother also sent him a copy of the North Briton. Id. at 56–62. In 
1774, as a delegate to the Continental Congress, Lee was on the committee with John Adams 
that drafted an address to the King regarding American grievances. Id. at 111–16. He also 
drafted the letter to the people of Quebec, which referenced arbitrary British search and 
seizure practices. See 1. J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 104–05 (1774). Lee, as delegate to the 
Continental Congress in 1776, drafted the resolution calling for independence. See 1 LEE, 
supra, at 170. 
  Adams and Lee were frequent correspondents. In a letter dated November 15, 1775, 
Adams shared with him his outline of his plan for government. Letter from John Adams to 
Richard Henry Lee (Nov. 15, 1775), in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 185–
87 (1851). In an interesting letter to John Adams on October 8, 1779, Lee stated that he was 
“much interested in the establishment of a wise and free republic in Massachusetts Bay” and 
expressed his desire to “finish the remainder of my days” in Massachusetts. Letter from 
Richard Henry Lee to John Adams (Oct. 8, 1779), in 2 THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY 
LEE, supra note 336, at 155. On September 10, 1780, Lee wrote to Adams regarding his 
reading the draft of the Massachusetts constitution. 10 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 
106, at 141–42. 
 338. See generally DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237. 
 339. See generally Lasson, supra note 3, at 83–100 (summarizing numerous letters). 
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indicate that the debate rarely involved delving into the details of an 
enumeration of a bill of rights. Instead, it was usually at a much higher level 
of generality, that is, whether to amend the Constitution or not to include a bill 
of rights.340 
Notwithstanding this, there were numerous, isolated references concerning a 
need for protection against searches and seizures. Some have claimed that the 
commentary addressed solely a concern with general warrants.341 The historical 
record, however, does not support that view. Instead, a variety of concerns were 
expressed. Most of the comments are themselves vague assertions, consisting of 
little more than a phrase or a sentence or two.342 Some did involve complaints 
                                                                                                                 
 
 340. The argument against a Bill of Rights was straightforward: it was not needed. One 
delegate to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention stated the position succinctly: “What occasion 
for a bill of rights when only delegated powers are given? One possessed of 1000 acres, conveys 
250. Is it necessary to reserve the 750?” Delegate Thomas McKean (Dec. 10, 1787), in 2 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 546–47 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). Similar 
comments, although perhaps more artfully stated, were repeatedly made. See, e.g., Anti-
Cincinnatus, HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE (Dec. 19, 1787), reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 237, at 488 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000) (discussing such views); 
Remarker, INDEP. CHRON. (Dec. 27, 1787), reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
237 at 527, 529; Lasson, supra note 3, at 88–91. 
  For representative rejoinders by the Anti-Federalists, see Vox Populi, MASS. 
GAZETTE (Nov. 16, 1787), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 251–
52 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1997); see also Portius, AM. HERALD 
(Nov. 12, 1787), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 216–18. The 
sentiments of those concerned with the absence of a bill of rights were well summed up by 
“One of the Common People,” writing in the Boston Gazette, on Dec. 3, 1787. After 
rebutting the claim of another essayist that a bill was not needed because the Constitution 
was a limited grant of authority to the Federal government, the writer concluded:  
I sincerely believe if the federal constitution which shall be given, be clearly 
defined, and a boundary line be marked out, declaratory of the extent of their 
jurisdiction, of the rights which the state hold unalienable, and the privilege 
which the citizens thereof can never part with, the republick of America will 
last for ages, and be free. 
See One of the Common People, BOSTON GAZETTE (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 4 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 367–69 (emphasis in original). 
 341. See, e.g., Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 610–11. 
 342. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 673–80, 686–91 (summarizing the pamphlets and 
essays). A notable exception was a “revised” constitution drafted by “The Society of 
Western Gentlemen.” In early 1788, those Anti-Federalists circulated a draft constitution that 
included the following provision: 
Every person has a right to hold himself, his house, papers, and possessions free 
from search or seizure, therefore general warrants to seize any person of his 
property, without evidence of an act committed, and a particular description of 
his offence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be granted. 
9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 773 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1990). The draft was published in April and May of 1788 in the Virginia Independent 
Chronicle. Id. at 769–70. 
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about general warrants343 but others addressed more broadly stated concerns 
about unjustified searches and seizures,344 the unlimited power of new officers345—
particularly excise officers,346 or the protection of the home.347 There are no tracts 
                                                                                                                 
 
 343. Anti-Federalist attacks included the claim that general search warrants would be 
permitted. See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 3, at 88 n.36, 93–94; see also Essay of Brutus No. 2, 
reprinted in COGAN, supra note 337, at 715; INDEP. GAZETTEER (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 172 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); INDEP. 
GAZETTEER (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 329–
37 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981); Centinel II, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J. 
(Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 457–68; A Son 
of Liberty, N.Y.J. (Nov. 8, 1787), reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, 
at 481. One interesting criticism was written by Mercy Otis Warren, who was James Otis’s 
sister: 
There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against the dangerous 
encroachments of power in too many instances to be named: but I cannot pass 
over in silence the insecurity in which we are left with regard to warrants 
unsupported by evidence—the daring experiment of granting writs of 
assistance in a former arbitrary administration is not yet forgotten in the 
Massachusetts; nor can we be so ungrateful to the memory of the patriots who 
counteracted their operation, as so soon after their manly exertions to save us 
from such a detestable instrument of arbitrary power, to subject ourselves to the 
insolence of any petty revenue officer to enter our houses, search, insult, and 
seize at pleasure. 
Mercy Otis Warren, Observation on the Constitution (Feb. 1788), reprinted in 2 BIRTH OF 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 143 (Jon L. Wakelyn ed., 
2004) [hereinafter BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS] (emphasis in original). Warren published 
the pamphlet under the name “A Columbian Patriot,” and it was for a long time thought to 
have been written by Eldridge Gerry. See 1 BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 73. 
Warren’s tract appears to be the only reference to Otis and the writs of assistance made 
during the period when the Constitution and proposed amendments were being debated. See 
Amar, supra note 183, at 76. 
 344. See, e.g., An Old Whig V, PHILA. INDEP. GAZETTEER (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 541 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1981) (expressing view that, without a Bill of Rights, no persons’ “houses and papers 
[would be] free from seizure and search upon general suspicion or general warrants”); 
Brutus II, N.Y.J. (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 
135 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2003) (arguing that a bill of rights was 
necessary because of the power of the central government of “granting search warrants, and 
seizing persons, papers, or property”). 
 345. “New officers may be created, the duties of which you would shudder to hear 
named.—Your houses may cease to be your castles—the most unreasonable searches may be 
made on you, your papers, &c. &c.” To the CONVENTION of MASSACHUSETTS, AM. HERALD 
(Jan. 14, 1788), quoted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 711 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998). 
 346. Compare VA. INDEP. CHRON. (Nov. 28, 1787), reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 237, at 177, 178 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988) 
(arguing that there should be no concern about the federal government collecting excise 
taxes, given that Pennsylvania had long used such taxes and, in executing such taxes, “[n]o 
man’s house was broke open. The rights and properties of the people were not outraged”), 
1034 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:979 
 
or detailed discussions about a search and seizure provision. I repeat two points 
for emphasis: the commentary urging the adoption of a search and seizure 
provision was fragmentary and isolated within a vast ocean of discussion about 
the proposed Constitution; and the concerns expressed often extended beyond 
general warrants. 
To illustrate these points, one of the most detailed comments consisted of a few 
sentences in a longer essay, published in a Massachusetts newspaper, expressing a 
concern about tax collectors, but touching on a broad range of search and seizure 
concerns: 
According to the spirit of obedience which you manifest; to the ease 
with which you part with your money, so will the mode of assessing 
and collecting it be varied from time to time by your new masters. If 
one [collector] shall not be competent, he shall be attended with an 
host.—Whether that host shall be the posse of your country or a file of 
armed soldiers, shall depend upon circumstances. They are to 
determine, and you are to make no laws inconsistent with such 
determination, whether such Collectors shall carry with them any 
paper, purporting their commission, or not—whether it shall be a 
general warrant, or a special one—whether written or printed—whether 
any of your goods, or your persons shall be exempt from distress, and 
in what manner either you or your property is to be treated when taken 
in consequence of such warrants. They will have the liberty of entering 
your houses by night as well as by day for such purposes.—All these 
points are given in letter and in spirit to the New Constitution, and the 
                                                                                                                 
with The Impartial Examiner I, VA. INDEP. CHRON. (Feb. 27, 1788), reprinted in 8 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 420, 422 (arguing that the “new species of 
authority . . . may warrant the most flagrant violations of the sacred rights of habitation” in 
pursuit of excise taxes). See also Luther Martin: Genuine Information VI, BALT. MD. 
GAZETTE (Jan. 15, 1788), reprinted in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 377 
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (“By the power to lay excises, a power 
very odious in its nature, since it authorises officers to go into your houses, your kitchens, 
your cellars, and examine into your private concerns, the Congress may impose duties on 
every article of use or consumption.” (emphasis in original)); A Son of Liberty, N.Y.J. (Nov. 
8, 1787), reprinted in 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 135 (John P. Kaminski 
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2003) (arguing that, under the new Constitution, “[e]xcise laws 
established, by which our bed chambers will be searched by brutal tools of power, under 
pretence, that they contain contraband or smuggled merchandize, and the most delicate part 
of our families, liable to every species of rude or indecent treatment, without the least 
prospect, or shadow of redress, from those by whome they are commissioned”). 
  Concern about the scope of searches to enforce excise taxes was longstanding. See, 
e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 300–02. The concerns expressed were particularly acute 
when the states were debating the proposed Constitution in 1787 to 1788. See, e.g., id. at 
678–79, 742 n.272; see also 22 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1710–11 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2008). 
 347. Robert Whitehill’s numerous comments and speeches at the Pennsylvania 
convention were some of the broader observations. They included: “Houses may be broke 
open by officers of the general government.” Robert Whitehill, Speech at Pennsylvania 
Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, 514 
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
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subject has not a shadow of security that they will not be executed.—
Nay, if they ever should mean to exercise the right of taxation at all, I 
affirm it can be done with success by them in no other way, but in an 
arbitrary manner, and by previously subduing the spirit and strength of 
this Commonwealth.348 
The essayist then referred to Article 14 to show that Massachusetts had “deemed it 
of consequence, to preface such powers, with the mode in which they should be 
exercised.”349 After setting forth the provisions of Article 14, the essayist added: 
These checks are omitted, however, in the present proceedings, and the sole 
reason why appears to be this, that the makers of them know the power itself 
to be improper, that the people would always be convinced of that 
impropriety, and would never submit, so long as they could resist.—That of 
course it must be collected without these checks, or not collected at all.350 
Eventually, all of the original thirteen states ratified the Constitution.351 It was, 
however, a close vote in several crucial states. To secure ratification, a strategy was 
developed of accompanying ratification with proposed amendments.352 Virginia, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, and New York each proposed amendments to the Constitution 
that included a search and seizure provision. But the actual process within each of those 
states demonstrates that only Virginia and New York had any real influence. North 
Carolina initially refused to ratify the Constitution unless its amendments were adopted 
but later reversed itself and approved of the Constitution unconditionally. Rhode Island’s 
ratification did not come until after the Constitution was in effect and the other states 
were in the process of ratifying the Fourth Amendment.353 A search and seizure  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 348. John De Witt IV, AM. HERALD (Nov. 19, 1787), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 237, at 269–70 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1997). 
 349. Id. at 270. 
 350. Id. 
 351. The list is in 1 ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 319–37 (1836). 
 352. See, e.g., 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 294–96 (John P. Kaminski 
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995) (discussing that strategy for New York). 
 353. Rhode Island, which ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790, requested the 
following amendment: 
That every person has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and 
seizures of his person, his papers, or his property; and therefore, that all 
warrants to search suspected places, to seize any person, his papers, or his 
property, without information upon oath or affirmation of sufficient cause, are 
grievous and oppressive; and that all general warrants (or such in which the 
place or person suspected are not particularly designated) are dangerous, and 
ought not to be granted. 
1 ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 335 (1836). The design of the Rhode Island proposal was 
virtually the same as New York’s, with the main difference being the substitution of 
“person” for New York’s “freeman.” 
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amendment was debated in Pennsylvania,354 Maryland,355 and Massachusetts,356 but the 
proposals were rejected by those states’ ratifying conventions.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 354. The absence of a bill of rights was a significant topic of debate at the Pennsylvania 
ratifying convention. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 436–38, 454, 489–90 (1836). As to 
searches and seizures, Robert Whitehill on December 8, 1787, argued that the proposed 
Constitution offered “no security . . . for people’s houses or papers” and that “[t]he case of Mr. 
[John] Wilkes, and the doctrine of general warrants show that judges may be corrupted.” Notes of 
James Wilson’s of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (Dec. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 526 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). He added: “A wicked 
use may be made of search warrants.” Id. A few days later, Whitehill proposed the following as part 
of a bill of rights: 
That warrants unsupported by evidence, whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, 
his or their property, not particularly described, are grievous and oppressive, and shall 
not be granted either by the magistrates of the federal government or others. 
Notes of Alexander J. Dallas (Dec. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
237, at 597; see also PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 421 (John B. McMaster & 
Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888). The convention rejected Whitehill’s proposal and then ratified the 
Constitution. Id. at 422–23. The dissenters thereafter widely circulated their reasons for rejecting the 
Constitution, which included Whitehill’s proposal. E.g., 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
237, at 7–34 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984). 
 355. A committee formed by the Maryland convention to consider amendments drafted the 
following proposal: 
That all warrants without oath, or affirmation of a person conscientiously scrupulous 
of taking an oath, to search suspected places, or seize any person or his property, are 
grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to 
apprehend any person suspected, without naming or describing the place or the 
person in special, are dangerous, and ought not to be granted. 
Address to the People of Maryland (Apr. 21, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 551 (1836). 
That proposal tracks closely the Maryland Constitution, Declaration of Rights provision of the time 
period, which remains unchanged to this day as Article 26. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, A Vision of 
Search and Seizure Protection, 34 MD. BAR J. 11 (2001) (describing textual limitations of 
Maryland’s search and seizure provision). The report of the Maryland convention states: 
This amendment was considered indispensible by many of the committee; for, 
Congress having the power of laying excises, (the horror of a free people,) by which 
our dwelling houses, those castles considered so sacred by the English law, will be 
laid open to the insolence and oppression of office, there could be no constitutional 
check provided that would prove so effectual a safeguard to our citizens. General 
warrants, too, the great engine by which power may destroy those individuals who 
resist usurpation, are also hereby forbidden to those magistrates who are to administer 
the general government. 
Address to the People of Maryland, in 2 ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 551–52 (1836). Despite these 
sentiments, the committee chose not to submit any proposed amendments to the Maryland 
convention. Id. at 555. Existing records indicate that there was also some concern expressed about 
the “power of excise officers to search and seize.” Samuel Chase, Notes of Speeches Delivered to 
the Maryland Ratifying Convention, in 2 BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 343, at 197; see 
also John Francis Mercer, Essays by a Farmer, I, in 2 BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 
343, at 191 (noting that, in England, it had become a maxim that juries would return “ruinous 
damages” for customs searches, although acknowledging that the damages were frequently paid by 
the government “upon a certificate of the judge that there was probable cause of suspicion”). 
 356. The journal notes of the Massachusetts ratification debates indicate that amendments were 
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Virginia’s search and seizure proposal became the basis for the other states that 
did propose a search and seizure provision. The Virginia convention began on June 
2, 1788, and it ratified the Constitution with recommended amendments on June 
27, 1787.357 In early June, the Anti-Federalist members of the convention agreed to 
a “Declaration or Bill of Rights.”358 Among those provisions was the following:  
                                                                                                                 
proposed on January 31, 1788, by John Hancock. See 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, 
at 1116–21, 1380–83 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000). Those amendments did 
not include a search and seizure provision. On February 2, 1788, a committee was appointed to 
consider Hancock’s amendments. Id. at 1405–06. It reported back on February 6. On that date, a 
motion was made to amend the committee report to add a provision that provided, inter alia, that the 
Constitution never be construed “to subject the people to unreasonable searches & seizures of their 
persons, papers, or possessions.” Id. at 1453. That motion was defeated. Id. One of the delegates, 
Jeremy Belknap, took notes of the proceedings that day. He wrote that Samuel Adams proposed an 
amendment for “Protection of Persons & Property from Seizure &c,” but that Adams subsequently 
withdrew the motion. Nonetheless, according to Belknap, another delegate renewed the motion, 
which was defeated (with even Samuel Adams voting against it). Id. at 1490. Massachusetts 
thereafter ratified the Constitution without a search or seizure provision as a recommended 
amendment. Id. at 1469–71. The convention had produced other requests for a bill of rights 
modeled on the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, id. at 1450, including a reference to Article 
14, that is, that the framers of the Massachusetts constitution had taken “particular care to prevent 
the [legislature] from authorizing the judicial authority to issue a warrant against a man for a crime, 
unless his being guilty of the crime was supported by oath or affirmation, prior to the warrants 
being granted,” Speech of Abraham Holmes at the Convention Debates (Jan. 30, 1788), reprinted 
in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1368 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 2000).  
 357. See 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 897–900. 
 358. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 1068. Mason acted as chair of 
the group. See Letter from Patrick Henry to John Lamb (June 9, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 237, at 817 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990). 
During the Virginia convention, as he had at the Federal convention, Mason was a strong 
proponent of amendments to the Constitution. See, e.g., 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 
supra note 151, at 1062–68. Mason composed a list of objections to the Constitution, listing 
inter alia, the absence of a “Declaration of Rights.” Id. at 991. Mason’s views became well 
known, with Mason sending his list to many influential men. See generally 8 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 237, at 40–42 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1988). 
That list included Elbridge Gerry, Letter to Elbridge Gerry from George Mason (Oct. 8, 
1787), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 1005–06; Thomas Jefferson, 
Letter to Thomas Jefferson from George Mason (May 26, 1788), in 3 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 1045; and George Washington, Letter to George 
Washington from George Mason (Oct. 7, 1787), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra 
note 151, at 1001. Washington, in turn, sent the list to James Madison. Id. at 1002. 
Washington also had a copy of Lee’s objections to the Constitution and observed that Lee’s 
and Mason’s “political tenants” were “always in unison.” Letter from George Washington to 
James Madison (Oct. 10, 1787), quoted in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, 
at 1002. Notably absent from Mason’s list was any reference to searches and seizures. 3 THE 
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 991. 
  It is unknown who drafted the recommended amendment sent to Congress by the 
Virginia ratifying convention. Some maintain that Mason probably drafted it. E.g., CUDDIHY, 
supra note 15, at 684–85 (arguing that Mason probably drafted the provision); see also KATE 
M. ROWLAND, 2 THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 444 (1892) (making the same argument and 
noting that the original manuscript is in the handwriting of Mason); 19 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 237, at 43, 63 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995) 
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That every free Man has a Right to be secure from all unreasonable 
Searches and Seizures of his Person, his papers, and his property. All 
Warrants therefore to search suspected places, or to seize any freeman, 
his papers, or Property, without Information upon Oath (or Affirmation 
of a Person religiously scrupulous of taking an Oath) of legal and 
sufficient Cause, are grievous and oppressive; and all general Warrants 
to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected Person, 
without specifically naming or describing the place or Person, are 
dangerous, and ought not to be granted.359 
The records of the Virginia convention’s debate have the most detailed 
comments concerning the need for a search and seizure provision of any of the 
ratifying conventions but the specific language of the Anti-Federalists’ proposal 
was never examined. The speakers sometimes expressed a concern about general 
warrants but they also spoke more broadly about unjustified intrusions. Patrick 
Henry spoke frequently. On June 5, 1788, around the same date that the Anti-
Federalists were drafting their search and seizure proposal,360 Henry argued in the 
convention broadly about the concern that “excise men . . . may search at any time 
your houses and most secret recesses.”361 On June 16, 1788, he made extended 
                                                                                                                 
(reproducing the draft and noting editorial changes in Mason’s hand). There is, however, 
reason to doubt that Mason was the drafter. Mason’s proposed amendments to the 
Constitution, circulated by him prior to the Virginia ratifying convention, did not include a 
search and seizure provision. Also, although Mason was the primary drafter of the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights in 1776, the general warrant provision was added by the convention; 
Mason disclaimed being the author and dismissed it as “not of fundamental nature.” 
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 323, at 302 n.8; see also 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
MASON, supra note 151, at 290. 
  The authorship of the general warrant provision of the Virginia constitution is also 
unknown. See 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 279, 286. The evolution 
of the language of the Virginia Declaration of Rights is detailed in 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
MASON, supra note 151. Mason’s initial draft made no reference to searches and seizures, 
with the exception of a note that it was “agreed to in committee condemning the use of 
general warrants.” Id. at 278. A later draft also referred only to general warrants, see id. at 
284, as did the final form, quoted in the text below, infra text accompanying note 368. See 
also 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 288. Edmond Randolph later 
stated that the Virginia provision had been inspired by the seizure of Wilkes’s papers in 
England under a general warrant. See id. at 290.  
 359. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 1070. It is also quoted in 3 
ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 658 (1836).  
 360. See Letter from Patrick Henry to John Lamb (June 9, 1788), in WILLIAM WIRT 
HENRY, 2 PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 342–43 (1891) (discussing 
how George Mason had agreed to act as chair of the Anti-Federalist group and that they had 
drafted amendments and a bill of rights that the group intended to introduce). 
 361. Patrick Henry, Debates, The Virginia Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 963 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1990). George Mason, on June 11, struck a similar theme: “And as to excises—This 
will carry the exciseman to every farmer’s house who distills a little brandy, where he may 
search and ransack as he pleases.” George Mason, Debates, The Virginia Convention (June 
11, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1157 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990). 
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remarks about the proposed Constitution and returned to a concern about searches 
and seizures at least twice. At one point, he observed: 
Suppose an exciseman will demand leave to enter your cellar or house, 
by virtue of his office; perhaps he may call on the militia to enable him 
to go. If Congress be informed of it, will they give you redress? They 
will tell you, that he is executing the laws under the authority of the 
continent at large, which must be obeyed; for that the Government 
cannot be carried on without exercising severity. If, without any 
reservation of rights, or controul, you are contented to give up your 
rights, I am not.362 
Later that same day, Henry argued: 
In the present [Virginia] Constitution, they are restrained from issuing 
general warrants to search suspected places, or seize persons not 
named, without evidence of the commission of a fact, &c. There was 
certainly some celestial influence governing those who deliberated on 
that Constitution:—For they have with the most cautious and 
enlightened circumspection, guarded those indefeasible rights, which 
ought ever to be held sacred. The officers of Congress may come upon 
you, fortified with all the terrors of paramount federal authority.—
Excisemen may come in multitudes:—For the limitation of their 
numbers no man knows.—They may, unless the General Government 
be restrained by a Bill of Rights, or some similar restriction, go into 
your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack and measure, every thing 
you eat, drink and wear. They ought to be restrained within proper 
bounds.363 
In both passages, Henry pointedly addressed unrestrained, broad, suspicionless 
searches. At one point, he unfavorably compared the lack of restrictions that 
Federal agents would operate under to the prohibition against general warrants in 
the Virginia Constitution. Yet, both passages extend beyond the concern with 
regulating only that type of warrant to a broader concern with searches “by virtue 
of [their] office.” 
However, Governor Randolph, in reply the next day, addressed only a concern 
about general warrants: 
 That general warrants are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to 
be granted, I fully admit. I heartily concur in expressing my detestation 
of them. But we have sufficient security here also. We do not rely on 
the integrity of any one particular person or body; but on the number 
and different orders of the Members of the Government: Some of them 
having necessarily the same feelings with ourselves. Can it be believed, 
that the Federal Judiciary would not be independent enough to prevent 
                                                                                                                 
 
 362. Patrick Henry, Debates, The Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1301 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1993). 
 363. Id. at 1331–32 (footnote omitted). 
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such oppressive practices? If they will not do justice to persons injured, 
may they not go to our own State Judiciaries and obtain it?364 
On June 24, 1788, Patrick Henry returned to the need for a bill of rights: 
I feel myself distressed, because the necessity of securing our personal 
rights, seems not to have pervaded the minds of men: For many other 
valuable things are omitted. For instance:—General warrants, by which 
an officer may search suspected places, without evidence of the 
commission of a fact, or seize any person without evidence of his 
crime, ought to be prohibited. As these are admitted, any man may be 
seized; any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, 
without any evidence or reason. Every thing the most sacred, may be 
searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power. We have 
infinitely more reason to dread general warrants here, than they have in 
England; because there, if a person be confined, liberty may be quickly 
obtained by the writ of habeas corpus. But here a man living many 
hundred miles from the Judges, may rot in prison before he can get that 
writ.365 
Randolph again replied, denying the power of the federal government to issue 
general warrants.366 
History is not neat and even the limited comments extant from the Virginia 
convention contain ambiguity. Some of the comments by Henry addressed the 
wider concern with broad, suspicionless searches of excise officers “by virtue of 
[their] office.” Nonetheless, as demonstrated by the exchanges between Patrick 
Henry and Governor Randolph, a significant focus was also on general warrants. 
The Anti-Federalist proposal was adopted by the Virginia convention on June 
27, 1788, as a recommendation to the first Congress.367 That recommendation 
differed notably from the search and seizure provision of the Virginia constitution 
of 1776, which provided: “That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger 
may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact 
committed, or to seize any person not named, or whose offense is not particularly 
described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to 
be granted.”368 
                                                                                                                 
 
 364. Edmund Randolph, Debates, The Virginia Convention (June 17, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1351–52 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1993). 
 365. Patrick Henry, Debates, The Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1474–75 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1993). 
 366. See Edmund Randolph, Debates, The Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1484 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1993). 
 367. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 1119; see also 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1515, 1550–52 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1993).  
 368. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights § 10, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 
323, at 312. 
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Instead, the Virginia proposal was demonstrably influenced by Article 14, 
largely adopting its structure and much of its language. The language of the first 
sentence was virtually a replication of Article 14, including Adams’s first sentence 
declaring a right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. That 
language had been used by Richard Henry Lee in his list of amendments, which he 
provided to Mason shortly after the conclusion of the federal convention.369 The 
second sentence of the Virginia proposal prohibited general warrants, continuing 
the evolution of the language of such prohibitions; it added some new verbiage but 
maintained the essential historical lesson of seeking objective criteria for warrants 
to issue. However, a notable change from Article 14 was the exclusion of slaves 
from its protection. In sum, the Virginia convention had before it two types of 
search and seizure provisions, including its own narrow one banning only general 
warrants; the convention chose the Adams model.370 
Virginia’s proposed search and seizure provision was dispatched to the New 
York convention,371 where it went through a peculiar evolution but ultimately 
emerged substantively unaltered. At the New York convention, the Federalists 
feared defeat and initially engaged in protracted discussions of the provisions of the 
proposed Constitution; the proceedings dragged on and no discussion of search and 
seizure principles occurred during that time.372 Upon arrival of the news that 
Virginia had ratified the Constitution, the Federalists stopped “‘disput[ing] every 
inch of ground’” and “‘quietly suffered [proposals made by the Anti-Federalists] 
without a word in opposition to them.’”373 On July 7, 1788, John Lansing, Jr. 
proposed a declaration of rights, which included a provision substantively identical 
to Virginia’s search and seizure recommendation.374 It was part of a larger group of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 369. See supra note 336. 
 370. During the course of the Virginia convention, there were general references to the 
Massachusetts Constitution but I have found no specific reference to Article 14. E.g., 10 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1268–69, 1380 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1993).  
 371. 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 151, at 1071; see also CUDDIHY, supra 
note 15, at 703 n.121 (citing sources for the transmission of the Virginia proposal to New 
York). There were extensive contacts between the Anti-Federalists in New York, Virginia, 
and other states during the period that the Constitution was before the states for ratification, 
and there were allegations that they were working in concert. See, e.g., 9 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 237, at 788–90, 811–13 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1990). The Virginia Anti-Federalists sent their amendments to New York on June 9, 1788. 
Id. at 813, 817–20. 
 372. See generally 22 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 1670–72 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2008). 
 373. Id. at 1672 (quoting letter from Nathaniel Lawrence to John Lamb on July 3, 1788); 
see also id. at 2084–87 (summarizing impact of receipt of the news from Virginia of that 
state’s ratification). 
 374. Lansing’s July 7, 1788 proposal was: 
That every Freeman has a Right to be secure from all unreasonable Searches & 
Seizures of his person, his papers & his property and that therefore all Warrants 
to search suspected places or to seize any Freeman his papers or property 
without Information upon Oath (or Affirmation of a person religiously 
scrupulous of taking an Oath) of sufficient Cause are grievous and oppressive 
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proposals and generated no recorded debate. Three days later, Lansing submitted a 
“new arrangement, and with material alterations,” of his previous plan.375 Lansing’s 
new plan produced an almost incoherent search and seizure provision,376 which was 
repeated by a proposal of Melancton Smith on July 17.377 Two days later, Lansing 
introduced another version,378 which restored the language to closely resemble 
Virginia’s proposal and that version, with some stylistic changes,379 was agreed to 
on July 26 by the convention.380 There was no recorded debate of the search or 
seizure provision at the convention.381 As an indication of how little thought was 
given to the process in New York, the convention did not even change Virginia’s 
limiting the coverage of the provision to a free man.382 
                                                                                                                 
and all general Warrants to search suspected places or to apprehend any 
suspected person without specifically naming or describing the place or person 
are dangerous & oppressive & ought not to be granted. 
Id. at 2111–12. 
 375. Id. at 2118.  
 376. Lansing’s July 10, 1788 proposal was: 
That every Freeman has a Right to be secure from all unreasonable Searches & 
Seizures of his person his papers & his property without Information upon Oath 
or Affirmation of sufficient Cause & that all general warrants to search 
suspected places or to apprehend any suspected person without specially 
describing or naming the place or person are dangerous & oppressive & ought 
not to be granted. 
Id. at 2120 (emphasis in original). Lansing’s marginal notes indicated “See Virginia Plan.” 
Id. at 2127 n.4. 
 377. Smith’s proposal had only stylistic changes. See 23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra 
note 237, at 2201 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2009). 
 378. Id. at 2236. 
 379. See id. at 2306. 
 380. The final version on July 26 provided:  
That every Freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and 
seizures of his person his papers or his property, and therefore, that all Warrants 
to search suspected places or seize any Freeman his papers or property, without 
information upon Oath or Affirmation of sufficient cause, are grievous and 
oppressive; and that all general Warrants (or such in which the place or person 
suspected are not particularly designated) are dangerous and ought not to be 
granted. 
Id. at 2328. 
 381. The records of the proceedings on July 19 state: “every freeman secure agt. Genl 
Warrants—agreed.” Id. at 2246; see also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 410 (1836) (noting 
that committee reported bill of rights to New York convention without any reported 
discussion). 
 382. In the South Carolina House of Representatives, during the debate on whether to call 
a convention to discuss ratifying the Federal Constitution, Charles Pickney (who had been a 
delegate to the Federal convention) reported that he initially had favored inclusion of a bill 
of rights but later became convinced that one was not necessary, given that the federal 
government had limited powers. See 4 ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 259–60 (1836). Pickney 
also observed that it would be “with very bad grace” for the delegates to advocate for a bill 
of rights because of the institution of slavery in South Carolina. Id. at 316. In the subsequent 
debates at the South Carolina ratifying convention, there were only brief references to the 
absence of a bill of rights, and no amendments were proposed. Id. at 317–42. 
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The North Carolina debate adds little more detail. On July 28, 1788, the North 
Carolina convention debated possible amendments.383 Delegate Spencer at one 
point argued that there “ought to be a bill of rights.”384 He asserted: “Our rights are 
not guarded. There is no declaration of rights, to secure every member of society 
those unalienable rights which ought not to be given up to any government.”385 
Another member replied that a bill of rights could not possibly list all of the rights 
and, if one was not listed, it would not be protected.386 Thus, he asserted, “a bill of 
rights might operate as a snare, rather than a protection.”387 And so it went. 
Members of the convention mentioned a few enumerated rights, such as trial by 
jury, but almost all of the discussion was on the level of generality as the comments 
just quoted indicate.388 On July 31, 1788, the convention resolved to consider 
proposed amendments collectively and not individually.389 It examined a long list 
of possible amendments, including a search and seizure provision similar to that 
proposed by the Virginia convention.390 The convention thereafter dissolved, after 
agreeing not to ratify the Constitution until a declaration of rights and certain other 
amendments had been presented to Congress or until a subsequent national 
convention was called to consider amendments.391 However, North Carolina 
                                                                                                                 
 
 383. See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA 129–77 
(Hodge & Wills 1789). 
 384. Speech of Delegate Spencer (Jul. 28, 1788), in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 
CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 383, at 161. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See Speech of Delegate Iredell (Jul. 28, 1788), in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF 
THE CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 383, at 168–74. 
 387. Id. at 173. 
 388. See generally PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF NORTH 
CAROLINA, supra note 383, at 129–77. 
 389. See id. at 268. 
 390. There appear to be two different versions of the North Carolina proposal. According 
to the official state records, the proposal provided: 
That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and 
seizures of his person, his papers and property: all warrants therefore to search 
suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected person without specifically 
naming or describing the place or person, are dangerous and ought not to be 
granted. 
22 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 18 (Walter Clark ed., 1907). A second, longer 
version, also purporting to be the official state records, provided: 
That every freeman has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and 
seizures of his person, his papers, and property: all warrants therefore to search 
suspected places, or seize any freeman, his papers or property, without 
information upon oath (or affirmation of a person religiously scrupulous of 
taking an oath) of legal and sufficient cause, are grievous and oppressive, and 
all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend any suspected 
person without specially naming or describing the place or person, are 
dangerous and ought not to be granted. 
18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 316 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1995). 
 391. The First Ten Amendments to the Constitution, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra 
note 323, at 420. 
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“reversed this action” on November 21, 1788, and “ratified the Constitution 
unconditionally,” that is, without any proposed amendments.392  
In aggregate, leading up to the first Congress, the need for a search and seizure 
provision was occasionally addressed but the comments tended to be terse. 
Nonetheless, the observations extended beyond merely regulating general warrants 
to broader concerns. Most states ratified the Constitution without reference to a bill 
of rights. Several states debated, but rejected, proposing a search and seizure 
provision. Virginia was the first state to propose one and the lineage back to Adams 
is clear: Lee utilized Adams’s model in his proposal to the Confederation Congress 
and shared that proposal with Mason and others. At the Virginia convention, the 
Anti-Federalists had Virginia’s own 1776 constitution and Adams’s model from 
which to choose. They chose the essential structure and language of the Adams 
model. The other three states that advocated a search and seizure provision were 
strongly—and seemingly viscerally—influenced by what Virginia had done. 
Hence, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island each produced 
recommended provisions with a declaratory first sentence lifted almost verbatim 
from the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, followed by a second, independent 
section condemning general warrants and setting forth criteria for a warrant to 
issue. Adams’s influence is undeniable, especially in light of the prevalence of the 
alternative model that typified state constitutions of the era, which banned only 
general warrants. 
E. The Drafting of the Fourth Amendment 
In response to the concerns regarding the absence of a bill of rights in the 
Constitution, the first Congress drafted a series of amendments, one of which 
ultimately became the Fourth Amendment. The initial draft was prepared by James 
Madison, who was a committed Federalist. He had been a delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention and was the primary author of The Federalist, which 
rejected the need for a bill of rights.393 However, Madison’s position evolved over 
time.394 After the Constitution was adopted and when seeking a seat in the new 
                                                                                                                 
 
 392. See 4 ELLIOT, supra note 331, at 240–51 (1836); see also The First Ten 
Amendments to the Constitution, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 323, at 420. 
 393. The primary Federalist Paper addressing whether a bill of rights should be included 
in the Constitution, and opposing such a bill, was Number 84, written by Alexander 
Hamilton. He asserted: “The truth is . . . that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, 
and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 435 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). Hamilton also maintained that a bill of rights was not 
only unnecessary “but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to 
powers not granted . . . .” Id. at 433. Madison wrote Number 38, in which he asserted that a 
bill of rights was not essential to liberty. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 (James Madison). 
 394. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, dated October 17, 1788, Madison asserted that his 
“own opinion has always been in favor of a bill of rights” but that he believed that an 
omission of a bill was not a “material defect, nor [had he] been anxious to supply it even by 
subsequent amendment, for any other reason than that it is anxiously desired by others.” 
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 271 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904) (emphasis in original). During the period of time 
when the House was debating amendments, Madison wrote that “many States” had ratified 
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Congress, Madison promised that, if elected, he would introduce amendments to 
the Constitution that included an enumeration of rights.395 In Congress, Madison 
offered the following draft: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, 
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing 
the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.396  
Madison left a record of what he believed was the evil to be combated: general 
warrants. Shortly before introducing his proposed amendment in Congress, 
Madison wrote that he perceived the need to be “security against general 
warrants.”397 Similarly, Madison detailed in a speech to the House of 
Representatives his reasons for proposing the amendments.398 At one point he 
highlighted the need for a search and seizure provision: 
It is true, the powers of the General Government are circumscribed, 
they are directed to particular objects; but even if Government keeps 
within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to 
the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent . . . ; because 
in the Constitution of the United States, there is a clause granting to 
Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested in the 
                                                                                                                 
the Constitution “under a tacit compact” that amendments would be adopted and that the 
Constitution would not have been ratified in Virginia “had no assurances been given by its 
advocates that such provisions would be pursued. As an honest man I feel bound by this 
consideration.” Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters (Aug. 19, 1789), in CREATING 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 282 
(Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1991) (emphasis in 
original). Others have seen a different motivation for Madison’s proposals for a Bill of 
Rights: to undercut the challenge posed by the Anti-Federalists. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra 
note 15, at 724–27; see also 23 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 2505 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2009) (quoting letter from James Madison to George 
Washington on August 11, 1788, stating concern about proposals regarding a second 
constitutional convention would have to “be parried”); id. at 2516 (summarizing Madison’s 
maneuvering in the House of Representatives and asserting that his introduction of his 
proposed amendments ended “any real chance that a second general convention would be 
summoned”). 
 395. Lasson, supra note 3, at 97–98. 
 396. Id. at 100 n.77 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789)). 
 397. Letter from James Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 394, at 319 n.I, 320; see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas 
Mann Randolph (Jan. 13, 1789), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 416 (Robert A 
Rutland & Charles F.  Hobson eds., 1977) (listing as one of the “essential rights . . . 
exemption from general warrants, &c”); Letter from James Madison to a Resident of 
Spotsylvania County (Jan. 27, 1789), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 428 
(listing “Exemption from General Warrants, &c” as a needed provision (emphasis omitted)). 
 398. See James Madison, Speech at the First Congress, First Session: Amendments to the 
Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 394, at 370. 
1046 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:979 
 
Government of the United States, or in any department or officer 
thereof; this enables them to fulfil every purpose for which the 
Government was established. Now, may not laws be considered 
necessary and proper by Congress, . . . which laws in themselves are 
neither necessary nor proper . . . ? I will state an instance, which I think 
in point, and proves that this might be the case. The General 
Government has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to 
collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the 
direction of the Legislature: may not general warrants be considered 
necessary for this purpose, as well as for some purposes which it was 
supposed at the framing of their constitutions the State Governments 
had in view? If there was reason for restraining the State Governments 
from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining the 
Federal Government.399 
Hence, little is left to speculation as to what Madison meant: his intent was to ban 
general warrants and his draft was designed to accomplish that narrow objective. 
Madison’s draft is a compilation of sources. Without doubt, he was acquainted 
with the Virginia Declaration of Rights and with the recommended amendment that 
resulted from the Virginia ratifying convention.400 What appears obvious is that, 
like the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Madison perceived general warrants as the 
evil to be avoided. However, instead of adopting that earlier formulation from 
Virginia, Madison adopted Adams’s structure embodied in Article 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, which had strongly influenced the Virginia 
ratifying convention’s formulation of its recommended amendment. Madison 
copied almost verbatim Adams’s declaratory statement containing four essential 
elements: (1) a right against searches and seizures; (2) limiting that right to be 
against only “unreasonable” intrusions; (3) defining a list of objects specifically 
protected, including persons, houses, papers, and “other property;”401 and (4) 
defining the quality of the right protected as the right to be “secure.”402 
                                                                                                                 
 
 399. Id. at 383–84; see also id. at 390 (indicating Madison’s notes of his speech 
referenced general warrants). 
 400. Madison had been a delegate to the Virginia ratifying convention. 9 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 237, at 908 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990).  
 401. The list of objects protected is identical to the Article 14 list, which was in turn 
derived from the Pennsylvania Constitution, see supra note 323, except for Madison’s 
substitution of the phrase “other property” for “possessions.” Madison’s phrase was changed 
in the House consideration of the amendment to the word “effects,” which remained in the 
amendment as adopted. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 n.7 (1984). “Effects” are 
limited to personal property and do not include real property. See id.; see also Hester v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
 402. Madison, in his address to the House of Representatives, repeatedly used variations 
on the concept of “security” as the underlying concern. Hence, he asserted, amendments 
were needed to “expressly declare the great rights of mankind secured under this 
Constitution.” James Madison, Speech at the First Congress, First Session: Amendments to 
the Constitution (June 8, 1789), 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 394, at 374. As 
another example, he stated that the Bill of Rights would “provide those securities for liberty 
which are required by a part of the community” and that it would “incorporate those 
provisions for the security of rights.” Id. at 374–75. 
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Madison, Adams, and the previous state constitutional provisions all condemned 
general warrants. The Madison draft differed from Article 14 in two significant 
ways: (1) linguistically, the draft only prevented general warrants;403 and (2) 
Madison used substantially different language to articulate the criteria for a proper 
warrant to issue. As to the second point, the Adams formula for prohibiting general 
warrants was awkward, vague, and wordy. Instead, Madison substituted new 
phraseology, drawing on warrant issuance criteria in other provisions, including the 
requirement of an oath or affirmation,404 a particular description,405 and a 
requirement of some level of individualized suspicion.406 The Madison draft’s sole 
substantive innovation was to identify that level of suspicion as probable cause. 
The congressional history concerning the evolution of the final form of the 
amendment’s language is sparse and somewhat disputed. The provision generated 
very little recorded debate.407 The Madison draft was referred to a Committee of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 403. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–84 (1980). Lasson, for example, 
maintained that this draft of the amendment was  
[a] one-barrelled affair, directed apparently only at the essentials of a valid 
warrant. The general principle of freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure seems to have been stated only by way of premise, and the positive 
inhibition upon action by the Federal Government limited consequently to the 
issuance of warrants without probable cause, etc. 
Lasson, supra note 3, at 103; see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 81 (1950) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Fourth Amendment was framed with general 
warrants especially in mind); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 191 (1947) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the Fourth Amendment was “designed in part, indeed perhaps 
primarily, to outlaw such general warrants”); TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 42 (indicating that 
Madison’s draft only prohibited general warrants). But see CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 695 
(arguing that Madison’s original draft “embraced the full breadth of the final version” but 
that general warrants, because they were “sufficiently egregious,” merited specific mention). 
 404. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1776, art. X, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra 
note 323, at 330.  
 405. See id. 
 406. The Pennsylvania Constitution required a “sufficient foundation.” Id. Both the 
Virginia and North Carolina Constitutions required “evidence of the fact committed” to 
search suspected places and that seizures of persons be “supported by evidence.” VA. CONST. 
of 1776, § 10, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 323, at 311, 312; N.C. 
CONST. of 1776, art. X, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 323, at 355, 356. 
Massachusetts required specification of the “cause or foundation.” MA. CONST. of 1780 art. 
XIV, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 323, at 373, 376. 
 407. It appears that many members of Congress viewed the amendments as having little 
real significance. Congressman John Sherman of Connecticut commented: “The 
amendments reported are a declaration of rights; the people are secure in them, whether we 
declare them or not . . . .” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 715 (1789). Two other congressmen uttered 
the view that, since four or five states had proposed amendments, they supported 
amendments to “gratify” the states. Id. at 732 (Aug. 15, 1789 comments of Mr. Hartley and 
Mr. Vining). Similarly, Congressman Fisher Ames wrote a letter on June 11, 1789, 
describing Madison’s proposed amendments: “Upon the whole, it may do good towards 
quieting men who attend to sounds only, and get the mover some popularity—which he 
wishes.” Letter from Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight (June 11, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 
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Eleven, which was made up of one member from each state represented in 
Congress.408 That committee reported a draft to the full House in the following 
form: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.409 
After this version was reported, the phrase “unreasonable searches and seizures,” 
inadvertently omitted in the committee’s draft, was inserted and the word “secured” 
was changed to “secure.”410 Those changes restored the amendment to the Madison 
draft proposal, with the sole substantive change being a narrowing of the objects 
protected from “other property” to “effects.” 
There was another—fundamentally important—change. After the Committee of 
Eleven reported its draft to the House, the phrase “by warrants issuing” was 
objected to by a member of Congress, who believed that “[t]his declaratory 
provision was good as far as it went, but he thought it was not sufficient; he 
therefore [sought] to alter it [to] read ‘and no warrant shall issue.’”411 The historical 
records do not further specify the basis of the objection. What is known is that the 
member appeared to recognize the amendment as declaratory of a right and that he 
sought to clarify that right by making the first clause linguistically independent of 
the second clause. The identity of the member is contested. The Annals of Congress 
lists the objector as Egert Benson of New York.412 Relying on a newspaper 
                                                                                                                 
394, at 247. Another Congressman, George Gale, sent a copy of Madison’s proposals to 
William Tilghman and commented: “I trust you will think most of them Innocent and were it 
not that the Opponents to the Government might exult perhaps insultingly would have little 
Objection to their being Adopted.” Letter from George Gale to William Tilghman (June 17, 
1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 394, at 252. James Madison perhaps best summarized that 
view: 
It is much to be wished that the discon[ten]ted part of our fellow Citizens could 
be reconciled to the Government they have opposed, and by means as little as 
possible unacceptable to those who approve the Constitution in its present form. 
The amendments proposed in the H. of Reps. had this twofold object in view; 
besides the third one of avoiding all controvertible points which might 
endanger the assent of 2/3 of each branch of Congs. and 3/4 of the State 
Legislatures. How far the experiment may succeed in any of these respects is 
wholly uncertain. It will however be greatly favored by explanatory strictures 
of a healing tendency, and is therefore already indebted to the co-operation of 
your pen. 
Letter from James Madison to Tench Coxe (June 24, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 397, at 257 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). 
 408. Lasson, supra note 3, at 100. 
 409. Id. at 100–01. 
 410. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789) (Aug. 17, 1789 comments and motion of Mr. 
Gerry).  
 411. Lasson, supra note 3, at 101 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789)).  
 412. Id.  
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account,413 scholars have challenged the accuracy of the Congressional Record and 
have argued that Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts made the motion.414 
Gerry had been a member of the Constitutional Convention, where he had 
proposed a bill of rights and thereafter declined to endorse the Constitution. Prior to 
the Massachusetts ratifying convention, he explained in a letter to the 
Massachusetts legislature that he refused to sign the Constitution, inter alia, 
because the “system is without the security of a bill of rights.”415 Gerry believed, 
however, that the proposed Constitution had “great merit, and by proper 
amendments may be adapted to the ‘exigencies of government and the preservation 
of liberty.’”416 In a letter on June 22, 1788, Gerry observed that New York was 
going to adopt the Constitution conditionally by annexing a bill of rights; he 
believed that “removed all [the] objections.”417 
After the Constitution had been ratified, Gerry stood for election to the House of 
Representatives. In an open letter to the citizens of his district, Gerry stated that he 
would “be desirous of such amendments as will remove the just apprehensions of 
the people, and secure their confidence and affection.”418 In Congress, he helped 
Madison’s efforts to introduce a bill of rights.419 Gerry was a long time intimate of 
Adams and, being from Massachusetts, he was undoubtedly familiar with Article 
14.420 If Gerry made the motion, it is reasonable to conclude that he did so to 
restore the structure set forth in Article 14 or at least to reflect the proposed 
provisions by Virginia and New York, which were in turn influenced by Article 
14.421 
                                                                                                                 
 
 413. See Gazette of the United States (Aug. 22, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 
394, at 179–82. 
 414. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 694–95 n.89, 730–31; Davies, Original Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 24, at 716–19; see also Amar, First Principles, supra note 22, at 775 
n.66 (criticizing accuracy of the House reporter). 
 415. Letter from Elbridge Gerry to the Senate and House of Representatives of 
Massachusetts (Oct. 18, 1787), in JAMES T. AUSTIN, 2 THE LIFE OF ELBRIDGE GERRY 42, 43 
(1829). 
 416. Id. 
 417. Letter from Elbridge Gerry to General Warren (June 28, 1788), in AUSTIN, supra 
note 415, at 84, 85. 
 418. Letter from Elbridge Gerry to the Electors of Middlesex District, Massachusetts, in 
AUSTIN, supra note 415, at 91, 93. 
 419. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 693. 
 420. In a letter to Gerry shortly after he drafted the Massachusetts Constitution, Adams 
discussed its structure and his hope for its adoption. Letter from John Adams to Elbridge 
Gerry (Nov. 4, 1779), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 505–06 (1854). In a 
letter dated December 2, 1814, upon hearing of the death of Gerry, Adams remarked that 
they had been friends for over forty years. Letter from John Adams to Rufus King (Dec. 2, 
1814), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 106 (1856). 
 421. During a debate in Congress, Gerry stated that the members of the Massachusetts 
delegation “were particularly instructed to press the Amendments recommended by the 
convention of that state at all times.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 662 (1789). However, a search and 
seizure provision was not among the amendments recommended by Massachusetts. See 
supra note 356. In a letter dated August 18, 1789, Congressman Frederick A. Muhlenburg 
wrote that the House had spent the day as a Committee of the Whole debating amendments. 
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In contrast, Benson had served on a Committee for Detecting Conspiracies, 
which Cuddihy has asserted “bombarded the citizens of New York with general 
warrants during the Revolution.”422 Nonetheless, Benson had been a member of the 
New York ratifying convention, which was one of the states urging adoption of a 
broad search and seizure provision. As a member of Congress from New York, it 
was plausible that he saw that model as the proper one. 
Regardless of whether the objecting member was Benson or Gerry, the 
substance of the objection is telling: “[t]his declaratory provision was good as far as 
it went, but he thought it was not sufficient; he therefore [sought] to alter it [to] 
read ‘and no warrant shall issue.’”423 In other words, Madison’s draft failed as an 
insufficient declaration of the right protected and the amendment should return to 
the Adams model of a broad declaratory statement, with a second component 
condemning general warrants. Buttressing such a conclusion was the language 
chosen repeatedly by the Virginia and other state conventions and the stated goal of 
Gerry and others to support the amendments proposed by the state ratifying 
conventions. 
The proposed revision appears to have been defeated by a “considerable 
majority.”424 Several days later, Benson, acting as chairman of the committee 
appointed to arrange and report amendments, reported the clause as either he or 
Gerry had proposed it, notwithstanding its apparent rejection by the House.425 At 
                                                                                                                 
Letter from Frederick A. Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush (Aug. 18, 1789), in CREATING THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra 
note 394, at 280. He observed: “Mr. Gerry & Mr. Tucker had each of them a long string of 
Amendts. which were not comprised in the Report of the special Committee, & which they 
stiled Amendments proposed by the several States.” Id. Cuddihy asserts that Gerry “had an 
established record of opposition to general searches and seizures.” CUDDIHY, supra note 15, 
at 695 n.90. In support of that claim, Cuddihy cites only the fact that Gerry had been a 
member of a committee in 1773 that had sent a copy of Otis’s arguments in the Writs Case to 
the Connecticut Committee of Correspondence. Id. 
 422. CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 724. 
 423. Lasson, supra note 3, at 101 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789)). 
 424. Lasson, supra note 3, at 101, 102 n.84 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (1789)). But 
see Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 719–20 (arguing that the motion 
passed, although acknowledging that the historical evidence “is inconsistent” and 
maintaining that a subsequent minor grammatical change in the language of the amendment 
made after the “no warrant shall issue” motion was made and supports his view). 
 425. Landynski, supra note 1, at 41–42;  Lasson, supra note 3, at 101–02. It is unknown 
whether the change was due to Benson’s oversight, his unilateral action, or an unreported 
acceptance of Benson’s phrasing by the House. Lasson, supra note 3, at 102 n.84. 
  The committee consisted of three members: John Sherman of Connecticut, Theodore 
Sedgwick of Massachusetts, and Benson. Id. at 101 n.81. There is no evidence that Sherman 
or Sedgwick had any influence on the drafting of the amendment. At best they were 
disinterested. Sherman had performed distinguished service on behalf of the colonies and the 
newly independent United States, including being the only person to have signed the 
Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of the Rights of the Colonies, the Articles of 
Confederation, and the Constitution. See ROGER SHERMAN BOARDMAN, ROGER SHERMAN: 
SIGNER AND STATESMAN 122 (1938). Yet, there is little history of Sherman having any 
interest in search and seizure issues. As a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and 
during the subsequent attempts to ratify the Constitution, he was opposed to the inclusion of 
a Bill of Rights. Id. at 261–62, 267–73; see also CHRISTOPHER COLLIER, ROGER SHERMAN’S 
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this point, the historical record is barren of substantive comments about the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment: the House version was accepted by the Senate, 
which was later formally enacted by both Houses of Congress and ratified by the 
states.426 There are no records of any debate in the Senate on the Fourth 
Amendment and virtually no information appears to exist about ratification debates 
regarding the amendment in the individual states.427 
                                                                                                                 
CONNECTICUT 242 (1971) (quoting Sherman as stating on September 12, 1787: “The State 
Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and being in force are 
sufficient.”). Sherman had been an associate justice in Connecticut from 1768 to 1769 and 
had some involvement in the debate as to whether writs of assistance should be issued as 
general or specific writs. The Connecticut court apparently declined to issue general writs. 
See QUINCY, supra note 83, app. I, at 501–06. As a member of Congress, Sherman 
eventually came to see the amendments as harmless. See, e.g., Letter from Roger Sherman to 
Henry Gibbs (Aug. 4, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD 
FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 394, at 271. Sherman wrote that the 
amendments “will probably be harmless & Satisfactory to those who are fond of Bills of 
rights.” Id. His main contribution to the Bill of Rights was as an advocate for not 
interweaving them into the text of the original document. See BOARDMAN, supra, at 293–94 
(citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–08 (1789)). Sherman did, however, maintain a long term 
friendship with John Adams. See id. at 123, 175; Letter from John Adams to Roger Sherman 
(July 17, 1789), in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 427, 429 (1851) 
(describing Adams’s “unalterable friendship” with Sherman). But I have found no indication 
that they specifically discussed search and seizure principles. Cf. Journal Entry of John 
Adams (Aug. 17, 1774), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 343 (1850) 
(describing Adams’s conversation with Sherman during the 1774 Continental Congress in 
which Sherman asserted that Otis’s tract on the rights of the colonists had conceded too 
much authority to parliament); 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 427–42 
(correspondence between Adams and Sherman on the structure of governments). In a debate 
at the Continental Congress regarding the composition of a statement of grievances against 
Great Britain, according to Adams’s notes, Sherman observed: “The Colonies adopt the 
common Law, not as the common Law, but as the highest Reason.” 2 DIARY AND 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ADAMS, supra note 101, at 129. 
  Sedgwick was a strong Federalist and unlikely candidate for limiting the powers of 
the federal government. See generally M.E. Bradford, High Federalist Teaching: Theodore 
Sedgwick of Massachusetts, 25 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 31 (1990). Sedgwick had been a 
delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying convention and had served on the committee that was 
asked to prepare recommended amendments. Id. at 34. As discussed in note 356, a search 
and seizure amendment was not proposed by that committee; a subsequent attempt to add 
one was defeated. In a letter dated July 19, 1789, Sedgwick showed little respect for 
Madison or his “system of amendments.” Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Benjamin 
Lincoln (July 19, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD 
FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 394, at 263–64. He did not want them to 
“shackle the operations of government,” and he viewed the debate regarding the 
amendments as a “water gruel business.” Id. Sedgwick wrote another letter on August 20, 
1789, in which he commented that the House was “still engaged about the unpromising 
subject of amendments,” and he predicted that their introduction at that time was “unwise 
and will not produce the beneficial effects which its advocates predicted.” Letter from 
Theodore Sedgwick to Pamela Sedgwick (Aug. 20, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, supra note 394, at 283. 
 426. Lasson, supra note 3, at 102–03. 
 427. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 712–23. Based on his examination of the state 
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IV. ADAMS’S VIEWS AND INFLUENCE 
Although the road is long and winding, Adams’s imprint on the final product is 
clear. No other actor, drafter, or “framer” had any comparable influence on the 
language and structure of the Fourth Amendment.428 Adams and his contemporaries 
were exposed to many sources of information about search and seizure practices 
and the criteria—or lack thereof—to regulate them. Adams had varied and unique 
experiences that informed his views.429 Without doubt, Otis’s arguments in the 
Writs of Assistance Case had a profound and lifelong influence on Adams. He lived 
in Massachusetts, which bore the brunt of the arbitrary customs search and seizure 
practices and generated a significant amount of other litigation on search and 
seizure principles. Adams, as a litigator, had numerous cases involving searches 
and seizures, including customs enforcement and general warrants, nighttime 
searches, and entries into the home. Regarding the Liberty seizure, Adams 
contributed to the popular conception of the proper criteria for a search or seizure 
by arguing in the press for the probable cause standard. He served in the 
Continental Congress, which warned Canada about British practices. Adams 
corresponded with virtually all of the leading figures of the day, exchanging ideas 
on the theories and structures of government.430 Adams read extensively, including 
the major treatises of the era that addressed search and seizure principles. In 
addition to writing the Massachusetts Constitution, Adams wrote extensively on the 
structure of government. Finally, he examined other state constitutions when 
drafting the Massachusetts Constitution. Reflecting all of those influences, he 
created something unique: Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 
Taylor, Amar, and those others who argue for a reasonableness standard without 
any objective criteria—general reasonableness—simply ignore or miss the rich 
search and seizure jurisprudence of the period leading up to the Fourth 
Amendment.431 On the other hand, those advocating a warrant preference rule 
                                                                                                                 
records regarding the ratification of the amendment, Cuddihy observed: “None of [the state 
legislative] journals preserves a single utterance by a state legislator on the right respecting 
search and seizure. . . . To the extent that the direct evidence indicates, the amendment’s 
ratifiers took their thoughts about its original meaning to the grave.” Id. at 713. 
 428. Cf. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 158 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(noting that because the Fourth Amendment was based on the Massachusetts model, “[t]his 
is clear proof that Congress meant to give wide, and not limited, scope to [the] protection 
against police intrusion”).  
 429. Adams was certainly not without faults. For example, it was during his 
administration that the Alien and Sedition Acts became law. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN 
ADAMS 504–07 (2001). 
 430. Adams’s correspondence is massive. See, e.g., Letter from Patrick Henry to John 
Adams (May 20, 1776), in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 201–02 (1851) 
(discussing their thoughts on government); Letter from John Adams to John Penn (Jan. 
1776), in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 203–09 (1851) (detailing a “sketch 
[of] the outlines of a constitution” for North Carolina at the request of delegates from that 
state). 
 431. Professor Davies asserts that the framers “would have understood ‘unreasonable 
searches and seizures’ as the pejorative label for searches or for arrests made under that most 
illegal pretense of authority–general warrants.” Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra 
note 24, at 693; see also id. at 723 (implying that the framers were merely banning general 
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cannot reconcile that view with the rich variety of search and seizure practices of 
the era.432 Many of the principles that remain today as core search and seizure 
concerns were being litigated at that time. Treatise writers, judges, and others were 
attempting to formulate objective criteria to measure the propriety of such 
intrusions. Those criteria extended well beyond the comparative worth of general or 
specific warrants. 
                                                                                                                 
warrants and not creating a broad reasonableness standard). There are multiple problems 
with Davies’s position. First, it ignores that portion of Otis’s argument that set out detailed 
objective criteria for a warrant to issue. See supra notes 112, 118, 149 and accompanying 
text. Second, if the framers were concerned only with general warrants, the initial draft of the 
Fourth Amendment was clearly sufficient to address those concerns, as were its numerous 
state predecessors regulating only warrants. Third, if “reasonableness” is to be equated with 
the common law standards of the day, as Davies asserts, he fails to acknowledge that there 
were a series of common law rules that regulated (and limited) warrantless and warranted 
searches and seizures. This is to say, as Cuddihy has observed: 
To Davies, “unreasonable searches and seizures” embrace little more than the 
declarations of the 81 members of the First Congress who framed the 
amendment and its immediate antecedents employing identical phraseology. 
Davies excludes, sidetracks, and otherwise minimizes unarticulated but 
palpable assumptions, documentation incompatible with his thesis, and most of 
the legacy of search and seizure before 1780. The reader is left with historical 
meaning without 99 percent of the history that vests meaning. Davies begins by 
quoting L.P. Hartley’s aphorism that “the past is a foreign country: they do 
things differently there.” Davies however, myopically narrows the “country” to 
which he takes us to little more than its preceding decade and views it only 
through the tunnel vision of textual literalism. 
CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 778. If the framers were referring to the common law in using 
the term “unreasonable,” then it is just as likely that the framers were incorporating the 
common law standards for both warrants and warrantless actions. Finally, the word 
“reasonable” had many meanings at the time of the framing, ranging from connoting “logic 
or consistency” to “denoting unconstitutionality.” Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, 
supra note 24, at 687–93; see also David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common 
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1777–81 (2000) (examining various historical meanings of 
the word “reasonable” and observing that the term “unreasonable” in the late eighteenth 
century “almost always” meant “what it means today: contrary to sound judgment, 
inappropriate, or excessive”). Davies’s choice of its meaning remains entirely speculative 
and, in my view, not well supported. 
  As for Amar and his inspiration, Taylor, see, e.g., Davies, Original Fourth 
Amendment, supra note 24; Maclin, supra note 24; Steiker, supra note 24. I agree with the 
view that Professor Amar’s account “offered little evidence for [his] central historical 
claims.” See Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 576; see also CUDDIHY, 
supra note 15, at 776–77 (broadly criticizing Amar’s work). 
 432. To be fair, there is some support in the framing era for the view that recourse to a 
magistrate was a favored procedure to pre-authorize a search. Otis, according to Adams’s 
abstract, stated that an officer should state his grounds to search “before a magistrate; and 
that such magistrate, if he think proper, should issue a special warrant to a constable to 
search the places.” 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, app. A at 525 (1850). In the 
article attributed to Otis, he maintained that the needed justification to invade a person’s 
home “ought to be determin’d by adequate and proper judges.” QUINCY, supra note 83, app. 
I at 490 (emphasis in original). Similar isolated comments were made by others, including 
Leach’s counsel. See supra note 174. 
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For example, James Wilson delivered a series of lectures on the law between 
1790 and 1792. Wilson was a strong Federalist and, among other accomplishments, 
was an important figure in the Constitution ratification debates in Pennsylvania.433 
In his lectures, Wilson covered a host of topics but several illustrate the then 
contemporary legal thought on search and seizure. He at one point discussed the 
importance of law books, asserting that “the law, particularly the common law, 
abounds in rich materials.”434 He cited as examples Coke and James Burrow.435 In 
organizing the materials and providing assistance to those studying law, Wilson 
pointed to Hale’s works as “a most valuable part” and also pointed to 
Blackstone.436 Regarding the apprehension of criminals, Wilson noted that 
obtaining a warrant “is the first step usually taken” and that, “[b]y the constitution 
of Pennsylvania,[437] no warrant to seize persons shall issue without describing 
them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation.”438 He detailed some of the standards for arrests: when a felony was 
committed in one’s presence, all persons of age were “bound to apprehend the 
person who has done the mischief” but if the crime was “out of their view, they are, 
upon hue and cry, obliged to pursue with the utmost diligence, and endeavor to 
apprehend him who has committed it.”439 Wilson added: “In all these cases, the 
doors of houses may, if necessary, be broken open for the apprehension of the 
offenders, if admittance is refused on signifying the cause of demanding it.”440 
Other contemporary441 and near contemporary commentators442 also saw the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 433. See generally PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787–1788 (John B. 
McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888). 
 434. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 254 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) (including 
his lectures as a professor of law from 1790 to 1792). 
 435. See id. 
 436. Id. at 255. 
 437. Pennsylvania amended its constitution in 1790 to closely resemble the Fourth 
Amendment. It provided: 
That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, 
from unreasonable searches and seizures: And that no warrant to search any 
place, or to seize any person or things, shall issue, without describing them as 
nearly as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. 
PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 8, quoted in Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 
24, at 615 n.181. If the Fourth Amendment was viewed at the time as having no application 
beyond banning general warrants, then there was no reason to amend the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, given that the previous version had done so. See supra note 323. 
 438. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 434, at 445. 
 439. Id. at 446. 
 440. Id.  
 441. A recent article, David T. Hardy, The Lecture Notes of St. George Tucker: A 
Framing Era View of the Bill of Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1527 (2009), sheds some 
additional light. St. George Tucker was a professor of law at William and Mary from 1790 
until his appointment to the bench in 1804. Id. at 1527. 
While at William and Mary, he produced an edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, annotated in light of American law. The text became “the 
standard work on American law for a generation” and Tucker remained the 
most frequently cited American legal scholar for over two decades. Tucker’s 
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role in American legal scholarship was likewise striking. He has been termed 
“the first modern American law professor” and creator of the American law 
degree.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). Tucker’s annotated Blackstone was cited by the Supreme Court in 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594–95 (2008), to help interpret the Second 
Amendment. Hardy reproduced Tucker’s notes on the Fourth Amendment and argued that 
the notes “treat[] probable cause and warrant issuance as components of reasonableness.” 
Hardy, supra, at 1535. These are Tucker’s notes: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers & effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated——What shall 
be deemed unreasonable searches and seizures. The same article informs us, by 
declaring, “that no warrant shall issue, but first, upon probable cause— 
 
which cause secondly, must be supplied by oath or affirmation; thirdly the 
warrant must particularly described the place to be searched; and fourthly—the 
persons, or things to be seized. All other searches or seizures, except such as 
are thus authorized, are therefore unreasonable and unconstitutional. And 
herewith agrees our State bill of rights—Art. 10. 
 
[Tucker note: “vi: Act concerning aliens—contra 5: Cong: c:”] 
 
The case of general warrants, under which term all warrants except such as are 
above described are included, was warmly agitated in England about thirty 
years ago—and after much altercation they were finally pronounced to be 
illegal by the common law—see [Release?] of Money v. Leach 3 Burrow 1743. 
1 Bl. Rep: 555; vi ___ 4 B.C. 291. 
 
But this clause does not extend to repeal, or annul the common law principle 
that offenders may in certain cases be arrested, even without warrant. As in the 
case of riots, or breaches of the peace committed within view of a Justice of the 
Peace, or other peace officer of a county, who may in such cases cause the 
offender to be apprehended, or arrest him, without warrant. 
 
Nor can it be construed to restrain the authority, which not only peace officers, 
but every private person possesses, by the common law, to arrest any felon if 
they shall be present when the felony is committed, 
Hardy, supra, at 1535–36 (footnote omitted) (quoting Tucker’s lecture notes). 
  In addition to the lecture notes, Tucker’s commentary on Blackstone has a specific 
section on the Fourth Amendment. In that section, Tucker sets forth the language of the 
amendment, notes that general warrants were found to violate the common law in a series of 
English cases, and discusses at some length why the Alien Act of 1789, passed by the fifth 
Congress, violated the Fourth Amendment. See 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
301–04 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803); see also Hardy, supra, at 1535 n.34 (noting that 
Tucker’s commentary was cited by Justice Story in his treatise); see supra note 429. 
 442. Justice Story wrote a famous commentary about the Constitution some fifty years 
after the Fourth Amendment was ratified. His commentaries are often cited for the pithy 
statement that the Fourth Amendment “is little more than the affirmance of a great 
constitutional doctrine of the common law.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1895, at 748 (1833). Story states that “its 
introduction into the amendments was doubtless occasioned by the strong sensitivities 
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amendment as extending protections beyond general warrants and did not see 
Fourth Amendment analysis as either some undefined reasonableness quest or 
cabined by a warrant requirement.  
In notable contrast to some of the current claims about the history and meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment, the period between 1760 and 1791 offered many voices 
attempting to develop and articulate objective criteria by which to measure the 
propriety (“reasonableness”) of a search or seizure, including: 
Probable Cause. One of the many disputes among contemporary legal scholars 
revolves around the meaning and significance of “probable cause” to the framers.443 
Yet, the concept of probable cause as a justification for a search or seizure was well 
known in the framing era: Thatcher, Otis, and Adams advocated such a standard.444 
Otis, for example, contrasted “wanton” exercises of power under the writs of 
                                                                                                                 
excited, both in England and America, upon the subject of general warrants almost upon the 
eve of the American Revolution.” Id. Relying on these brief references, some draw support 
for the view that the amendment was merely designed to address the general warrant 
controversies or was not designed to address warrantless situations. E.g., Davies, Original 
Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 618 n.190. 
  Story’s commentaries, read in full, simply do not support that view; in fact, they are 
inconsistent with it. First, in the quotation just reproduced, Story was merely observing that 
the amendment was “occasioned by” the general warrant controversies; he did not say that it 
was defined or limited by them. Second, Story provided a broad view of the amendment’s 
purpose: “This provision seems indispensible to the full enjoyment of the rights of personal 
security, personal liberty, and private property.” STORY, supra, § 1895, at 748. Third, Story 
cited two instances involving warrantless situations, which were viewed as being within the 
purview of the amendment. The first, during Adams’s administration, involved the Alien Act 
of 1798, which was viewed as a violation of the amendment because it authorized the 
President to order the removal of “such aliens, as he should judge dangerous to the peace and 
safety of the United States, or have reasonable grounds to suspect of any treasonable, or 
secret machinations against the government.” Id. at 749 n.1. The second event involved the 
seizure of two Americans by military force during Jefferson’s administration “without any 
warrant, or order of any civil authority,” from New Orleans to Washington for trial. Id. 
(citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (4 Cranch) (1807)). Story observed that the Supreme 
Court found that the seizures “wholly disregarded” the Constitution. Id. at 749–50 n.1. He 
added: “Without any warrant or lawful authority, citizens are dragged from their homes by 
military force . . . against the plain language of this very article.” Id. Finally, Story cited to 
Sailly v. Smith, 11 Johns. 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814), which upheld the warrantless seizure of 
allegedly uncustomed goods against a claim, inter alia, that a warrant was needed. Id. at 749 
n.1. It would make no sense for him to cite the case if he did not believe that the amendment 
applied only to regulate warrants. 
 443. See, e.g., Davies, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 24, at 629–40. See 
generally Sklansky, supra note 431. 
 444. The early Congresses passed several customs statutes that have been cited to support 
various points of view as to the need for warrants or individualized suspicion to justify 
searches. See CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 735–39; Morgan Cloud, Searching Through 
History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1739–43 (1996) (book review); see 
also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 671 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(referring to the Collection Act of 1789 to illustrate the First Congress’s desire to maintain 
individualized suspicion as a requirement even where the warrant requirement would be 
inapplicable). As Professor Cloud notes, the statutes had a mix of requirements depending 
upon the location and purpose of the search. Cloud, supra, at 1739–43. 
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assistance where “[b]are suspicion without oath [was] sufficient.”445 Otis, in his 
famous oration, repeatedly argued in favor of the criteria to issue warrants for 
stolen goods, which required a showing of “good Grounds of suspicion,”446 
“probable suspicion,”447 or “probable ground.”448 Variations of that wording 
abound in treatises and commentaries.449 Recall also the arguments in Money v. 
Leach that the search was justified because the authorities had probable cause at the 
time of the search, despite the fact that the authorities were acting under a general 
warrant. Madison’s sole innovation in drafting the Fourth Amendment was to 
explicitly adopt probable cause as a required basis for a warrant to issue. He did not 
write those words in a vacuum. In sum, and as noted throughout this article, that 
standard was repeatedly referenced as a needed criterion.450 Merely because the 
meaning of probable cause was not fixed does not undermine its importance.451 
Indeed, its meaning remains unfixed to this day.452  
Certain procedures valued. The era offered a rich set of other criteria to measure 
the propriety of a search or seizure, including a prohibition against nighttime 
                                                                                                                 
 
 445. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, app. A, at 524 (1850); see supra text 
accompanying note 118. 
 446. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, app. A, at 522 (1850). 
 447. Id. at 525 (emphasis omitted). 
 448. Id. 
 449. E.g., 1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 85 (1762) 
(asserting that an arrest must be based on “some probable ground”); 2 HALE, supra note 53, 
at 91–92 (stating that when the constable ascertained that a felony had been committed and 
he had “probable grounds” that a specific person was the perpetrator, the constable could 
arrest the suspect without a warrant); id. at 103 (observing that an arrest based on hue and 
cry permissible when probable cause to arrest present); accord Payton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 605 (1980) (White, J., dissenting); see also CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 413–14, 
423–27, 642–45, 754–58 (tracing numerous instances of the use of probable cause or 
individualized suspicion as a needed requirement to justify a search or seizure). 
 450. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418–19 (1976) (discussing 
“ancient” common law rule permitting arrests without warrant for misdemeanors and 
felonies committed in an officer’s presence and for felonies not in an officer’s presence for 
which there were reasonable grounds to arrest); see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 605 (1980) 
(White, J., dissenting); Samuel v. Payne, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B.) (recognizing as a 
defense to a false imprisonment claim, stemming from constable’s arrest of the plaintiff, the 
fact that the arrest was based on allegations that the plaintiff had stolen goods); 1 JAMES F. 
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 193 (1883) (referring to the level 
of suspicion as “reasonable grounds” that the person has committed a felony). Nonetheless, 
there were numerous examples of suspicionless searches and seizures throughout England 
and its American colonies. See, e.g., CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 486–97. 
 451. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: The Odds on Probable Cause, 74 
MISS. L.J. 279, 284 (2004) (“From its origins until the enactment of the Fourth Amendment, 
probable cause seems to have remained in a state of flux.”). 
 452. See CLANCY, supra note 24, § 11.3.2.1.1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of the meaning of probable cause). Others claim that, although probable cause was a 
requirement of legal doctrine, “judges in the Framers’ era did not widely engage in 
aggressive sentryship of probable cause.” Arcila, supra note 32, at 4–5. Such claims, 
however, do not undermine the existence of the standard. 
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searches;453 a requirement to knock and announce for execution of a warrant at a 
home;454 and a distinction between arrests in a house and in public.455 In contrast, 
the writs of assistance were seen as deficient because, inter alia, they existed for an 
unlimited length of time, they were not returnable, no oath was required for one to 
issue, and no grounds were need to justify the request. The era was characterized by 
repeatedly expressed concerns about the scope of searches and seizures and the 
need to limit an officer’s discretion. Illustrative are the views expressed about the 
seizure of all of Entick’s, Wilkes’s, and Leach’s papers, and Adams’s recollection 
of Otis noting the scope of searches under writs of assistance as “[h]ouses were to 
be broken open, and if a piece of Dutch linen could be found, from the cellar to the 
cock-loft, it was to be seized and become the prey of governors, informers, and 
majesty.”456  
Certain objects valued. Houses were universally acknowledged as a man’s 
castle.457 Indeed, the physical entry into the home has been described as the “chief 
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .”458 
Camden in Entick emphasized the importance of a person’s private papers. The 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, followed by Adams’s Article 14, which was 
only slightly modified in the Fourth Amendment, gave a list of four protected 
objects: persons, houses, papers, and effects. Variations of this list appeared to be 
common in that era, stemming from Blackstone’s Commentaries, where he stated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 453. See CLANCY, supra note 24, § 12.5.3 (analyzing legal status of nighttime execution 
of warrants under Fourth Amendment); CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 747–48 (providing an 
overview of the legality of nocturnal searches); QUINCY, supra note 83, app. I at 450 
(discussing how writs of assistance for customs searches were modified in 1768 to authorize 
day time only execution); id. at 448 (discussing how, in 1766, custom searchers withdrew 
from Daniel Malcomb’s residence to avoid entering at night, recognizing that the writ would 
not justify a nighttime entry). 
 454. See CLANCY, supra note 24, § 12.5.4 (analyzing legal status of knock and announce 
requirement under Fourth Amendment); CUDDIHY, supra note 15, at 749–50 (providing 
historical analysis of unannounced searches of the home). 
 455. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 592–98 (discussing the common law views of the 
requirement of a warrant to arrest in-house); Watson, 423 U.S. at 418–19 (discussing 
“ancient” common law rule permitting arrests without warrant for misdemeanors and 
felonies committed in an officer’s presence and for felonies not in an officer’s presence for 
which there were reasonable grounds to arrest). 
 456. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 319. 
 457. The Supreme Court has been quite insistent in affording special protection for the 
home. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (collecting cases and 
emphasizing “‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion’” as being at the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment 
protections (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001))). That special protection 
has carried forward the framing era consensus. E.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
390 (1914) (“Resistance to these practices had established the principle which was enacted 
into the fundamental law in the 4th Amendment, that a man’s house was his castle, and not 
to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.”); Osmond 
K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 365 (1921) (opining 
that it was “apparent” that the Fourth Amendment embodied the principle in English liberty 
that found “expression in the maxim ‘every man’s home is his castle’”). 
 458. E.g., United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
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that the rights of Englishmen are primarily “the free enjoyment of personal 
security, of personal liberty, and of private property.”459 It is notable that the 
Supreme Court has similarly construed the Fourth Amendment as protecting three 
interests: “two kinds of expectations” in property, one involving searches and the 
other involving seizures; a search occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy 
is infringed; a seizure occurs when there was some “meaningful interference” with 
an individual's possessory interest; the third interest that the Fourth Amendment 
protects is a person’s “liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary” unimpeded 
by the government.460 Similarly, Justice Story, in his famous commentaries 
observed that the Fourth Amendment “seems indispensible to the full enjoyment of 
the rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”461 
Certain qualities in those objects valued: the right to be secure. Adams and his 
contemporaries repeatedly used the concept of “security” to describe the quality of 
the right protected as to each person’s life, liberty, and property.462 Otis, in the 
article attributed to him, argued that the writs of assistance made “every 
householder . . . less secure.”463 Recalling Otis’s argument many years later, 
Adams said in a letter to William Tudor that Otis examined the acts of trade and 
demonstrated that “they destroyed all our security of property, liberty, and life.”464 
After complaining of the seizure of all his papers under a general warrant and 
receiving the reply from the authorities that such papers that did not prove his guilt 
for seditious libel would be returned, Wilkes countered: “I fear neither your 
prosecution nor your persecution, and will assert the security of my own house, the 
liberty of my person, and every right of the people, not so much for my own sake, 
as for the sake of every one of my English fellow subjects.”465 That same 
concept—security—was utilized by Adams in Article 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and is replicated in the Fourth Amendment. More broadly, 
the concept of security, in contradistinction to the modern notion of privacy, was 
repeatedly referenced in the framing era as defining the nature of the right that was 
to be protected in each of the objects ultimately listed in the amendment.466 
                                                                                                                 
 
 459. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 197, at *143; see also id. at *129 (stating that the three 
rights are: “the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty and the right of private 
property”). For representative references to Blackstone’s list, see James Otis, A VINDICATION 
of the British Colonies Against the Aspirations of Halifax Gentleman, in His Letter to a 
Rhode Island Friend (1765), reprinted in 1 PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 
supra note 110, at 558 (“The absolute liberties of Englishmen, as frequently declared in 
Parliament, are principally three: the right of personal security, personal liberty, and private 
property.” (emphasis in original)); Article in the New York Journal (Jan. 23, 1788), 
reprinted in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 237, at 643 (John P. Kaminski & 
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2004). 
 460. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 63 & n.8 (1992). 
 461. 3 STORY, supra note 442, § 1895, at 748. 
 462. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 86, at 315–16. 
 463. QUINCY, supra note 83, app. I at 489 (emphasis in original). 
 464. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (June 1, 1818), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 7, at 314, 316 (1856).  
 465. PETER D.G. THOMAS, JOHN WILKES: A FRIEND TO LIBERTY 32 (1996) (citation 
omitted).  
 466. For a general discussion of the origin and meaning of the word “secure,” see 
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CONCLUSION 
Knowledge of the past is always incomplete. Nonetheless, lawyers are taught 
about the need to make inferences and to draw conclusions from incomplete sets of 
facts. Thus, for example, it is disappointing that Adams never commented 
specifically on the structure and meaning of Article 14. It is also disappointing and 
puzzling that no one ever stated that the Fourth Amendment’s first clause was 
designed to broadly regulate all types of governmental searches and seizures or that 
no one ever rejected that view and said that the amendment was designed to address 
only general warrants. Instead, one must draw the conclusions that appear the most 
sound, based on what is known. In this regard, John Adams offered some advice: 
In unforeseen cases, that is, when the state of things is found such as 
the author of the disposition has not foreseen, and could not have 
thought of, we should rather follow his intention than his words, and 
interpret the act as he himself would have interpreted it, had he been 
present, or conformably to what he would have done if he had foreseen 
the things that happened. This rule is of great use to Judges.467 
It demeans him and fails to acknowledge the depth of his learning, experience, and 
knowledge of search and seizure principles to say that Adams had no concept of 
reasonableness, that he had no criteria by which to measure it, and that, in drafting 
Article 14, his carefully crafted language reflected solely a concern with general 
warrants. Linguistically, it does not and the historical record belies such claims. 
Indeed, the record demonstrates that Adams had experiences examining a rich 
variety of proper search and seizure practices. He was concerned with criteria and 
he articulated that criteria: a suspicion-based regime; limitations on the scope of 
warrants; and standards for warrants to issue. Obviously drawing from the 1776 
Pennsylvania Constitution, Adams identified four objects as protected: people, 
houses, papers, and possessions. He defined the quality of the right to be protected 
in those objects as the right to be “secure.” He limited those protections to be 
against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. 
The men more directly involved in the drafting of the Fourth Amendment were 
strongly influenced by the Massachusetts model. During the crucial period from 
1787 to 1789, when the various state conventions debated the need for a search and 
seizure provision, there were two models: the model prohibiting general warrants 
and Article 14. Virginia, taking the lead, chose the Massachusetts model, as did 
New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. None chose the general warrant 
model, even though it had been the prevalent one in state constitutions. Madison, in 
his draft, conflated the two models. The House of Representatives, however, 
recognized that Madison’s draft was inadequate and changed the Fourth 
Amendment to closely resemble the structure of Article 14.  
Even if one rejects my view as to the strong historical links between Adams, 
Article 14, and the Fourth Amendment, thus discounting the importance of 
Adams’s views and role, there remains abundant evidence that the framers were 
                                                                                                                 
CLANCY, supra note 24, § 3.1; Clancy, supra note 182.  
 467. Journal Entry of John Adams (Dec. 27, 1765), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, 
supra note 7, at 166 (1850) (citations omitted). 
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concerned with more than general warrants. It is neither historically accurate to say 
that the Reasonableness Clause had no meaning to the framers nor that the 
amendment was designed solely to ban general warrants. During the 1761 to 1791 
time period, there was a vibrant jurisprudence seeking to establish the primacy of 
objective criteria to measure the legitimacy—that is, the reasonableness—of 
governmental searches and seizures. Admittedly, discussion about the details of a 
desirable search and seizure provision was sparse. Yet, the comments that are 
extant show a wide range of search and seizure issues on the minds of the people. 
Clearly, there were concerns about general warrants but there were many other 
comments about broader issues: worry about unreasonable searches and seizures; 
about the unlimited power of new officers (particularly excise officers); about 
nighttime entries; and about protection of the home. Looking even more widely, the 
treatise writers of the era offered detailed criteria for measuring the propriety of 
searches and seizures. Adams and others utilized those treatises and common law 
cases to argue for the primacy of measurable criteria: no nighttime searches; a need 
to knock and announce before entering; and probable cause to justify a seizure, 
among other criteria. Although Adams and our other forefathers struggled to 
establish exactly what the proper standards were, objective criteria to measure the 
propriety of a search and seizure that persisted from case to case was the goal. 
As Adams teaches us, the modern era is not freed from making important 
decisions about the content of the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” command 
by simply examining the past and seeking exact answers. Instead, we are informed 
by the framers’ understanding that search and seizure principles were evolving and 
complex, as they are now. Yet, in that era there was a quest to identify objective 
criteria outside the control of the government that served to measure the propriety 
of a search or seizure to insure that each person would be “secure.” It is that 
methodology that should inform us today as to how to measure reasonableness.  
  

